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Abstract 
This thesis examines the moderating effect of dispositional reinvestment 
upon ‘choking’ in cognitive based tasks such as decision-making. Study 1 tested 
sixty-three participants’ performances on low- and high-complexity tests of motor 
skill, psychomotor skill and working memory under low- and high-pressure 
conditions. The association between reinvestment and choking was shown to extend 
beyond the motor skill domain to cognitive tasks, particularly those that tax working 
memory, with task complexity moderating this relationship. Next, a psychometric 
scale to identify individuals more susceptible to impaired decision-making under 
pressure was developed. A 13-item decision-specific version of the Reinvestment 
Scale (Masters, Polman, & Hammond, 1993) measuring an individual’s propensity 
to engage in conscious control and manifestations of ruminative thoughts emerged 
following factor analysis. Initial assessment of the scale’s predictive validity showed 
scores were highly correlated with coaches’ ratings of players’ tendency to choke. 
The final two studies examined choking using sport specific decision-making tasks. 
Initial findings were inconclusive, as choking was not observed. It was suggested the 
task lacked the sufficient cognitive demands to induce reinvestment. The last study, 
manipulating task complexity, found dispositional reinvestment to be associated 
with choking in the high complexity condition. The Decision-Specific Reinvestment 
Scale was also shown to be a better predictor of choking than the original scale. 
Overall, support was found for the hypothesis that Reinvestment is detrimental to 
performance under pressure in cognitive based tasks; however may not be the sole 
cause of disrupted performance. Masters and Maxwell’s (2004) concept of a 
working memory based explanation and Mullen and Hardy (2000) attentional 
threshold hypothesis offer a potential explanation to the findings. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Study Context 
Today’s modern athlete is undoubtedly better rewarded than those of 
yesteryear. Greater, wages, bonuses, prize money and sponsorship deals have 
resulted in the earning potential of many elite athletes reaching heights that are 
unfathomable to those who passionately follow their exploits. However, with such 
rewards available and a concomitant increase in intense media scrutiny, participation 
is often accompanied by huge psychological pressure stemming from the need to 
succeed. Indeed, instances of unexpected failure at crucial points often provide the 
media with a bigger story than those of success. The phenomenon of “choking” in 
sport is one that has interested the media and researchers for decades. Broadly 
defined as the occurrence of poor performance in spite of high motivation and 
incentives for success (Baumeister, 1984), choking in a sporting context has 
predominantly been examined using proceduralised motor skills (Jackson, Ashford 
& Norsworthy, 2006; Masters, 1992; Masters, Polman & Hammond 1993). Media 
representations of choking also commonly report on the breakdown of motor skills. 
Some of the most commonly referenced examples of choking refer to the 
performances of Greg Norman and Jana Novotna. Norman will forever be 
remembered for giving up a six-stroke lead in the final round of the 1996 U.S. 
Masters golf tournament, eventually losing to Nick Faldo by five strokes following a 
round of 78. This was some fifteen shots more than his course record equalling score 
of 63 set just three days before. Jana Novotna’s display in 1993 was arguably the 
greatest disintegration ever witnessed in a Wimbledon final. Serving at 40-30 with a 
4-1 lead in the deciding set, Novotna’s double-fault initiated a complete capitulation 
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in performance to the extent that Steffi Graf was being crowned champion just over 
10 minutes later.  
It is not only motor skills that can suffer as a result of increased pressure, the 
failure to make the correct decision under pressure can be equally detrimental to 
success. At the 1999 Open Championship at Carnoustie, golfer Jean Van de Velde 
only needed a double-bogey six on the final hole to win the tournament. Despite a 
three-shot lead, he decided to use his driver off the tee, and proceeded to drive the 
ball to the right of the burn, luckily finding land. Even more crucially, he then 
decided to go for the green with his second shot rather than what appeared to be the 
safer option of ‘laying up’. His second shot drifted right and hit the grandstands on 
the side of the green, bounced off a rock and landed fifty yards back in knee deep 
rough. Hacking through the rough, his third shot flew into the Barry Burn and after a 
lengthy debate, and quick paddle in the water, he took a drop only to find the 
greenside bunker with his fifth shot. After firing to six feet from the hole, Van de 
Velde putted for a triple-bogey seven, dropping him into a three-way playoff, which 
he eventually lost to Paul Lawrie.  
In a more time-constrained environment, Formula One racing driver Lewis 
Hamilton’s recent performances provide further illustrations of poor decision 
making. With six races remaining Lewis Hamilton led the Formula One 
championship by three points over Mark Webber whilst holding a 41 point 
advantage over Fernando Alonso. Two races later and Hamilton fell to third place, 
20 points behind championship leader Webber and even trailing Alonso by nine 
points, courtesy of two key decisions that have severely damaged his title 
aspirations. At Monza, Hamilton's hopes of defending his championship lead ended 
at the second chicane on the first lap as he was trying to take advantage of a battle 
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between the two Ferrari drivers. Hamilton decided to try and pass Massa on the 
inside but collided with Massa’s rear wheel which in turn broke the suspension of 
Hamilton's car. Reflecting on the incident Hamilton said "In a realistic world I 
perhaps should've stayed there a while. I put my car up the inside and tried to get 
third - it was obviously a little bit too much.” Two weeks later in Singapore 
Hamilton found himself directly behind his rival Webber with Alonso leading. 
Hamilton decided to try to overtake the Australian after a restart by passing him on 
the outside, the two collided and Hamilton's race was over, and with it his title 
aspirations. Akin to Hamilton’s maiden season (where he was championship 
favourite until errors in the final two rounds cost him the title to Kimi Raikkonen), 
he lost the championship to Sebastian Vettel, finally finishing in fourth place behind 
Fernando Alonso and Mark Webber; thus illustrating the consequences of poor 
decision-making in high pressure situations. 
Research exploring the underlying processes that govern the choking 
phenomenon in motor skills has often been conducted through self-focus theories, 
which suggest that performance pressure increases self-awareness about performing 
correctly causing individuals to attempt to consciously control normally automatic 
processes and behaviors. The most prominent of these is reinvestment theory 
(Masters, 1992) which has also been examined from an individual differences 
perspective (Masters, Polman, & Hammond, 1993). While there have been no 
investigations specifically measuring cognitive skill failure in sport, explanations of 
skill failure under pressure in cognitive-based tasks such as mathematical solutions 
have tended to focus on distraction-based theories, which suggest that increases in 
performance pressure provoke a shift in focus of attention to task-irrelevant cues 
(DeCaro, Rotar, Kendra, & Beilock, 2010). The current thesis aims to examine the 
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applicability of reinvestment theory when examining choking in the more cognitive 
elements of sports performance, particularly in relation to decision making. In 
addition, it aims to develop and validate a psychometric instrument that can identify 
individuals with a greater predisposition to making poor decisions under pressure. 
1.2 Thesis Overview 
The current introduction is followed by a review of the extant literature, 
which introduces the theoretical concepts and offers critical appraisal of the 
empirical research that underpins the current line of investigation. Drawing from 
research in social and cognitive psychology, it develops a thorough and detailed 
account of the research topic housed in a sport psychology context. Chapters 3 to 6 
focus on the four studies that comprise the research programme. These chapters are 
presented independently as ‘stand-alone papers’ but are interrelated and examine 
specific hypotheses in order to contribute to the existing body of knowledge, 
developing areas that currently lack depth and clarity in understanding. First, 
Chapter 3 examines the moderating effect of dispositional reinvestment on choking 
in motor and cognitive tasks. Chapter 4 is focused on the development of a 
psychometric instrument, based on the Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993), 
which aims to highlight individual differences in the propensity for engaging in 
conscious control and ruminative behaviors with respect to decision making. In 
Chapter 5, a study is presented that examines susceptibility to choking in a 
badminton perceptual judgment task that requires rapid decisions to be made 
regarding the intentions of an opponent. Additionally, the predictive validity of the 
Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale and original Reinvestment Scale are 
compared. After failing to find evidence of choking in the badminton judgment task, 
Chapter 6 focuses on the issue of task complexity by examining decision making in 
5 
a team sport (basketball) using 3-on-3 and 5-on-5 offensive plays. Again, the 
predictive validity of the Decision-Specific and original Reinvestment Scales are 
scrutinized.  
The four experimental chapters are written as standalone papers and due to 
the common themes that run through the thesis, there is inevitably some repetition of 
literature-based information. Also, when referring to Experiment 1 and 2 later in the 
thesis, the published versions of these experiments are cited (Kinrade, Jackson & 
Ashford, 2010; and Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford & Bishop, 2010, respectively). 
Finally, Chapter 7 contains a general discussion which summarizes the key findings 
from the experimental work presented, highlights the emergent themes and discusses 
the practical implications stemming from the research. The chapter concludes with 
consideration of possible limitations with the research presented herein, and 
highlights possible directions for future investigation. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The following review of literature provides the theoretical backdrop in which 
the current line of investigation was undertaken. It is structured to enable the reader 
to familiarize themselves with the body of knowledge pertaining to the research 
topic by examining operational definitions, conceptual models and theoretical 
explanations that have been derived from the plethora of empirical research over the 
last few decades. This aims to provide the reader with the necessary grounding with 
which to appraise the concepts examined in the following four chapters. Each of 
these research chapters contains its own brief introduction and rationale pertaining to 
its specific area of investigation. 
The present chapter will begin by offering a clear definition to the central 
theme of the current research, choking, followed by an insight into the hypothesized 
causes. The main body of the review is concerned with the proposed processes that 
underpin this phenomenon; specifically, distraction and reinvestment accounts of 
choking. Following this, evidence for mediating factors associated with choking will 
be addressed. Finally, the concept of decision-making in sport will be discussed, and 
conclusions drawn that lead into the rationale for the present programme of research. 
2.2 Defining Choking 
The concept of choking was initially defined by Daniel (1981) as “the 
inability to perform up to previously exhibited standards” (p. 70). However, this 
vague description of the phenomenon mirrors its colloquial use in the media. The 
term choking is often used in the media to describe just about any sub-optimal sports 
performance. Terms such as “choker” or, more derisively, “choke artist” are 
commonly used to describe individuals or even teams who fail to win a game or 
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tournament after being strongly favored to do so. The issue with such a broad 
definition is that it fails to take into account external variables such as the 
opposition, motivation and the random variation of such instances occurring. A 
desire to achieve is vital for optimal performance and random fluctuations of skill 
happen to all athletes at some point during their careers. Baumeister’s (1984) 
definition of choking under pressure defined the phenomenon as “performance 
decrements under circumstances that increase the importance of good or improved 
performance” and highlighted that pressure described “any factor or combination of 
factors that increases the importance of performing well” (p. 610). Closer inspection 
of each definition highlights inclusion of the term pressure as superfluous 
considering the latter half of the definition for choking, however Baumeister’s 
definition certainly improved on the early description by Daniel (1981). Similarly, 
Baumeister and Showers (1986) referred to the term “paradoxical performance 
effect” that they further defined as “the occurrence of inferior performance despite 
striving and incentives for superior performance” (p. 361).  
These definitions both address shortcomings of the early definition by 
encapsulating two vital elements: poorer performance and situational incentives. 
However, issues are still inherent in that inferior performance in the above situation 
could still occur as a result of an injury or adverse weather conditions. Indeed, Leith 
(1988) conceptualised the phenomenon by describing three different types of 
performance the term choking should be used to describe, citing perfect performance 
in practice accompanied with poor performance in game situations, successful 
performance in all games except the most important game and acute skill failure at 
clutch moments despite optimal performance throughout the rest of the game. 
Beilock and Gray (2007) looked to focus the definition by describing choking as 
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“poor performance in response to what an individual perceives as an important and 
stress filled situation” (p. 426). Despite greater specificity, Gucciardi and Dimmock 
(2008) still draw criticism due to the lack of quantification applied to the term sub-
optimal performance, suggesting that the choke only applies to a significant 
deterioration in performance rather than any poorer performance under pressure. The 
most recent definition comes from Hill, Hanton, Fleming and Mathews (2009) who 
drew on other research supporting the need to make reference to the acute nature of 
the phenomena (e.g., Clark, Tofler, & Lardon, 2005; Wilson, Chattington, Marple-
Horvat & Smith, 2007). Using a grounded theory approach, analysis of qualitative 
data taken from interviews with four “experts” of applied sport psychology resulted 
in choking being defined as “a stress response that concludes with a significant drop 
in performance” (p. 203).  
 Baumeister and Showers (1986) well supported definition of choking was 
chosen to describe the concept in experimental chapters 3-6. However, when 
defining the phenomenon in regards to the current line of investigation presented 
within the thesis as a whole, the commonly associated link between anxiety and 
pressure (see Section 2.3.1) was also considered. Therefore, choking may be defined 
as a pressure induced deterioration in performance, often but not exclusively 
accompanied by feelings of increased anxiety, exhibited during situations where the 
performer is motivated and expected to succeed.  
2.3 Theoretical Explanations 
Despite the continued debate and lack of clarity concerning a widely 
accepted definition of choking, several theories have been proposed which attempt 
to explicate the mechanisms underpinning the phenomenon. The hypothesized 
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theoretical explanations which aim to give a clearer picture of the choking processes 
can broadly be divided into two categories: drive theories or attentional theories. 
2.3.1 Arousal Theories. General Arousal theories propose that performance 
is affected by an individual’s current level of arousal or drive (Spence & Spence, 
1966). Arousal is the intensity dimension of behavior, the general state of activation 
ranging on a continuum from deep sleep to extreme excitement (Gill, 2000). It is 
said to be a multi-dimensional construct, encompassing both physiological and 
psychological elements (Gould, Greenleaf & Krane, 2002). However, specific 
details regarding the precise way arousal affects performance have been subject to 
much debate. Hull’s (1943) drive theory proposed a linear relationship between 
arousal and performance (See Figure 2.1) that suggests as arousal increases so does 
quality of performance. This theory however, has come under much criticism 
(Fisher, 1976; Martens & Landers, 1970) being considered too simplistic to explain 
athletic performance and fails to account for any performance decrements under 
pressure. 
 
Figure 2.1. Hull's (1943) proposed drive theory. 
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Yerkes and Dodson’s (1908) inverted-U hypothesis suggests a curvilinear 
relationship, suggesting that as arousal increases so does performance until reaching 
an optimal point whereby any further rise in arousal levels leads to a decrement in 
performance (see Figure 2.2). Essentially, arousal must be at an intermediate level, 
too much or too little arousal will result in sub-optimal performance. Despite 
empirical evidence supporting this theory (Klavora, 1977; Sonstroem & Bernado, 
1982), it too, has come under criticism regarding the shape of the curve, lack of 
consideration of the multidimensional nature of arousal, and failure to distinguish 
between individual differences when performing the same skill (Neiss, 1988). 
 
Figure 2.2. The Inverted-U hypothesis (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). 
 
Hanin (1989) moved away from the broader description of arousal focusing 
on the role of anxiety and performance under pressure. Anxiety has been defined as 
“a negative emotional state characterised by nervousness, worry, and apprehension 
and is associated with activation or arousal of the body” (Weinberg & Gould, 1999, 
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p. 72). Individual zones of optimal functioning theory suggests there is a bandwidth, 
rather than specific point, at which optimal performance can be attained and that this 
zone is specific to the individual. While this theory has received some support 
(Raglin & Turner, 1993; Randle & Weinberg, 1997) it considers anxiety as a 
unidimensional concept and fails to fully explain the interaction of individual 
differences variables (Gould & Tuffey, 1996). 
Martens, Vealey and Burton, (1990) conceptualized anxiety as consisting of 
a cognitive component identified by negative self evaluations or expectations and 
worry, and a somatic component recognized by the perception of physiological 
manifestations of stress, and can occur chronically (trait) or acutely (state). They 
originally hypothesized that the two components would have differing relationships 
with performance, suggesting a negative linear relationship with cognitive anxiety, 
while somatic anxiety displayed an inverted-U relationship. Subsequent support for 
this theory has been rather ambiguous with several authors attributing observed 
differences to other factors including skill level (Martens, Vealey, Burton, Bump & 
Smith, 1990), and competitiveness (Swain & Jones, 1992). Additionally, the theory 
fails to consider the interaction between the multi-dimensional components, rather 
examining them as independent relationships (Woodman & Hardy, 2001). 
To address the issues raised with the multidimensional theory of anxiety 
Hardy (1990) adapted the cusp catastrophe model to provide a three dimensional 
illustration of the anxiety-performance relationship. The model (Figure 2.3) 
demonstrates how, at high levels of cognitive anxiety, performance and 
physiological arousal share a positive curvilinear relationship up to a point. Beyond 
this point, even small increases in physiological arousal can result in a dramatic 
plunge in performance as opposed to the more steady decline predicted by the 
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inverted-U hypothesis. Catastrophe theory also predicts that recovering from such 
sudden declines in performance can be difficult. A major strength of catastrophe 
theory is that it considers the interaction between cognitive anxiety and 
physiological arousal in determining performance. As with previous theoretical 
explanations this theory has received support (e.g. Hardy, Parfitt & Pates, 1994) and 
criticism (see Tenenbaum & Becker, 2005) with Hill, Hanton, Mathews and Fleming 
(2010) concluding that further research is required to establish this theory as an 
explanation for choking. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. The Cusp Catastrophe Model (Hardy, 1990). 
 
It should be noted that although arousal-based theories provide a useful 
explanation for some types of performance failure they suffer from three major 
limitations. First, they are descriptive, giving little insight into the mechanisms that 
cause the performance failure. Second, there is conflict within the theories as to how 
arousal should be conceptualised; and finally, they fail to account for a number of 
situations where performance failure is observed (Beilock & Gray, 2007). One such 
theory that looked to apply a mechanistic explanation to the inverted-U hypothesis is 
Easterbrook’s (1959) cue utilization hypothesis, which suggest that increases in 
anxiety results in attentional narrowing. At low levels this narrowing aids 
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performance by filtering out task irrelevant cues. However, high levels of arousal 
causes attention to narrow beyond optimum levels resulting in task relevant 
information being rejected and thus performance deteriorates. 
2.3.2 Attentional Theories. Considering the aforementioned limitations of 
arousal-based theories, attentional theories offer an attempt to describe the processes 
underlying choking (Hill et al., 2010). Attentional theories aim to describe how the 
attentional mechanisms and memory structures are influenced by pressure and the 
subsequent impact these changes have upon performance (Beilock & Gray, 2007). 
They can be divided into two main theoretical frameworks; distraction and self-
focus accounts, which draw evidence from differing backgrounds in order to explain 
choking. 
2.3.2.1 Distraction Theory. Distraction-based accounts of choking view skill 
failure as a consequence of overloaded working memory. Working memory 
described as the “desktop of the brain” (Logie, 1999, p. 174) encompasses a 
compilation of distinct systems involved in cognitive functioning. Baddeley and 
Hitch’s (1974) model of working memory describes three main components, the key 
contrivance being the central executive, which processes, stores and regulates the 
flow of information, retrieves information from alternative memory systems (e.g. 
long term memory) and co-ordinates its slave systems the visuo-spatial sketchpad 
and phonological loop (Baddeley, 1992). The former is concerned with the 
manipulation of material of a visual or spatial nature, while the latter provides 
temporary storage and manipulation of auditory verbal material (Logie, 1999). 
Baddeley (2000) has since added a fourth component, the episodic buffer. This third 
slave system of the central executive is responsible for linking information across 
domains to form integrated units of visual, spatial, temporal and verbal information. 
14 
Distraction theories propose that pressure creates a distracting environment by 
shifting attention towards task-irrelevant cues such as worries regarding the situation 
and importance of the outcome. These distracting cognitions consume working 
memory that is vital for holding, manipulating and processing task-relevant 
information necessary for successful performance. As a result, these competing 
demands create a dual-task environment that requires the individual to perform the 
task at hand while dealing with apprehension and manifested worry (Beilock & 
Gray, 2007). Support for this theory largely emanates from investigations utilising 
cognitive tasks that rely on working memory, such as complex math tasks (Ashcraft 
& Kirk, 2001). Beilock, Kulp, Holt, and Carr (2004), assessed individuals’ 
performance on high- and low-complexity modular arithmetic tasks (Gauss, 1801) 
under conditions of low and high pressure. They found that only performance on the 
high-complexity modular arithmetic task deteriorated under pressure supporting the 
hypothesis that pressure reduced working memory capacity resulting in performance 
decrements on tasks that are more reliant upon working memory. Although not 
specifically examining performance under pressure, Beilock, Rydell, and McConnell 
(2007) examined this hypothesis using a different type of stress, negative 
performance stereotypes. Analyses revealed that women under stereotypical threat 
performed more poorly than controls (no negative stereotype) on problems heavily 
reliant working memory only. Beilock and Carr (2005) examined working memory 
from an individual differences perspective suggesting that the more working 
memory capacity an individual has, the better their performance on academic tasks 
(Engle, 2002). To explore how high-pressure situations influenced this assumption, 
individuals lower and higher in working memory were examined using the same 
experimental design highlighted in Beilock et al. (2004) and Beilock and Carr 
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(2005). It was found that only higher working memory individuals suffered 
performance decrements under pressure. In a follow-up study, Beilock and DeCaro 
(2007) examined the solution strategies used by each group. Again, using a similar 
experimental design they discovered that the high working memory group used more 
computationally demanding algorithms than the low working memory group in the 
low-pressure condition. Furthermore, under high pressure the high working memory 
group reverted to using the simpler solution strategies used by the low working 
memory group, and their performance duly suffered.  
Similar to Beilock and colleagues’ descriptions of distraction based accounts 
of choking; Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency theory examines the 
influence of cognitive anxiety, manifested as worry, on performance. The theory 
postulates that anxiety has two main effects. First, working memory’s storage and 
processing resources are occupied by worry, producing performance decrements in 
cognitively demanding tasks. Second, anticipation of imminent skill failure results in 
additional processing resources (i.e., mental effort) being allocated in order to 
maintain performance (Wilson, 2008). Consequently, processing efficiency theory 
postulates that performance effectiveness is often less affected than processing 
efficiency due to increases in effort compensating for the depletion of attentional 
resources (Calvo, 1985). Furthermore, Eysenck and Calvo (1992) account for 
individual differences in the intensity of such responses to pressure, hypothesizing 
that individuals with high trait anxiety will be more likely to exhibit such responses 
compared to low-trait anxious individuals. Research evidence supports this 
prediction and indicates that there are fundamental differences between such 
individuals (Jerusalem, 1990). Moreover, an impressive body of research from 
within the mainstream cognitive psychology literature (e.g. Eysenck, 1996; Eysenck, 
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Payne, & Derakshan, 2005) and a number of sport settings (e.g. Murray & Janelle, 
2003; Williams, Vickers, & Rodrigues, 2002) has provided support for the 
predictions of processing efficiency theory (see Wilson, 2008, for a review). More 
recently, Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo (2007) proposed an alternative 
attentional control theory to provide a more precise explanation regarding the 
specific functions responsible for skill failure under pressure. They suggest that 
anxiety disrupts the balance between two attentional systems (Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002). More specifically, they propose the efficiency of the goal driven attentional 
system is impaired leading to a greater influence of the stimulus driven attentional 
system resulting in reduced attentional control and impaired functioning of 
‘inhibition’ and ‘shifting’ functions of the central executive. These functions refer to 
the ability to suppress prepotent responses (inhibition) and the ability to switch back 
and forth between multiple tasks, operations or mental sets (Miyake et al., 2000). 
While addressing some of the limitations of processing efficiency theory in terms of 
its lack of precision or explanatory power theoretically, much more empirical 
research is required to test the predictions of Attentional Control Theory (Wilson, 
2008). 
2.3.2.2 Self-Focus Theory. The other class of attentional theory used to 
describe the processes underpinning choking is self-focus theory. The essence of this 
theory lies in the assumption that pressure increases anxiety which has been shown 
to lead to self-focus (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1978), and that self-focus can lead to 
skill failure through attempts to apply conscious thought to automatic movements. 
Baumeister (1984) described the process thus;  
“under pressure a person realises consciously that it is important to execute 
the behaviour correctly. Consciousness attempts to ensure the correctness of 
this execution by monitoring the process of performance (e.g. the co-
ordination and precision of muscle movements) but consciousness does not 
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contain the knowledge of these skills, so that ironically reduces the reliability 
and success of the performance when it attempts to control it.” (p.610). 
 
Central to this assumption is Fitts and Posner’s (1967) progression–
regression hypothesis which discusses the influence of processing changes as a 
result of the transition though the stages of skill acquisition. Here, novice 
performance is described as relying on the processing of explicit rule-based 
declarative knowledge for skill execution. Researchers have suggested that during 
the initial cognitive stage of learning, skill execution involves assistance from a 
collection of unintegrated control structures held in working memory that control 
performance in a step-by-step manner (Anderson, 1982; Fitts & Posner, 1967). As a 
result, spare processing capacity is considerably reduced and unavailable for 
interpreting and processing external stimuli yielding slow and errorful performance. 
Following prolonged practice, skills become more automated and function through 
the processing of implicit procedural knowledge. Such skills do not require online 
processing as they are executed outside of working memory, thus enabling sufficient 
attentional resources to process extraneous information (Fitts & Posner, 1967). 
However, it is claimed that under pressure individuals experience increased self-
consciousness which causes individuals to regress back to inefficient processing of 
explicit information similar to that observed in novice performers. Support for this 
theory comes from a number of studies in the implicit learning literature, which have 
shown that providing participants with explicit information can actually degrade 
performance in comparison to those who learned implicitly (Berry & Broadbent, 
1988; Green & Flowers, 1991; Reber, 1976; Reber, Kassin, Lewis & Cantor, 1980).  
Support for a self-focus theory of choking has come from a number of 
studies examining the effect of attentional focus on performance, many of which do 
18 
not directly examine pressure per se, but instead look to replicate the attentional 
demands that pressure might induce (Beilock & Gray, 2007). Beilock, Carr, 
MacMahon, and Starkes (2002) performed two studies in which they manipulated 
the attentional focus of experienced golfers by performing one of two types of dual 
task to either direct attention towards or away from movement execution. The skill 
focus manipulation required golfers to say ‘stop’ at the completion of their putting 
swing while the distracting secondary task required them to say ‘tone’ when they 
heard a target sound. They found putting performance was worse in the ‘skill-
focused’ condition compared to both single-task and distracting dual-task conditions. 
A similar experimental design was then used to test the original hypothesis in 
experienced footballers. Here, the same secondary auditory monitoring task was 
used to distract attention away from execution and the skill-focused task required 
individuals to monitor the side of the foot that most recently contacted the ball. 
Again, performing in a distracting dual-task did not harm the dribbling skill of 
experienced soccer players in comparison to a single-task practice condition used as 
a baseline. However, the skill focused dual-task caused deterioration in dribbling 
skill compared to both the dual-task condition and a single-task baseline.  
Gray (2004) directly investigated the effects of performance pressure on 
batting performance in highly skilled baseball players by comparing batting 
performance between pressure and control groups. Participants in the pressure group 
were required to perform a second set of trials under the proviso that they and a 
designated partner were to gain a monetary incentive based on them improving their 
performance. Control participants were given no further instruction during the 
second set of trials. Batters in the pressure group exhibited clear choking effects 
making significantly more temporal batting errors following the pressure 
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manipulation than their baseline performance compared to a control group who 
showed no significant differences between mean temporal errors in the two blocks of 
trials. To investigate the role of attentional focus, a post test required participants to 
judge the direction their bat was moving at specified intervals. Gray found that only 
the participants in the pressure group showed a significant decrease in the percentage 
of judgment errors in this task in comparison to a pre-test used as a baseline. He 
concluded that the pressure caused an inward shift of attention to monitoring of 
swing execution therefore disrupting automated execution processes, resulting in 
poorer batting performance. Additional support for the role of attentional focus has 
also been observed using a manipulation that placed emphasis either on speed or 
accuracy of performance. Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy and Carr (2004) limited the 
opportunity for skill-focused, explicit monitoring by instructing experienced golfers 
to perform a putting task rapidly. They found the golfers’ performance improved in 
comparison with golfers who were instructed to take as much time as they needed to 
be accurate. Phenomenological reports indicated that golfers felt the speed 
instructions aided their performance by keeping them from thinking too much about 
execution.  
Wulf and colleagues have conducted extensive research over the past decade 
(see Wulf, 2007 for a review) that provides evidence that an external focus of 
attention (i.e., focus on the movement effect) is more effective than an internal focus 
(i.e., focus on the movements themselves). They proposed the constrained action 
hypothesis (Wulf, Shea, & Park, 2001) in which they suggest that an external focus 
allows unconscious, fast, and reflexive processes to control the movement. By 
contrast, an internal attentional focus is hypothesized to constrain the motor system 
by intervening in the processes that regulate the coordination of an individual’s 
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movements. Consequently, the automatic control processes that have the capacity to 
control movements effectively and efficiently are disrupted. Advantages of adopting 
an external focus, induced by instructions or feedback, have been observed in a 
variety of sports including skiing (Wulf, Hob & Prinz, 1998), golf (Wulf, 
Lauterbach, & Toole, 1999), basketball (Zachry, Wulf, Mercer, & Bezodis, 2005), 
American football (Zachry, 2005) and soccer (Wulf, McConnel, Gartner, & 
Schwarz, 2002), across different skill levels (Wulf & Prinz, 2001), and in different 
populations including Parkinson’s disease (Wulf, Landers, & Tollner, 2006, c.f. 
Wulf, 2007) and stroke patients (Fasoli, Trombly, Tickle-Degnen, & Verfaellie, 
2002). Despite the considerable support for self-focus theories Mullen (2007) 
highlighted important fundamental flaws that affect the interpretation of attentional 
focus research to date. The first concerns the lack of manipulation checks to examine 
adherence to the treatment conditions. This potential issue here is neatly illustrated 
by Maxwell and Masters (2002) who found from post-experiment interviews that 
several participants had discovered the advantages of adopting an external focus of 
attention during practice and switched away from their assigned strategy. Second, 
Mullen suggested that examining attentional focus in experts is problematic due to 
pre-existing automated performance routines; thus, if the routines commonly 
adopted by experts contrast with the treatment condition requirements it is doubtful 
they will be adhered to. 
2.4 Reinvestment Theory 
The disruption to skilled performance that occurs when attention is directed 
towards controlling one’s movements has been described in a variety of ways. 
Beilock and Carr (2001) looked to conceptualise this theory as the explicit 
monitoring hypothesis; however, use of this terminology has since received criticism 
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as it refers only to the monitoring of processes explicitly and not attempts to 
consciously control ones actions. Jackson, Ashford and Norsworthy (2006) 
speculated that 'explicit monitoring' of performance processes could take place 
without implicating 'conscious control' of them, in which case choking might not 
necessarily result from explicit monitoring (see also Masters & Maxwell, 2008). 
Furthermore, using explicit monitoring as an umbrella term for variants of self-focus 
theories is potentially misleading as a person could explicitly monitor the 
environment, a focus that is more aligned with distraction-based theories (Masters, 
Personal Communication, 2010).  
Fitts, Bahrick, Noble and Briggs (1961) presented the progression-regression 
hypothesis, wherein they suggested that learning involves a progression from simple 
to complex control strategies, and that, under pressure, people may regress to 
simpler levels of control. Masters (1992) referred to this process as reinvestment, 
borrowing terminology from Deikman’s (1969) concept of deautomatization in 
which he originally described the process of “reinvesting actions and percepts with 
attention” (p. 31). In discussing individual differences, Masters and Maxwell (2004) 
defined reinvestment as “the propensity for manipulation of conscious, explicit, rule 
based knowledge, by working memory, to control the mechanics of one’s 
movements during motor output” (p. 208). Masters (1992) tested his reinvestment 
theory by hypothesizing that individuals who learned a skill explicitly would be 
more likely to choke than those who learned the skill implicitly, because the latter 
would not possess the explicit knowledge with which to reinvest. In his study, 
participants were allocated to one of two groups: one group learned a golf-putting 
task explicitly, via an instruction manual, and the other practiced the skill whilst 
performing a secondary-task to discourage hypothesis-testing which would result in 
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explicit knowledge generation. The results revealed performance of the explicit 
learning group declined when participants were put under pressure, whilst 
performance of individuals using implicit techniques actually improved under stress. 
Masters concluded that implicit learners had no explicit-based rules to consciously 
draw from and so did not choke under pressure whereas the explicit learners tried to 
evoke control over their actions under pressure by applying their explicit knowledge 
and, so, choked.  
Unfortunately there are difficulties in the interpretation of Masters’ original 
findings owing to a methodological flaw. Hardy et al. (1996) and Bright and 
Freedman (1998) suggested that Masters’ significant findings may have been due to 
a release from the secondary task, used during the learning phase to prevent the 
acquisition of explicit rules, in the high-pressure trials. To test this hypothesis Hardy 
et al. replicated Masters’ (1992) protocol and added an implicit learning group that 
had to perform the dual-task during the stress trials. They hypothesised that only 
implicit learners without the secondary task would show performance improvements 
under pressure. However, both implicit learning groups showed performance 
increments during the stressed trials, thus supporting Masters’ reinvestment theory. 
However, Bright and Freedman (1998) performed a similar replication of Masters 
(1992) study and found contrasting results. They found that only the implicit group 
released from the secondary task in the stressed trials showed an improvement in 
performance. To support this they performed a follow up study manipulating the 
complexity level of the secondary task and showed the improvement was greater in 
those individuals who were released from a more complex dual-task. However, there 
were several critical differences in their replication of the Masters (1992) and Hardy 
et al. (1996) studies that cast doubt on their interpretations. In this type of 
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investigation there is a need for novice participants to eliminate the possibility of 
any residual explicit knowledge from previous experience. The criteria used by 
Bright and Freedman (1998) to screen participants for inclusion was inadequate as 
participants in the implicit groups may have been practicing with explicit knowledge 
previously acquired prior to the 12 month abstinence cut off that was implemented 
(Maxwell, Masters, & Eves, 2000). Other issues, surrounding the complexity of the 
task used, number of trials in the learning phase and differences in the pressure 
manipulation used have also been highlighted as weaknesses in the experimental 
design that cloud the researchers’ conclusions (Mullen, Hardy & Oldham, 2007). 
Mullen et al. (2007) looked to address the conflict in findings between Bright 
and Freedman (1998) and Masters (1992) and Hardy et al. (1996) by revisiting the 
study designs adopted. Here they replicated the study using absolute novices and 
more trials than that of Bright and Freedman. Thirty-two participants were allocated 
to one of three separate implicit training groups or an explicit training group, and 
practiced putting golf balls. Participants were exposed to an anxiety intervention at 
two points during practice. The Explicit practice group received a list of explicit 
instructions throughout the learning phase. Participants in the first two implicit 
learning groups were given no instructions on how to putt and were required to 
perform a random letter generation task while putting. The two groups differed in 
that one group was only exposed to the anxiety intervention at Test 2, while the 
second group was put under pressure at both Test 1 and Test 2. The final implicit 
group was required to learn the task while performing the random letter generation 
task. However, as in the previous studies, during the high-anxiety test conditions 
participants in the last implicit group were not required to generate random letters. 
Results revealed that practice improved performance in all of the putting conditions, 
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a result that contradicted Bright and Freedman’s (1998) finding of a difference 
between the implicit practice groups who performed the random letter generation 
task at test and those who did not. During the final pressure trial the three implicit 
practice groups continued to improve, regardless of whether participants were asked 
to putt with or without random letter generation task, while the explicit practice 
group failed to further improve their performance. Mullen et al. concluded that their 
findings supported Masters’ (1992) and Hardy et al’s (1996) earlier findings that 
motor skills are robust under pressure when acquired in implicit practice conditions.  
Further support comes from Mullen and Hardy (2000) who compared the 
putting performance of 18 experienced golfers when performing two types of dual-
task against normal putting conditions; verbalising explicit instructions and random 
letter generation, under conditions of low and high state anxiety. The explicit 
instruction group’s performance deteriorated under pressure, whereas the 
performance of those in the random letter generation group remained stable. Mullen, 
Hardy, and Tattersall (2005) replicated this study, modifying the design by replacing 
the random letter generation with a tone counting task. In contrast to Mullen and 
Hardy (2000), participants’ putting performance was impaired by both explicit 
knowledge cues and the task-irrelevant (tone counting) dual-task under pressure. 
The authors therefore suggested the findings offer only partial support to the 
conscious processing hypothesis and highlight that the performance decrements 
observed may not be the result of a single mechanism (Mullen et al., 2005). 
Maxwell et al. (2000) performed a longitudinal replication of the Masters’ 
(1992) study in order to examine the observed difference between explicit and 
implicit learning groups during the practice phase. In both Masters and Hardy et al., 
(1996) performance of the implicit group was inferior to that observed by the 
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explicit learners. Although, the same pattern was shown regarding differences in 
learning even after 3000 trials, further support was found for reinvestment theory in 
that the explicit group accumulated more explicit rules during learning, which had a 
negative effect on subsequent performance during learning, particularly under stress. 
The association between explicit knowledge, self-focused attention and performance 
failure under pressure was also supported by Liao and Masters (2002) who found 
self-focused training of basketball free-throw shooting led to a greater amount of 
explicit knowledge (e.g., rules) and worse performance under pressure relative to a 
control group. Liao and Masters (2001) looked to the use of analogies as an 
alternative to implicit learning in providing instruction. The function of the analogy 
was to integrate the complex rule structure of a skill into a simple metaphor that 
could be reproduced by the learner without conscious awareness of the explicit rules 
that govern the skill’s execution. Liao and Masters conducted two experiments to 
see if learning by analogy could invoke similar characteristics as implicit learning. 
The first experiment showed that the analogy and implicit learning groups 
accumulated fewer explicit rules during the learning phase than the explicit group on 
a table tennis forehand top-spin shot task. The second experiment tested subsequent 
performance under stress and thought suppression interventions and found that only 
the explicit group suffered impaired performance. These findings are supported by 
Lam, Maxwell, and Masters (2009) who found performance on a modified (seated) 
basketball shooting task by analogy and explicit learning groups was equal during 
learning and delayed retention tests. However, performance on a pressurized transfer 
test showed deterioration in the explicit groups performance whilst the analogy 
group’s performance remained unaffected. 
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Several other studies have provided evidence to support Masters’ (1992) 
initial hypothesis regarding a regression back to explicitly governed action as a 
result of pressure induced self-focus. Jackson et al. (2006) examined the attentional 
processes governing skilled motor behavior using a dribbling task. In the first 
experiment, field hockey players performed a dribbling task under single-task, dual-
task, and skill-focused conditions under both low and high pressure situations. In 
Experiment 2, skilled soccer players performed a dribbling task under single-task, 
skill-focused, and process-goal conditions, again under low and high pressure 
situations. Results replicated those of work highlighted earlier supporting conscious 
processing hypothesis; specifically, the detrimental effect of skill-focused attention 
and the facilitative effect of dual-task conditions on skilled performance. 
Furthermore, it was noted that focusing on movement-related process goals 
adversely affected performance.  
Pijpers, Oudejans, Holsheimer, and Bakker, (2003) explored behavioural 
changes to climbing performance as a result of pressure. Seventeen novice climbers 
traversed two routes on a climbing wall. Anxiety was manipulated by using routes 
defined at different heights (low and high). The results showed that state anxiety 
affected participants’ movement behaviour, demonstrated by an increased geometric 
index of entropy and by longer climbing times. They concluded that the effects of 
anxiety had caused a temporary regress to a movement execution that is associated 
with earlier stages of motor learning.  
Reinvestment theory has also been examined in music. Wan and Huon 
(2005) investigated the cognitive mechanisms responsible for performance 
degradation under pressure in music. Following lessons on basic note and rhythm 
reading skills, 72 novice musicians trained on a keyboard task under one of three 
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conditions (single-task, dual-task, video-monitoring) before being exposed to either 
a high-pressure or low-pressure post-test. Analysis revealed that pressure led to skill 
failure in the single-task and dual-task groups, but resulted in improved performance 
in the video-monitoring group. They concluded that training under the video-
monitoring condition familiarized participants with performing under conditions that 
encourage conscious monitoring of task processes; thus, resulting in resilience to 
performance failure under pressure. 
2.5 Predicting Choking 
Researchers have looked to examine the impact of self-focused attention 
from an individual differences perspective to try and identify those individuals who 
are more prone to engage in behaviours detrimental to performing under pressure. 
Two related scales have been used to examine individual differences in the 
propensity for reinvestment and in particular, the relationship between trait self-
focus and performance under pressure. In his early examination of choking, 
Baumeister (1984), indicated that more self-conscious individuals, defined using the 
Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975), were less susceptible 
to choking (Baumeister, 1984, Experiments 4 and 5). Baumeister concluded that 
highly self-conscious individuals are more accustomed to performing in a self-aware 
state, and are therefore better able to cope with the self-scrutiny induced by pressure 
compared to individuals whom exhibited low levels of self-consciousness. Support 
for this hypothesis was reported by Lewis and Linder (1997) who found that 
acclimatizing participants to a high self-conscious environment, using the presence a 
video camera during practice, reduced the extent to which performance broke down 
under stressful conditions. More recently researchers have suggested that high 
dispositional self-focus increases susceptibility to choking. Wang, Marchant, Morris 
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and Gibbs (2004) examined the role of dispositional self-consciousness and trait 
anxiety in Basketball free throw shooting under pressure. Sixty-six basketball 
players completed the Self-Consciousness Scale and the Sport Anxiety Scale prior 
performing free throws in low-pressure and high-pressure conditions. Multiple 
regression analyses revealed the best predictors of choking were private self-
consciousness and somatic trait anxiety that together accounted for 35% of the 
explained variance; thus, supporting the hypothesis that self-conscious athletes were 
more susceptible to choking under pressure. Similarly, Dandy, Brewer, and Tottman 
(2001) found that high self-conscious basketball players showed greater 
deterioration in free-throw percentages during competitive games than low self-
conscious players. Bawden, Maynard, and Westbury (2001) also found that golfers 
who scored high on the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) were 
more likely to break down under self-focused attention than low self-conscious 
golfers. Support has also been derived from an examination of driving performance 
under evaluative pressure. Maxwell, Masters, and Poolton (2008) discovered that 
high self-conscious drivers exhibited riskier driving behaviours whilst being 
observed by a perceived evaluator and suggested thathigher self-consciousness was 
associated with poorer performance in general. 
Masters, Polman, and Hammond (1993) looked to explore this phenomenon 
by developing the Reinvestment Scale which was constructed by pooling together 
items from several existing scales relevant to the processes underlying reinvestment. 
Following factor analysis, the final scale was comprised of twelve items from the 
private self-consciousness and public self-consciousness subscales of the Self-
Consciousness Scale, seven items from the rehearsal factor of the Emotional Control 
Questionnaire (Roger & Nesshoever, 1987), and one item from the Cognitive 
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Failures Questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982). Private self-
consciousness refers to the attention an individual gives to his or her thought 
processes, whereas public self-consciousness is concerned with the awareness of the 
self as a social object (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Rehearsal relates to one’s tendency to 
mentally rehearse emotional events. The final item, taken from the Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire item (“Do you have trouble making up your mind?”), 
describes the tendency to have action slips, occasions in which one’s actions are not 
performed as intended (Broadbent et al., 1982) and was related to performance under 
pressure in the golf putting task used in Masters’ (1992) original investigation. 
Initial assessments of the Reinvestment Scale’s psychometric properties showed 
high internal reliability (coefficient alpha = .80) and test-retest reliability (r = .74). 
To examine the predictive validity of the Reinvestment Scale, Masters et al. (1993) 
examined performance on a rod tracing task under conditions of low and high 
pressure. The results failed to show performance decrements under pressure in either 
high or low reinvestment groups. The authors concluded that this was due to the 
level of complexity for the motor skill they employed, suggesting that the pegboard 
task was too simple to lend itself to explicit rule use. In a follow up experiment 
Masters et al used a more complex golf putting task. This time they found high 
Reinvestment Scale scores were associated with greater performance decrements 
under pressure. In their final validation experiment, Reinvestment Scale scores of 
university squash and tennis players were correlated with their tendency to choke 
under pressure, as rated by their coaches and team captains. Higher scores indicated 
those individuals rated as more prone to choke under pressure. 
Support for the Reinvestment Scale’s ability to highlight individuals more 
prone to choking has come from a variety of different sports tasks. Chell, Graydon, 
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Crowley and Child (2003) examined whether the Reinvestment Scale predicted skill 
breakdown under pressure in fourteen university soccer players using a wall-volley 
task. They found that high reinvesters scored significantly worse in a high-stress 
than a low-stress condition, whereas low reinvesters’ performance remained stable 
across conditions. Maxwell et al. (2006) also found a significant correlation between 
reinvestment score and change in golf putting performance under evaluative 
conditions, with high reinvesters suffering greater decrements in performance under 
pressure. Additional support comes from Jackson et al., (2006, Experiment 1) who 
found that Reinvestment Scale scores were a significant predictor of choking in a 
group of skilled field-hockey players, such that high reinvesters slowed more under 
pressure than did low reinvesters on a dribbling task. Similarly, in Maxwell et al.’s 
(2000) longitudinal study, participants in the explicit group only showed positive 
correlations between Reinvestment Scale score and the number of rules accrued 
which were negatively correlated with overall putting performance during the 
learning phase. The association between use of explicit knowledge, reinvestment and 
performance failure under pressure was also examined by Poolton, Maxwell and 
Masters (2004) who, using structural equation modelling, found that Reinvestment 
Scale scores predicted the number of rules accumulated by novice golf putters, 
which in turn predicted subsequent performance failure under anxiety-inducing 
conditions. 
Despite the substantial evidence generated from this body of research to 
support the use of the Reinvestment scale, as a psychometric instrument it suffers 
from a number of limitations. The most important of which is a lack of face validity. 
The scale was developed by pooling items from various existing scales and does not 
directly specify movement. Jackson et al. (2006) highlighted that the scale ‘does not 
31 
attempt to measure the process of reinvestment directly but instead aims to bring 
together conceptually linked items that predict this process’ (p. 65). Masters, Eves 
and Maxwell (2005; cf. Masters & Maxwell, 2008) developed a movement-specific 
version of the Reinvestment Scale to address these and other methodological issues 
present in the original scale’s construction (e.g. sample size for factor analysis). The 
new scale comprised two factors (movement self-consciousness; conscious motor 
processing) and had sound test-retest and internal reliability properties. Evidence 
supporting the conscious motor processing factor present in the new scale has 
largely come from the health setting, specifically situations in which the propensity 
to focus attention on performance processes might be disruptive to movement 
execution. Comparison of stroke patients (Orrell, Masters & Eves, 2009), 
Parkinson’s disease patients (Masters, Pall, MacMahon, & Eves, 2007) and age 
matched controls revealed higher Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale scores for 
the two groups of patients more than their age-matched controls. In stroke patients, 
conscious motor processing and time spent in rehabilitation were found to be 
associated with amount of movement difficulty; whilst higher conscious motor 
processing scores were associated with longer durations of Parkinson’s disease, 
implying that patients use conscious control of their movements increasingly as the 
disease progresses. Additional studies found that people who had fallen scored 
higher on both factors on the scale that those who had not (Wong, Masters, Maxwell 
& Abernethy, 2008).  
2.6 Distraction vs. Self-Focus Theory 
Given the seemingly contrasting predictions of distraction-based and self-
focus-based accounts of choking and the substantial support each has received, 
several studies have adopted experimental designs to examine which theoretical 
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explanation truly represents the processes underpinning skill failure under pressure. 
As a result several other hypotheses have subsequently been generated. Beilock, 
Kulp, et al. (2004) suggested there may be a “double whammy” effect of pressure 
and that it is the characteristics of the skill demands that govern the nature of skill 
failure. More specifically, they suggest that pressure induces worries about the 
situation and its consequences, thereby reducing working memory capacity available 
for performance and concurrently encourages individuals to exert conscious control 
over skill execution. Therefore, for skills that rely heavily on working memory, skill 
failure will be as a consequence of reduced resources necessary for performance, 
whilst skills that run efficiently without working memory (e.g. proceduralised skills) 
will fail as a consequence of conscious control. Hardy, Mullen, and Martin (2001) 
investigated the role of conscious processing in performance breakdown using 12 
national-level, female trampolinists who were required to performed their 
competition routines with and without concurrent explicit instruction from their 
coach in both high and low anxiety conditions. The results showed support for the 
conscious processing hypothesis in that performance deteriorated in the high anxiety 
condition when shadowing was present. In explaining the results of this and a 
previous study examining conscious processing and processing efficiency theories 
(Mullen & Hardy, 2000); Hardy et al. proposed the attentional threshold hypothesis. 
They suggested that anxiety-related cognitions (e.g., worry) and the coaching 
instructions, came at a cost to the attentional capacity of the individual that in 
isolation does not diminish performance; however, when an individual experiences 
both components collectively the depletion of attentional resources is too great to 
maintain efficient performance. To examine this theoretical explanation Gucciardi 
and Dimmock (2008) designed an experiment to compare the attentional threshold 
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hypothesis with the conscious processing hypothesis. Twenty experienced golfers 
putted using three explicit knowledge cues, three task-irrelevant knowledge cues, 
and a single swing thought cue under low and high anxiety. Overall, the swing 
thought condition promoted the most successful putting performance. However more 
importantly, under increased cognitive anxiety putting performance deteriorated in 
the explicit knowledge condition, whilst remaining stable in the task-irrelevant and 
swing thought conditions, providing support for the conscious processing 
hypothesis. These theories complement Masters and Maxwell’s (2004) concept of a 
working memory based explanation which looked for common ground in the two 
contrasting attentional theories of choking. They highlight that the explicit process 
used when reinvesting under pressure consumes working memory in the same way 
that distraction based accounts suggest anxiety induced worry and task irrelevant 
cues do. The reduced function of working memory then debilitates processing 
efficiency causing skill breakdown, a conclusion quite comparable to Eysenck and 
Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency theory. 
2.7 Other Moderators of Choking 
The moderating effects of explicit or procedural knowledge, self-
consciousness, dispositional reinvestment, reduced working and memory on 
performance under pressure have been discussed in detail previously. There are 
several other moderating factors that have emerged from investigations into the 
effects of pressure on performance.  
2.7.1 Trait Anxiety. A number of studies have demonstrated that high levels 
of trait anxiety are associated with poorer performance under pressure. Indeed 
qualitative investigations examining instances and experiences of choking have 
revealed anxiety to be described as the major contributor to suboptimal performance 
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in penalty kicks (Jordet, 2009; Jordet, Elferink-Gemser, Lemmink, & Visscher, 
2006; Jordet, Hartman, Visscher, & Lemmink, 2007). Murray and Janelle (2003) 
found that individuals who reported higher levels of trait anxiety were more 
susceptible to the paradoxical performance effects of pressure than their low-anxious 
counterparts during a simulated motor racing task. Wang, et al. (2004) also showed 
highly trait anxious players exhibited poorer free throw shooting under pressure than 
low anxious players. Several theories have been suggested to explain this observed 
association. Janelle (2002) suggests that anxiety in general may alter visual search 
and gaze behaviour, resulting in inefficient and ineffective search strategies. 
Giacobbi and Weinberg (2000) suggested it may be a result of the way pressure is 
perceived and the subsequent coping behaviours adopted between low and high trait-
anxious individuals. Hill et al. (2010) highlight the association between trait anxiety 
and existing attentional theories of choking, suggesting that high trait anxiety 
appears to encourage choking through distraction and self-focus mechanisms. From 
a distraction perspective the frequent and intense state anxiety responses experienced 
by highly trait anxious individuals under pressure overwhelms their working 
memory causing processing inefficiency and thus encouraging choking (Wilson, 
2008). Similarly, high trait anxious individuals also tend to have high dispositional 
reinvestment (Masters et al., 1993) and are therefore vulnerable to choking via 
conscious control processes. Indeed, Wang et al. (2004) reported that performance 
decrements were magnified for highly trait-anxious athletes who were also high in 
self-consciousness.  
2.7.2 Skill Level. The majority of research supporting self-focus theory 
presented in this review has examined the phenomenon using skilled participants. 
However, differences in the attentional mechanisms that govern skill execution in 
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novices and experts highlight issues in applying reinvestment theory to explain 
choking in novices. Novice performance relies on declarative or explicit knowledge 
manipulated by working memory and processed in a step-by-step fashion, and 
therefore should remain unaffected from pressure-induced attention to execution. To 
examine this, Beilock and Carr (2001) had novice participants practice a golf-putting 
task and tested putting performance under pressure both early and late in practice. 
Their results indicated that pressure actually facilitated execution in the early test 
trials. However, following prolonged practice performance decrements under 
pressure were observed. It was concluded that the proceduralised performances of 
experts are disrupted by pressure, whereas novice skill execution, which requires 
online processing, remained unaffected. Beilock and Carr (2001) suggested that 
choking in novices can be more readily explained through distraction. More 
specifically, novices’ processing of task-relevant information exceeds their limited 
capacity to cope with additional demands of pressure. Despite limited evidence to 
suggest novice performers may also choke via self-focus (Pijpers, Oudejans, 
Holsheimer, & Bakker, 2003), further evidence has shown that the performances of 
novices are maintained or even enhanced when they explicitly monitor their skill 
under dual-task conditions (Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2002). Additionally, Mullen 
and Hardy (2000) found that highly-skilled golfers’ performance deteriorated under 
pressure; however, less skilled golfers' putting performance remained unaffected by 
the high pressure trial. 
2.7.3 Coping Styles. Recently, researchers have suggested that the coping 
strategy adopted by an individual to deal with situations of increased pressure 
influences their susceptibility to choking. Initial observation data from penalty kicks 
taken at the World Cup, European Championships, and Copa America between 1976 
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and 2004 by Jordet et al. (2007) highlighted the importance of coping strategies in 
dealing with the immense pressure of a penalty shootout. The results showed that the 
importance of the kicks (indicative of stress) was negatively related to the outcomes 
of the kicks, whereas skill and fatigue were less, or not at all, related to outcome. It 
was concluded that psychological components are most influential for the outcome 
of penalty kicks. Wang et al. (2004) examined the role of coping style on basketball 
shooting performance of 88 basketball players under conditions of low and high 
pressure. Correlation and hierarchical regression analyses revealed that an approach 
coping style was significantly related to choking. However, Jordet and Hartman 
(2008) recently suggested that an escapist coping style is likely to increase 
susceptibility to choking. In this study, Jordet and Hartman analyzed the preparation 
time for 359 soccer penalty kicks from 291 players and found that players who 
missed goals in the high-pressure penalty kicks had significantly faster preparation 
times than those that scored a goal. The authors suggested that the quicker 
preparation times reflected an immediate, behavioural withdrawal from the situation.  
2.7.4 Task Characteristics and Complexity. As discussed earlier, the two 
contrasting theories of distraction and reinvestment have received support from 
differing skill domains. The bulk of evidence supporting a self-focus model of 
choking has come from motor skills; whilst support for a distraction-based account 
of choking is derived from tasks dependent on working memory, including digit 
span tasks (Jones & Cale, 1989), analogical reasoning (Tohill & Holyoak, 2000) and 
mathematical problem solving (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Beilock & Carr, 2005; 
Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Beilock, Kulp, et al., 2004). However one facet central to 
both theoretical explanations is the role of task complexity. Within the motor skill 
literature, choking has only been observed in relatively complex motor tasks, such as 
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golf putting, baseball batting and soccer and hockey dribbling tasks (Beilock, Carr et 
al, 2002; Jackson et al., 2006; Masters et al., 1993), training for which is typically 
associated with substantial technical instruction. However, research examining 
performance using simple motor tasks has tended to prove more robust under stress. 
For example, Magill and Clark (1997) and Masters et al. (1993) found no evidence 
of performance breakdown on a simple tracking task and rod-tracing task, 
respectively, while Baumeister, Hutton and Cairns (1990) found that performance on 
a simple card-sorting task actually improved under pressure. Similarly Beilock et al. 
(2004) found that pressure impaired performance on modular arithmetic problems 
that place high demands on working memory but not on problems that were less 
demanding.  
2.8 Decision Making in Sport 
Choking under pressure in a sporting context has predominantly examined 
skill failure in motor skills and has therefore supported reinvestment theory on skill 
failure (Masters, 1992; Masters et al., 1993), while research using cognitive tasks 
that place significant demands on working memory has generally supported 
distraction theory (Beilock and Carr, 2001; Beilock, Kulp, et al., 2004). However, 
sport-specific cognitive skills such as decision-making have received relatively little 
attention, especially regarding examinations into performance under pressure. 
Decision-making has been defined as the ability to select an advantageous response 
from among an array of available options (Damasio, 1994). The importance of 
decision-making in sport has been well documented for over half a century 
(Crossman, 1953), with the realisation that it is important for the athlete to know 
what specific movement to perform (cognitive skill) as well as knowing how to 
perform that specific movement (motor skill). Many skills in sport have a significant 
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decision-making component such that cognitive and perceptual components reliably 
discriminate experts from their less-skilled counterparts (Abernethy, Zawi, Jackson, 
2008; Williams, 2000). However, little research has been undertaken into decision-
making in sport (McMorris & Graydon, 1997). Indeed, Bar-Eli and Raab (2006) 
exclaim the distinct lack of research into judgement and decision-making in sport 
despite the potential provided by this context. According to McMorris and Graydon, 
this lack of research is due to difficulties in examining decision making with regards 
to validity, reliability and objectivity. Research into decision-making in sport has 
generally used tachistoscopic presentations, which despite showing construct 
validity (Starkes, 1987; McMorris and MacGillivary, 1988) have been criticized for 
lacking ecological validity by presenting static stimuli, in contrast to the dynamic 
displays encountered in real life sporting situations (Helsen & Pauwels, 1988). 
Whilst not directly investigating decision-making under pressure, several 
studies have examined the effects of moderators associated with choking and 
reinvestment, namely arousal, explicit instruction and conscious control, and found 
contrasting effects on performance. McMorris and Graydon’s (1996a; 1996b; 1997) 
research into decision-making during exercise found that increases in arousal were 
beneficial to performance. Their findings from a series of experiments suggest that 
changes in physiological arousal, as a consequence of exercise, resulted in increases 
in speed of response whilst having no impact on decision accuracy.  
Researchers have demonstrated the benefits of specific decision-making 
training. Raab, Masters, and Maxwell (2005) showed that a combination of 
behavioral and decision training significantly improved the performance of elite 
players compared to behavioral training alone; additionally Vickers (2003) found 
that decision training resulted in better performance during retention and transfer 
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trials than behavioral training. Bunker and Thorpe (1982) examined the teaching of 
sports in British schools and discovered that the majority of teachers gave little 
consideration to the development of decision-making skills within their lesson plans. 
Dissatisfaction with this led to the development of the teaching games for 
understanding (TGFU) approach (Bunker & Thorpe, 1982) with its emphasis on 
decision-making. The TGFU is predominantly based upon providing individuals 
with explicit instructions of what they should look for in order to make faster and 
more accurate decisions. This explicit method of teaching is congruent with 
traditional beliefs in early motor learning literature. However as highlighted earlier, 
explicit learning is characterized by the use of deliberate problem solving strategies 
or specific instructions, which lead to a large verbalisable pool of explicit knowledge 
shown to be detrimental to performance under pressure (Masters, 1992; Liao & 
Masters, 2001; Farrow & Abernethy, 2002). Whilst implicit instruction has shown to 
provide resilience to choking symptoms in motor skill performance, Jackson and 
Farrow (2005) highlight several methodological and practical issues in 
implementing an implicit learning method to teach complex anticipation skills.  
However, Raab (2002) evidenced that tactical decisions could be learnt 
implicitly; showing performance on a dynamic video-simulated decision-making 
task was superior in implicit and explicit groups compared to a control group and far 
superior than chance. However, improvements in decision quality that were retained 
after four weeks by the explicit group were not observed in the implicit group. 
Another study by Raab (2003) investigated implicit and explicit learning of 
decision-making in sports and the effects of task complexity. Four experiments were 
performed in low-complexity and high-complexity situations in handball, basketball 
and volleyball. The results showed that in low-complexity situations implicit 
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learners were superior to explicit learners, whereas in high-complexity situations 
explicit learners were superior. Whether this finding transfers to performances under 
conditions of increased pressure has yet to be fully examined.  
Although removed from a sporting context, Dijksterhuis (2004) highlighted 
the limitations of conscious thought when making complex judgments that require 
the weighting of several different attributes. For example, in one study participants 
were asked to judge the attractiveness of four apartments using a list of 12 attributes. 
Dijksterhuis found that participants who engaged in a distracter task for three 
minutes after listing the attributes were better able to differentiate between the most 
attractive and least attractive apartments than were participants who were 
encouraged to think carefully. Perhaps more relevant to the current line of 
investigation is the work of Smeeton, Williams, Hodges and Ward (2005) who 
conducted one of the few examinations into decision-making under pressure in 
sports. Here they compared the robustness under stress of explicit, discovery and 
guided discovery learning protocols in junior intermediate-level tennis players. The 
explicitly trained group was significantly slower than both of the other groups when 
under anxiety-inducing conditions; they were also inaccurate. Consistent with the 
reinvestment and conscious processing hypotheses, decision time under pressure was 
positively correlated with the number of rules accumulated during the learning 
period. Overall they discovered that explicit instruction, guided discovery, and 
discovery learning all lead to improvements in anticipation skill. However, guided 
discovery showed faster improvements in performance compared to discovery 
learning, which in turn was shown to be more robust under stressful conditions. 
2.9 Rationale for present study 
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The theories and literature referred to throughout this chapter highlight the 
implications of self-focus of attention and consumed working memory for the 
phenomenon of choking. It has been shown that support for self-focus theories that 
include reinvestment theory and the conscious processing hypothesis are largely 
derived from examinations of skill failure in motor tasks (Masters, 1992; Masters et 
al., 1993). By contrast, distraction theory has generally been supported by 
examinations into skill failure on cognitive tasks that place significant demands on 
working memory (Beilock and Carr, 2001; Beilock, Kulp, Holt, & Carr, 2004). 
However, decision-making skill, despite being acknowledged as a vital component 
of expertise in many sports, has received relatively little attention regarding the 
influence of pressure on performance. Research examining concepts related to 
conscious processing have shown mixed results regarding their impact on decision-
making performance. The aim of this research programme was to investigate, from 
an individual differences perspective, the underlying processes that may govern 
performance under pressure. More specifically, based on the work by Masters and 
colleagues (see Masters & Maxwell, 2008, for a review) the purpose of the current 
series of studies was to examine skill failure in the more cognitive elements of sports 
performance, and at the same time investigate the moderating effect of dispositional 
reinvestment. With respect to the latter, a second purpose was to develop a decision-
specific version of the Reinvestment Scale with the aim of identifying individuals 
who might be more prone to poor decision-making when placed under pressure to 
perform well. 
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Chapter 3: Dispositional Reinvestment and Skill Failure in Cognitive and 
Motor Tasks  
3.1 Introduction 
Skill failure under stress or ‘choking’ refers to the occurrence of poor 
performance in spite of high motivation and incentives for success (Baumeister, 
1984; Jackson & Beilock, 2007). The processes underlying skill failure have been 
the focus of considerable interest in the social psychology, motor learning and sport 
psychology literature over the past two decades, with research conducted on the 
reinvestment of explicit knowledge or controlled processing (Masters, 1992; 
Maxwell, Masters & Eves, 2000), self-attention and skill-focused attention 
(Baumeister, 1984; Baumeister & Showers, 1986; Beilock, Carr, MacMahon & 
Starkes, 2002), internal and external attentional foci (Wulf, Hob & Prinz, 1998; 
Shea, Wulf, Whitacre & Park, 2001), dispositional factors (Baumeister, 1984; 
Masters, Polman & Hammond, 1993) and their interaction (Jackson, Ashford, & 
Norsworthy, 2006). This has generated a considerable body of evidence in support 
of what, collectively, Beilock and Carr (2001) call ‘explicit monitoring’ theories of 
choking.  
Researchers have suggested that the processes underlying choking may differ 
for motor and cognitive tasks. In motor tasks, there is considerable evidence that 
performance is impaired when individuals attempt to exert conscious control over 
processes that normally run off automatically (Baumeister, 1984; Mullen & Hardy, 
2000). For example, Beilock, Carr et al. (2002) found that experienced soccer 
players performed worse on a slalom course when attending to the point-of-contact 
of the ball on their foot than when performing a concurrent word-monitoring task. 
Similarly, Jackson et al. (2006) found that skilled soccer players who set movement-
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related process goals performed more slowly compared to a control condition. The 
role of conscious control in performance under pressure was examined by Gray 
(2004) in the perceptual-motor domain. He found that skilled baseball batters were 
more accurate at reporting the position of the bat during the hitting action when they 
were performing poorly than when performance level was high, lending support to 
the theory that pressure encourages on-line explicit monitoring of the motor action. 
Masters (1992) referred to this process as ‘reinvestment’ of explicit knowledge and 
conscious control and considered the applied implications of this process for motor 
learning. In particular, he hypothesized that skills learned in a manner that 
minimised the accrual of explicit rules would be more robust under stress or under 
dual-task conditions that placed significant demands on working memory; the 
underlying premise being that if performers did not have explicit rules in the first 
place they would not rely on this information to consciously control their actions 
under pressure. Support for this hypothesis was initially found in golf putting (cf. 
Hardy, Mullen & Jones, 1996) and has recently been extended to the domain of 
music (Wan & Huon, 2005) and to include robustness under physiological fatigue 
(Masters, Poolton, & Maxwell, 2008; Poolton, Masters, & Maxwell, 2007).  
Thus far, the majority of evidence for choking has come from relatively 
complex motor tasks, training for which is typically associated with substantial 
technical instruction. These include golf putting, baseball batting and soccer and 
hockey dribbling tasks (Beilock, Carr et al., 2002; Jackson et al., 2006; Masters et 
al., 1993). Shea et al. (2001) proposed that complex motor skills might be more 
vulnerable to reinvestment because of the higher associated attentional demands and 
found that increasing explicit knowledge resulted in poorer performance of a 
complex stabilometer balance task. By contrast, simple motor tasks have tended to 
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prove more robust under stress. For example, Magill and Clark (1997) and Masters 
et al. (1993) found no evidence of performance breakdown on a simple tracking task 
and rod-tracing task, respectively, while Baumeister, Hutton and Cairns (1990) 
found that performance on a simple card-sorting task improved under pressure.  
In contrast to the work on motor skills, research using cognitive tasks that 
place significant demands on working memory tends to support a distraction-based 
account of choking. For example, researchers have found that cognitive anxiety 
impairs performance on tasks that place demands on the central executive 
component of working memory, including digit span tasks (Jones & Cale, 1989), 
analogical reasoning (Tohill & Holyoak, 2000) and mathematical problem solving 
(Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Beilock & Carr, 2005; Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Beilock, 
Kulp, Holt, & Carr, 2004). The findings of this body of literature suggest that 
increases in pressure create worries about the situation and its consequences that 
compete for working memory resources. As a result, more anxious individuals or 
those who rely most heavily on working memory for successful execution are most 
likely to suffer performance decrements in high pressure situations. Recently, 
Beilock, Kulp et al. (2004) found that pressure impaired performance on modular 
arithmetic problems that place high demands on working memory but not on 
problems that were less demanding. In two subsequent studies, they found that 
practicing the more demanding problems until they could be directly retrieved from 
memory eliminated performance decrements under pressure. Interestingly, Beilock 
and Carr (2005) found that individuals with high working memory capacity were 
more prone to choking on demanding modular arithmetic problems. Beilock and 
Carr reasoned that these individuals routinely used more elaborate (and superior) 
solution strategies; however, increased pressure led to the use of simpler, less 
45 
effective strategies, which resulted in impaired performance. Consistent with this 
account, the high working memory group attained a higher level of performance 
than the low working memory group under low pressure but the two groups 
performed at the same level under high pressure. In a follow-up study, Beilock and 
DeCaro (2007) examined the solution strategies used by each group and found that 
the high working memory group did indeed use more computationally demanding 
algorithms than the low working memory group in the low-pressure condition. 
Furthermore, under high pressure the high working memory group reverted to using 
the simpler solution strategies used by the low working memory group, and their 
performance duly suffered.  
3.1.1 Dispositional Reinvestment and Skill Failure. To investigate 
individual differences in choking, Masters et al. (1993) developed a scale containing 
items that were hypothesised to predict conscious processing and motor skill failure 
under stress. The Reinvestment Scale contains twenty items drawn from the Self-
Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975), the Emotional Control 
Questionnaire (Roger & Nesshoever, 1987), and the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982). Masters et al. found 
a significant correlation between Reinvestment Scale scores (RS-scores) and 
performance decrements under pressure in golf putting and also found a significant 
correlation with coach and team captain ratings of university tennis and squash 
players’ tendency to choke under pressure. Subsequently, Chell, Graydon, Crowley 
& Child (2003) found that high reinvesters performed more poorly under pressure on 
a soccer “wall-volley” task, while Masters and Maxwell (2004) demonstrated that 
high reinvesters used more explicit knowledge than low reinvesters to control their 
movements during a stressed performance test. Using structural equation modelling 
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to investigate choking in golf putting, Poolton, Maxwell and Masters (2004) shed 
light on the nature of the association between explicit rule usage and performance. 
Specifically, they found that the accumulation of rules was associated with higher 
RS-scores that in turn led to poorer performance under stress. Work using the Self-
Consciousness Scale has similarly revealed a significant correlation between 
dispositional self-consciousness and performance decrements under pressure 
(Brockner, 1979; Dollinger, Greening, & Lloyd, 1997; cf. Baumeister, 1984). For 
example, Wang, Marchant, Morris and Gibbs, (2004) found that more self-conscious 
basketball players scored fewer free-throws under pressure than their low self-
conscious counterparts.  
While there is increasing evidence that the Reinvestment Scale predicts skill 
failure under pressure in motor tasks, the nature of any relationship with skill failure 
in more cognitive-oriented, working-memory dependent tasks has yet to be 
determined. The Reinvestment Scale was designed to measure individual propensity 
for engaging in conscious-control processes under pressure (Masters et al., 1993) 
and items from the private self-consciousness sub-scale such as “I am aware of the 
way my mind works when I work through a problem” align closely with the concept 
of reinvesting conscious control. However, the scale also contains several items that 
arguably align more closely with distraction-based accounts of choking. 
Specifically, the RS includes seven items assessing rumination about past emotional 
events (e.g., “I get ‘worked up’ just thinking about things that have upset me in the 
past”) and six items focusing on awareness of the self as a social object (e.g., “I am 
concerned about what other people think of me”). Accordingly, in the present study 
we aimed to investigate the predictive validity of the Reinvestment Scale and its 
constituent components in both motor and cognitive tasks of varying complexity. 
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We predicted that propensity for reinvestment would be associated with poorer 
performance under pressure in both motor and cognitive-oriented tasks. We further 
predicted that the rehearsal and public self-consciousness sub-scales would be more 
strongly related to choking in the cognitive-oriented tasks whereas the private self-
consciousness sub-scale would be more strongly related to choking in the motor 
tasks.  Finally, in line with evidence from motor and modular arithmetic tasks, we 
predicted that choking and associated relationships with dispositional reinvestment 
would be strongest in the high-complexity versions of these tasks (Beilock et al., 
2004). 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Participants. Sixty-three university students participated in the study. 
The sample was comprised of 40 males and 23 females, with a mean age of 22.87 
years (SD = 3.99). Institutional ethical approval was granted and all participants 
gave written consent (Appendix A) prior to participating in the study. All 
participants were novices with respect to golf putting, having never received 
instructional tuition or had competitive playing experience. 
3.2.2 Design and Measures. The design was a 2 (Pressure: low pressure, 
high pressure) x 2 (Task complexity: low-complexity, high-complexity) repeated 
measures design, in which participants completed motor, psychomotor, and working 
memory tasks. Pressure was counterbalanced across participants such that half the 
participants performed the low-pressure trials first and half the participants 
performed the high-pressure trials first. To control for possible fatigue effects, high-
pressure and low-pressure conditions were completed on different days separated by 
a minimum of one week. The order in which tasks were completed on each occasion 
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was counterbalanced across participants and was the same for the low-pressure and 
high-pressure testing sessions. 
3.2.2.1 The Reinvestment Scale. The Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 
1993; Appendix B) is comprised of twenty items that were considered likely to 
predict individual propensity for reinvesting controlled processing under pressure or 
psychological stress. Twelve items were taken from the Self-Consciousness Scale 
(e.g., “I’m aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem”; 
Fenigstein et al., 1975). These items can be further broken down into items assessing 
private self-consciousness, the attention one gives to one’s inner thoughts and 
feelings, and public self-consciousness, awareness of oneself as a social object. A 
further seven items were taken from the Rehearsal factor of the Emotional Control 
Questionnaire (Roger & Nesshoever, 1987). Rehearsal refers to an individual’s 
tendency to mentally rehearse or ruminate about emotional events; for example, “I 
often find myself thinking over and over about things that have made me angry”. 
The final item in the Reinvestment Scale (“Do you have trouble making up your 
mind?”) was taken from the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, designed to measure 
the tendency to have ‘slips of action’, that is, occasions on which one’s actions “do 
not proceed in accordance with intention” (Broadbent et al., 1982, p1). Masters et al. 
reported that the Reinvestment Scale had good internal reliability (Cronbach alpha = 
0.86) and test-retest reliability over a four-month period (r = .74).  
In the present study participants rated each item on a 5-point scale from 0 
(extremely uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic). This scale was favoured 
because it enables respondents to indicate the extent to which they identify with each 
item (Oppenheim, 1992) and was used in the original Self-Consciousness Scale, 
from which more than half of the Reinvestment Scale items are drawn. In line with 
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Jackson et al. (2006), the item “Do you have trouble making up your mind?” was 
written in statement form: “I have trouble making up my mind” to facilitate rating 
using the 5-point scale.  
3.2.3 Tasks. Each participant completed two motor tasks, two card-sorting 
tasks and two modular arithmetic tasks. In each case, one task was of low-
complexity and one was high-complexity. 
3.2.3.1 Motor Task: Low-complexity. The low-complexity motor task was a 
peg-board task that measures gross hand, finger and arm dexterity. The grasping and 
placing a peg in a hole is regarded as a simple motor task (Schulze, Lüders & 
Jäncke, 2002). The peg-board was divided into two sections of 28 holes displayed in 
a 4 x 7 grid. Across the top were 56 pegs (28 red and 28 blue) arranged in random 
order. The task involved placing red pegs along the right side of the board and blue 
pegs along the left side. Participants were allowed to pick up only one peg at a time 
with each hand but were allowed to use both hands simultaneously. Participants 
aimed to place the pegs in the holes as quickly as possible and completed two trials 
under each pressure condition. Mean task completion time served as the dependent 
variable. 
3.2.3.2 Motor Task: High-complexity. The high-complexity motor task was 
a golf putting task in which participants attempted to putt a golf ball on a carpeted 
surface so that it came to rest in the centre of a circular target (diameter 0.5 m) 
located at a distance of 3 m. A score of 5 points was awarded for a ball that came to 
rest in the centre circle (diameter = 0.1 m) of the target, while 4, 3, 2, and 1 points 
were awarded to balls that came to rest within the surrounding concentric circles of 
diameters 0.2 m, 0.3 m, 0.4 m, and 0.5 m, respectively. Balls stopping more than 0.5 
m from the target were awarded zero points. A standard golf putter and golf balls 
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were provided and participants performed 20 putts in each pressure condition. Golf 
putting is a complex rule-bound skill that is associated with a plethora of technical 
instructions relating to how best to grip the club, the correct stance to adopt and the 
technical execution of the swing (Masters et al., 1993). It has been extensively used 
in choking research and appears susceptible to breakdown under stress in both 
skilled and relatively novice performers (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Masters, 1992). 
3.2.3.3 Card Sorting Task: Low-complexity. In the low-complexity version 
of the card-sorting task, participants were required to sort a standard pack of playing 
cards by the four suits (clubs, hearts, spades and diamonds). Participants performed 
two trials under each pressure condition and were instructed that they could hold the 
cards however they wished, but could not turn over the cards until the experimenter 
instructed them to begin. Participants were asked to work as quickly and accurately 
as possible. This task has been used previously to assess psychomotor and cognitive 
performance (Woo, Proulx & Greenblatt, 1991). 
3.2.3.4 Card Sorting Task: High-complexity. In the high-complexity version 
of the card-sorting task participants again sorted the pack into the four suits but 
additionally were required to place the “picture” cards (Jack, Queen and King) 
above their respective piles for the two red suits (hearts and diamonds) and below 
their respective piles for the two black suits (spades and clubs). It was further 
stipulated that the order of the piles should be spades, diamonds, clubs and hearts. 
Participants performed two trials under each pressure condition and were asked to 
work as quickly and accurately as possible. In both card sorting tasks, the mean 
number of errors made and the mean task completion time served as the dependent 
variables. 
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3.2.3.5 Working Memory Task: Low-complexity. For the working memory 
tasks, we used Gauss’s (1801) modular arithmetic task (Bogomolny, 1996, cf. 
Beilock & DeCaro, 2007). The aim of modular arithmetic tasks is to assess the truth-
value of problem statements such as “5 ≡ 3 (mod 2).” To solve each problem, the 
middle number is subtracted from the first number (i.e., 5 - 3) and the difference is 
divided by the last number (i.e., 2). If the dividend is a whole number (in this case, 
1), the statement is true, if not then the statement is false. Following Beilock et al., 
the low-complexity version of the task required participants to perform a single-
digit, no-borrow subtraction operation. Participants attempted to solve ten problems 
under each pressure condition and were asked to work as quickly and accurately as 
possible.  
3.2.3.6 Working Memory Task: High-complexity. In the high-complexity 
working memory task participants were required to perform a double-digit borrow 
subtraction operation such as 44 ≡ 28 (mod 7). A heavier demand is placed upon 
working memory as larger numbers require longer sequences of steps and 
maintenance of more intermediate products than when managing smaller numbers 
(Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001). Participants attempted to solve ten problems under each 
pressure condition and were asked to work as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
In both working memory tasks, the mean number of errors made (accuracy) and the 
mean task completion time (speed) served as the dependent variables. 
3.3 Procedure 
After filling out the participant information (Appendix D) and consent form, 
each participant completed the Reinvestment Scale (RS; Masters et al., 1993). 
Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to examine 
psychological aspects of sport participation and that the experiment required them to 
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complete three tasks on two separate occasions. They were then shown each of the 
tasks and told about the associated requirements. In the high-pressure condition 
participants were required to perform the tasks in the presence of an associate of the 
experimenter who also filmed the trials. This technique has previously been found to 
induce self-focus and skill failure (Carver & Scheier, 1978; DeCaro, Carlson, 
Thomas & Beilock, 2008). 
3.3.1 Manipulation checks.  
3.3.1.1 State Anxiety. To assess the effectiveness of the pressure 
manipulation, the cognitive and somatic anxiety subscales of the Revised 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2R; Cox, Martens & Russell, 2003; 
Appendix E) were administered prior to the low-pressure and high-pressure trials. 
Participants were asked to indicate the intensity with which they were experiencing 
each of the 12-items on a 4-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (not at all) and 4 
(very much so). 
3.3.1.2 Perceived Pressure. At the end of each testing session, participants 
responded to the question “How much pressure did you feel that you were under 
during the trials you have just completed?” on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored 
by 1 (“no pressure”) and 7 (“extreme pressure”). 
3.3.2 Data Analysis. To analyse the effects of pressure in the simple (peg-
board) and complex (golf putting) motor tasks, separate one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted for the task completion time and point score performance data, 
respectively, with pressure entered as a repeated measure. For the card-sorting and 
modular arithmetic tasks, the task completion time and error data were analysed by 
separate 2 x 2 (Pressure x Complexity) repeated measures ANOVAs. To investigate 
the relationship between RS-score and performance change under pressure, 
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Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients were calculated between total RS 
score, the respective sub-scale items (private self-consciousness, public self-
consciousness, rehearsal) and the difference between scores on each of the 
performance measures under low pressure and high pressure. Alpha was set to .05 
with effect size being indicated by partial eta squared (ηp2) for main statistical tests, 
and for the test of simple effects, a Bonferroni adjustment was applied to give an 
alpha level of .0125 with effect size indicated by Cohen’s d. 
3.4 Results 
Preliminary screening of all data, using univariate z scores (> ±3.29) and 
Mahalanobis distance values, revealed three outliers who were removed prior to the 
main analyses. Descriptive statistics revealed that participants’ reinvestment scores 
ranged from 19 to 70 (M = 43.30, SD = 10.60).  
3.4.1 Motor Tasks. 
3.4.1.1 Peg-board Task. The one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect for pressure (F(1,59) = 7.40, p = .01, ηp2 = .11), with mean task completion 
time significantly longer under high pressure (M = 44.10 s, SD = 5.91) than under 
low pressure (M = 42.61 s, SD = 4.24). Higher RS-scores were associated with 
greater increases in task completion time from low pressure to high pressure (r = .23, 
p = .04). 
3.4.1.2 Golf Putting Task. The mean number of points scored in the golf-
putting task did not differ significantly between low-pressure (M = 35.30, SD = 
12.93) and high-pressure conditions (M = 33.07, SD = 13.98; F(1,59) = 2.70, p = 
.11, ηp2 = .04). RS-score was negatively correlated with the change in number of 
points scored from low pressure to high pressure (r = -.26, p = .02), indicating that 
high reinvesters scored fewer points under pressure. The only sub-scale to reveal a 
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significant relationship with performance change under pressure was public self-
consciousness (r = -.30, p = .01). 
3.4.2 Card Sorting Task. 
3.4.2.1 Completion Time. Analysis of the task completion time data revealed 
significant main effects of pressure (F(1,59) = 5.40, p = .02, ηp2 = .08) and task 
complexity (F(1,59) = 235.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .80) and a significant Pressure x Task 
complexity interaction (F(1,59) = 4.61, p = .04, ηp2 = .07). Analysis of simple effects 
revealed a significant difference between low and high pressure conditions in the 
high complexity task (t(59) = 2.59, p < .0125, d = .47) but not in the low-complexity 
task. As can be seen in Figure 3.1A, mean task completion time remained stable 
across pressure conditions in the low-complexity card sorting task. However, in the 
high-complexity task participants were significantly faster under high pressure (M = 
53.53, SD = 9.72) than under low pressure (M = 55.43, SD = 10.27). RS-score was 
significantly correlated with the difference in task completion time under low- and 
high-pressure conditions in both the low-complexity (r = -.22, p = .04) and high-
complexity (r = -.23, p = .04) card sorting tasks. This reflected greater speeding of 
performance under pressure for high reinvesters. Rehearsal was the only sub-scale to 
yield a significant relationship with change in completion time under pressure in the 
simple (r = .26, p = .02) version of the task. This relationship approached 
significance in the high-complexity version of the task; r = .21, p = .05). 
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Figure 3.1. Mean task completion time (A) and mean errors made (B) for the card 
sorting tasks under low and high pressure conditions 
 
3.4.2.2 Errors. Analysis of the mean number of errors revealed significant 
main effects for pressure (F(1,59) = 32.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .36) and task complexity 
(F(1,59) = 32.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .36) and a significant Pressure x Task complexity 
interaction (F(1,59) = 25.71, p < .001, ηp2 = .30). Analysis of simple effects 
revealed a significant difference between low and high pressure conditions in the 
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low-complexity task (t(59) = -4.89, p < .0125, d = -1.44) and in the high complexity 
task (t(59) = -5.45, p < .0125, d = -1.55). As can be seen in Figure 3.1B, the mean 
number of errors was low but still increased under the high pressure conditions for 
the low-complexity card sorting task (low pressure, M = 0.03, SD = 0.11; to high 
pressure, M = .39, SD = .63); in the high-complexity card sorting task the change in 
mean number of errors from low pressure (M = 0.23, SD = 0.35) to high pressure (M 
= 2.99, SD = 4.02) was more visible. The relationship between RS-score and the 
difference between errors made under low-pressure and high-pressure conditions 
was non-significant in both the low-complexity and high-complexity card-sorting 
tasks (r = .18, r = .16, respectively). Sub-scale scores were also not significantly 
related to the change in errors made under pressure. 
3.4.3 Modular Arithmetic Task. 
3.4.3.1 Completion Time. Analysis of the task completion time data revealed 
a significant main effect of task complexity (F(1,59) = 154.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .72). 
The main effect of pressure (F(1,59) = 1.03, p = .32, ηp2 = .02) and the Pressure x 
Task complexity interaction (F(1,59) = 0.31, p = .58, ηp2 = .01) were non-significant. 
As expected, the main effect for task complexity reflected the faster task completion 
times in the low-complexity task (Figure 3.2A). RS-score was not significantly 
related to changes in task completion time from low pressure to high pressure in 
either the simple or complex task (r = -.12, r = -.11, respectively). Only the rehearsal 
sub-scale score was also significantly related to the change in completion time under 
pressure in the low complexity task (r = -.25). 
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Figure 3.2. Mean task completion time (A) and mean errors made (B) for the 
modular arithmetic tasks under low and high pressure conditions. 
 
3.4.3.2 Errors. Analysis of the mean number of errors revealed a significant 
main effect of pressure (F(1,59) = 51.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .46) and task complexity 
(F(1,59) = 64.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .52) and a significant Pressure x Task complexity 
interaction (F(1,59) = 10.98, p = .002, ηp2 = .16). Analysis of simple effects revealed 
a significant difference between low and high pressure conditions in the low-
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complexity task (t(59) = -4.48, p < .0125, d = -.91) and the high complexity task 
(t(59) = -6.53, p < .0125, d = -1.22). As can be seen in Figure 3.2B, more errors 
were made in the high-pressure condition and on the high-complexity version of the 
task. The significant interaction reflected the fact that the increase in the mean 
number of errors made under pressure was greater in the high-complexity task (mean 
increase = 1.52 errors) than in the low-complexity task (mean increase = 0.70 
errors). A significant positive correlation was evident between RS-score and the 
difference in errors made under low and high pressure in both the simple (r = .26, p 
= .02) and complex (r = .32, p = .00) modular arithmetic tasks. The public self-
consciousness sub-scale was most strongly related to the change in errors made 
under pressure on the complex version of the task (r = .30, p = .01), followed by the 
rehearsal sub-scale (r = .27, p = .02). The rehearsal sub-scale was also significantly 
correlated with change in errors in the simple version of the task (r = .25, p = .03). 
For ease of reference, a collated summary of all correlations performed can be found 
in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.?. Correlation between performance change from low to high pressure and Reinvestment Scale and its constituent components. 
 
Task Total 
Reinvestment 
Private 
Self-Consciousness 
Public 
Self-consciousness 
Rehearsal 
Low-complexity motor task- completion time .23* .09 .30** .12 
High-complexity motor task- point score -.26* -.15 -.30** -.16 
Low-complexity card sorting task- completion time -.22* -.11 -.12 -.26* 
Low-complexity card sorting task- errors .18 .04 .14 .18 
High-complexity card sorting task- completion time -.23* -.06 -.15 -.21 
High-complexity card sorting task- errors .16 .01 .10 .14 
Low-complexity modular arithmetic task- completion time -.12 -.06 .12 -.25* 
Low-complexity modular arithmetic task- errors .26* .16 .14 .25* 
High-complexity modular arithmetic task- completion time -.11 -.14 -.04 -.12 
High-complexity modular arithmetic task- errors .32* .08 .30* .27* 
*p< .05, **p< .01 
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3.4.4 Pressure Manipulation Check. To test whether the pressure 
manipulation was successful a repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was performed with the cognitive and somatic sub-scale scores of the 
CSAI2-R and perceived pressure rating scores entered as dependent variables. The 
multivariate analysis indicated a significant overall effect of pressure (F(3,56) = 
26.65, p < .05, Wilks Lambda = .41, ηp2 = .59). The univariate analyses revealed 
significant effects of pressure for cognitive anxiety (F(1,58) = 43.97, p < .001, ηp2 
=.43), somatic anxiety (F(1,58) = 26.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .31) and the perceived 
pressure rating score (F(1,58) = 67.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .54). An inspection of the 
mean scores revealed increases from low pressure to high pressure for cognitive 
anxiety (M = 14.00 to 18.27), somatic anxiety (M = 11.14 to 14.77) and perceived 
pressure ratings (M = 2.53 to 3.95). 
3.5 Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effect of pressure on 
performance in motor and cognitive tasks of varying complexity, and to examine the 
extent to which any evidence of choking was moderated by dispositional 
reinvestment and its sub-scale components of private self-consciousness, public self-
consciousness and rehearsal. It was predicted that choking would be more evident in 
the more complex tasks and that RS-score would moderate the choking effect in 
both motor and cognitive tasks. With regard to the sub-scale components it was 
predicted that the rehearsal and public self-consciousness sub-scales would be more 
strongly related to choking in the cognitive-oriented tasks whereas the private self-
consciousness sub-scale would be more strongly related to choking in the motor 
tasks. In the study, participants performed three high-complexity and three low-
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complexity tasks under low-pressure and high-pressure conditions. Analysis of the 
cognitive and somatic anxiety sub-scales of the CSAI2R and the ratings of perceived 
pressure revealed that the manipulation was successful. Whilst the changes observed 
between low and high pressure trials were similar to those reported by previous 
researchers (Jackson et al., 2006), it should be noted that a common criticism of 
studies in which experimenters attempt to manipulate pressure in contrived 
laboratory settings is that the resultant changes in anxiety are unlikely to reflect what 
we might expect to see “in the field”. It should also be noted that the manipulation 
used to induce self focus to increase pressure, is just one of several contributory 
factors that influence pressure such as monetary rewards and audience presence. 
Overall, partial support was found for the prediction that dispositional reinvestment 
would be associated with susceptibility to skill failure under pressure and the nature 
of this evidence is discussed in relation to each of the tasks in the following section. 
However, closer inspection of the association between skill failure and the subscale 
items of public self-consciousness and rehearsal highlights potential limitations 
associated with viewing the Reinvestment Scale simply as a measure of individual 
propensity for engaging in conscious control processes under pressure. 
In the motor tasks, higher RS scores were associated with greater 
performance decrements between low and high pressure conditions in both the peg-
board and golf-putting tasks. In particular, higher RS scores were associated with a 
more negative difference in the number of points scored under high pressure 
compared to low pressure in the golf-putting task and in relatively slower task 
completion times under high pressure in the peg-board task. These results are 
consistent with the existing literature that has utilised the Reinvestment Scale 
(Masters et al., 1993; Maxwell et al., 2000); however, it should be noted that 
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performance was only significantly worse under pressure for the peg-board task and 
not the golf putting task. It is also noted that caution needs to be expressed when 
comparing the results from the two tasks due to the difference in task demands. The 
presence of a significant relationship between RS-score and choking in this simple 
motor task suggests that reinvestment of explicit rules may not be a necessary 
precursor of explicit monitoring or conscious control of motor actions. The peg-
board task does not lend itself to explicit technical instruction as it is not a complex, 
rule bound skill, therefore the significant correlation suggests either that explicit 
monitoring or control of movements may occur independently from the application 
of explicit rules or that a different process of skill breakdown may be implicated. 
However, it should be noted that the present study failed to adopt an explicit 
knowledge check to investigate the type and amount of information participants 
were relying upon when completing the tasks. Therefore, inferring whether or not 
the completion of any of the tasks used was governed by explicit knowledge is 
limited to conjecture. A further insight into the underpinning processes of skill 
failure comes from analysing the relationships between skill failure and the RS sub-
scales. A non-significant relationship was found between skill failure under pressure 
and the sub-scale containing items that most clearly align with explicit monitoring 
accounts of choking (private self-consciousness). Only the public self-consciousness 
sub-scale was significantly related to decreases in performance under pressure in the 
motor tasks (both simple and complex). The RS was developed by using questions 
from previously validated scales, which the authors viewed as being associated with 
an inward focus of attention to the mechanics of one’s movements (Masters & 
Maxwell, 2008). Jackson et al. (2006) noted that the RS “does not attempt to 
measure the process of reinvestment directly but instead aims to bring together 
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conceptually linked items that predict this process” (p. 65). Items from the public 
self-consciousness sub-scale are concerned with the awareness of the self as a social 
object and it is argued would indicate a thought that draws attention away from the 
primary task (e.g., “I am concerned about what other people think of me”) rather 
than relating to conscious processing of task relevant information to control 
performance. 
With regard to the peg-board task, the nature of task may also offer a 
potential explanation due to its dependence upon two elements: the transfer of the 
peg to the vicinity of the hole and the fine motor adjustment required to insert the 
peg into the hole. Anecdotally, participants appeared faster under pressure on the 
transfer element but then made more errors or adjustments when attempting to place 
the pegs in the holes. Consequently, without a measure of errors made, care needs to 
be taken when interpreting the completion time data, which suggested a slowing in 
completion time under pressure, as this may have resulted from a change in the 
speed/accuracy trade off adopted by participants (Masters, Personal Communication, 
2010). This observation needs to be confirmed empirically; however, it is consistent 
with previous research showing that the components of a task that rely upon effort 
tend to be unaffected by (or even improve under) pressure while the skill-based 
components tend to be impaired (Baumeister et al., 1990).  
With respect to the golf putting task, it should be noted that performance was 
not significantly different in the low-pressure and high-pressure conditions; 
however, the change in performance from low pressure to high pressure was 
negatively related to RS-score and the public self-consciousness sub-scale. The 
participants in this study were novices with respect to golf putting so the lack of 
evidence for choking in the putting task might be explained by their reliance on 
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explicit processes to support performance. For example, Beilock, Carr et al. (2002) 
found that novice soccer players performed faster under skill-focus conditions 
compared to dual-task conditions, a pattern that was also present when experienced 
soccer players dribbled the ball using their non-dominant foot. A similar pattern of 
results was reported by Beilock, Wierenga and Carr (2002) when experienced 
golfers putted using a novel ‘funny’ putter.  
Evidence of choking was also mixed in the card sorting and modular 
arithmetic tasks. In the card-sorting task, participants generated more errors under 
pressure; however, in the more complex task they also exhibited faster task 
completion times, indicating that speed-accuracy trade-off may have been an issue. 
It is possible that participants compromised the accuracy of their actions in order to 
achieve a faster completion time. Of these, RS-score and rehearsal subscale score 
were associated with the change in task completion time from low pressure to high 
pressure but not with changes in the number of errors made. Specifically, higher 
scores were associated with significantly faster times under pressure. By contrast, in 
both modular arithmetic tasks, completion time remained stable across the two levels 
of pressure, with differences only relating to the rehearsal sub-scale in the low 
complexity task. However, the increase in errors from low pressure to high pressure 
was greater in the more complex modular arithmetic task and in both cases the 
difference in errors was significantly related to RS-score and more specifically, the 
more distraction aligned sub-scales of the instrument (Public Self-consciousness and 
Rehearsal). A possible explanation for this pattern of results is offered by Beilock & 
DeCaro (2007) who suggest there is a qualitative shift in the type of solution 
strategies employed by participants under pressure. A shift from using more 
elaborate strategies to using simpler ones under pressure would have masked any 
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increase in response time one might have expected had participants engaged in 
distracting thoughts when attempting to apply the more elaborate solution strategies. 
Assuming the simpler strategies were less accurate, the number of mistakes would 
be expected to increase and would be more evident in the more complex version of 
the task, which is what was found. Consequently, this suggests that these performers 
may have suffered impaired ‘inhibition’ functioning of the central executive which 
prevented them from being able to suppress the less effective simple strategies they 
automatically reverted to. 
In further considering the pattern of results for RS-score correlations, the 
difference in the direction of the relationships in the peg-board and card-sorting 
tasks is noteworthy. These tasks are similar in that they both involve placing objects 
in different positions; however, the peg-board task requires participants to exhibit 
fine motor control in order to place each peg in a hole. The demands of the card 
sorting task are largely limited to the process of classifying each card appropriately: 
there are no contingencies relating to the accuracy or precision with which each card 
is placed on the appropriate pile. Baumeister et al. (1990) used a card-sorting task in 
which participants had to sort the cards by suit and number. They classified the task 
as ‘effort-based’ and found that praise improved performance relative to baseline 
whereas praised participants did worse on a ‘skill-based’ video game task compared 
to their unpraised counterparts. Baumeister et al. hypothesized that effort-based tasks 
are facilitated by conscious control as this helps focus attention and increase 
motivation. Consistent with this, we found no adverse effect of pressure on either the 
speed or accuracy of performance in the simple card sorting task. However, in the 
more complex version of the task pressure led to faster, more error-prone 
performance. Taken together, the findings with respect to RS score on these tasks 
66 
 
are more consistent with a motivational explanation because RS score was 
significantly correlated with the difference in task completion time in both versions 
of the task. Additional support for differences observed between effort-based and 
skill-based tasks comes from Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency 
theory and later Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo’s (2007) attentional control 
theory. The main assumption of these theories is that anxiety (induced by pressure) 
impairs processing efficiency rather than performance effectiveness. They suggest 
that anxiety disrupts the balance between two attentional systems (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002); more specifically, the efficiency of the goal driven attentional 
system is impaired leading to a greater influence of the stimulus driven attentional 
system therefore resulting in reduced attentional control and also the impairment of 
the inhibition and shifting functions of the central executive. In order to compensate 
for this impairment, strategies such as increased effort and greater use of processing 
resources are utilised. Consequently, tasks that require low resources (such as effort 
based tasks) performance will be unaffected and possibly even enhanced. 
In conclusion, the results of the present study lend support to the hypothesis 
that high reinvesters are more susceptible to the detrimental effects of pressure 
(Masters et al., 1993) and that findings from studies of motor tasks extend to 
cognitive tasks and particularly to those that place significant demands on working 
memory. However, it is suggested that the observed relationship between skill 
failure and Reinvestment score is not necessarily indicative of an individual’s 
propensity to exert conscious control because the scale contains several items that 
are more closely associated with distraction. At the same time, the present study 
gives some indication about the process by which performance is disrupted. In tasks 
in which speed is the most salient feature (e.g., card sorting), high reinvesters appear 
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more prone to emphasising this feature of performance under pressure, a process that 
results in more errors when the task becomes more complex. In tasks in which the 
cognitive component is the dominant feature (e.g., modular arithmetic), performance 
accuracy appears more affected than speed and high reinvesters were duly more 
affected than low reinvesters in the number of errors made. These results have 
implications for more cognitive elements of skilled performance, for example those 
in which both fast and accurate decisions are necessary for effective performance. 
Although speculative at this stage, the present data suggest that high reinvesters may 
be prone to making more errors under pressure, thereby exhibiting a form of choking 
that parallels that observed in the motor domain.  
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Chapter 4: Development and Validation of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment 
Scale 
4.1 Introduction 
“At the elite level, factors such as the presence of an audience (Baumeister & 
Showers, 1986), evaluative others (Martens & Landers, 1972), a competitive 
environment (Seta, Paulus & Risner, 1977), and financial incentives (Baumeister, 
1984) can result in choking, defined as the occurrence of inferior performance in 
spite of high motivation and incentives for success (Jackson & Beilock, 2007).” 
Self-focus or reinvestment theories of choking propose that, under pressure, 
performers consciously attempt to focus their attention on the process of how to 
perform the task, thus disrupting the normal automatic processing of the task 
(Masters, 1992; Beilock & Carr, 2001). In this chapter, we consider the role of 
attention-based psychological constructs in the propensity for engaging in conscious 
control processes and describe the development of the Decision-Specific 
Reinvestment Scale, in which items from the Reinvestment Scale (Masters, Polman 
& Hammond, 1993) are adapted to apply to the decision-making component of 
skilled performance.  
The disruption to skilled performance that occurs when attention is dedicated 
to controlling one’s movements has been described in a variety of ways. Fitts, 
Bahrick, Noble and Briggs (1961) presented the progression-regression hypothesis, 
wherein they suggested that learning involves a progression from simple to complex 
control strategies, and that, under pressure, people may regress to simpler levels of 
control. Masters (1992) referred to this process as reinvestment, borrowing 
terminology from Deikman’s (1969) concept of deautomatization in which he 
described the process of “reinvesting actions and percepts with attention” (p. 31). 
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Masters and Maxwell (2004) defined reinvestment as an inward focus of attention to 
consciously control the mechanics of one’s movements by processing explicit 
knowledge of how the movement is performed. 
4.1.1 Dispositional Self-Focus. Two related scales have been used to 
examine individual differences in the propensity for reinvestment and in particular, 
the relationship between trait self-focus and performance under pressure. In his early 
examination of choking, Baumeister (1984) used the Self-Consciousness Scale 
(Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975), while Masters et al. (1993) explored this 
phenomenon through the development of the Reinvestment Scale. This scale 
comprises 12 items from the private self-consciousness and public self-
consciousness subscales of the Self-Consciousness Scale, seven items from the 
rehearsal factor of the Emotional Control Questionnaire (Roger and Nesshoever, 
1987), and one item from the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, 
Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982). Private self-consciousness refers to the attention an 
individual gives to his or her thought processes, whereas public self-consciousness is 
concerned with the awareness of the self as a social object. Rehearsal relates to one’s 
tendency to mentally rehearse emotional events. The final, Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire item (“Do you have trouble making up your mind?”), describes the 
tendency to have action slips, occasions in which one’s actions are not performed as 
intended (Broadbent et al., 1982). High internal reliability (coefficient alpha = .80) 
and test-retest reliability (r = .74) were evident in the initial assessment of the 
Reinvestment Scale’s psychometric properties. 
Early work using the Self-Consciousness Scale indicated that more self-
conscious individuals were less susceptible to choking (Baumeister, 1984). These 
results were consistent with Baumeister’s hypothesis that highly self-conscious 
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individuals would be used to performing in a self-aware state, enabling them to cope 
better with the self-scrutiny induced by pressure than their low self-conscious 
counterparts. However, more recently researchers have suggested that high 
dispositional self-focus increases susceptibility to choking. For example, in golf 
putting Masters et al. (1993) found a significant correlation (r = .59) between 
Reinvestment Scale score and performance change between stressed and non-
stressed conditions; high scores were associated with greater performance 
decrements under pressure. Similarly, Masters et al. found a significant correlation (r 
= .64) between the Reinvestment Scale scores of university squash and tennis 
players and their tendency to choke under pressure, as rated by their coaches and 
team captains. 
 Chell, Graydon, Crowley and Child (2003) examined whether the 
Reinvestment Scale predicted skill breakdown under pressure in 14 university soccer 
players using a wall-volley task. They found that high reinvesters scored 
significantly worse in a high-stress than a low-stress condition, whereas low 
reinvesters performance remained stable across conditions. Jackson, Ashford and 
Norsworthy (2006, Experiment 1) also found that Reinvestment Scale scores were 
significant predictors of choking in a group of skilled field hockey players, such that 
high reinvesters slowed more under pressure than did low reinvesters on a hockey 
dribbling task. Similarly, Maxwell, Masters and Poolton (2006) found a significant 
correlation between reinvestment score and change in golf putting performance 
under evaluative conditions, with high reinvesters suffering greater decrements in 
performance under pressure. Using structural equation modelling, Poolton, Maxwell 
and Masters (2004) also found that Reinvestment Scale scores predicted the number 
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of rules accumulated by novice golf putters, which in turn predicted subsequent 
performance failure under anxiety-inducing conditions. 
To date, research into the relationship between dispositional self-focus and 
choking has centred on the motor component of skilled activity. Masters, Eves and 
Maxwell (2005; cf. Masters & Maxwell, 2008) recently developed a movement-
specific version of the Reinvestment Scale to further enhance the face validity of the 
original scale, which comprised two factors (movement self-consciousness; 
conscious motor processing) and had sound test-retest and internal reliability 
properties. Masters and colleagues have also extended this research to non-sport 
populations, for example, by examining the relationship between reinvestment and 
medical conditions such as Parkinson’s disease (Masters, Pall, MacMahon & Eves, 
2007), stroke (Orrell, Masters & Eves, 2009) and the association between movement 
specific Reinvestment Scale and “faller or non-faller” status in the elderly (Wong, 
Masters, Maxwell & Abernethy, 2008). Many skills have a significant decision-
making component such that cognitive and perceptual components reliably 
discriminate experts from their less-skilled counterparts (Abernethy, Zawi, Jackson, 
2008; Williams, 2000). The relationship between propensity for reinvesting 
conscious control and decision-making performance under stress has received little 
attention; however, the need for both fast and accurate judgments in many 
competitive sports, often made under complex and changing visual environments, 
suggests that more deliberative decision making may impair performance. 
Outside of sport, Dijksterhuis (2004) highlighted the limitations of conscious 
thought when making complex judgments that require the weighting of several 
different attributes. For example, in one study participants were asked to judge the 
attractiveness of four apartments using a list of 12 attributes. Dijksterhuis found that 
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participants who engaged in a distracter task for three minutes after listing the 
attributes were better able to differentiate between the most attractive and least 
attractive apartments than were participants who were encouraged to think carefully. 
This finding has been mirrored in sport. Smeeton, Williams, Hodges and Ward 
(2005) found that explicit processing inhibited not only the accuracy, but also the 
speed, of perceptual judgments. Smeeton et al. compared the robustness under stress 
of explicit, discovery and guided discovery learning protocols in junior intermediate-
level tennis players. The explicitly trained group was significantly slower than both 
of the other groups when under anxiety-inducing conditions; they were also 
inaccurate. Consistent with the reinvestment and conscious processing hypotheses, 
decision time under pressure was positively correlated with the number of rules 
accumulated during the learning period (r = .76). 
In this study we develop a decision-specific version of the Reinvestment 
Scale that measured the individual’s propensity for engaging in conscious decision-
making. In so doing, we aimed to construct a tool that predicts susceptibility to 
impaired decision-making under pressure. The validity of the scale was examined in 
several stages, each examining a different aspect of validity (Anastasi & Urbina, 
1997).  In the first study, we examine the adequacy of the item pool in terms of 
relevance to theory and understanding by modifying items from the original 
Reinvestment Scale and assessing face validity through a review by expert coaches. 
We then employ exploratory factor analysis to explore the underlying structure of 
the data by performing principal components analysis. Finally, we test the factorial 
validity of the proposed factors using confirmatory factor analysis. Here the 
competing models, representing different theoretical positions, are examined before 
testing the generality of the best fitting factor structure across the samples. In the 
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second study, we assess the predictive validity of the final version of the Decision-
Specific Reinvestment Scale by correlating scores on the scale with peer assessment 
ratings of participants’ likelihood to choke, made by their respective coaches. 
4.2 Development of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale 
4.2.1 Stage 1: Scale Construction. Items from the Reinvestment Scale 
(Masters et al., 1993) were modified so as to reflect cognitions when making 
decisions. For example, the item “I’m aware of the way my mind works when I 
work through a problem” was modified to “I’m aware of my thought processes when 
I make a decision”. One additional item was created: “I always try and weigh up all 
the different factors when making decisions” in order to draw parity with 
reinvestment theory in regard to the use of explicit rules in controlling behavior 
(Appendix F). 
4.2.1.1 Face Validity. To assess face validity, the modified items were 
administered to two basketball coaches and one volleyball coach (M = 7.20 years’ 
experience); both sports require performers to make decisions in time-constrained 
environments. It was explained to coaches that the purpose of the items was to 
assess individual differences in the way sports performers make decisions. The 
coaches were asked to assess how well each item applied to the decision-making 
processes in their sport, to highlight any items they deemed unsuitable and to add 
any items they thought would improve the instrument. The scale was also 
administered to 16 postgraduate students to address any wording issues within the 
questionnaire which included hypothetical, leading or double-barrelled questions, 
ambiguous or technical terminology and hidden assumptions as well as more general 
aspects, such as the layout, typeface and size (Nunnally, 1978; Oppenheim, 1992). 
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As a result of the assessment of face validity, only minor amendments to the layout 
were made. 
4.2.2 Stage 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis. Institutional ethics approval 
was granted and all participants gave written consent (Appendix A) prior to taking 
part in the study. The modified instrument was administered to 165 undergraduate 
university students (88 males, 77 females; mean age = 20.88 years, SD = 3.80) who 
were competing at the time in a variety of team sports, primarily football (n = 52), 
rugby (n = 25), field hockey (n = 18), netball (n = 13), athletics (n = 9) and 
basketball (n = 7), thus satisfying the minimum sample size required for factor 
analysis (see Gorsuch, 1983) of five participants per item. Participants were 
currently competing for local clubs or in inter-university competitions (n = 82); for 
recreational teams (n = 41); in county or regional level teams (n = 28), or at national 
or international level (n = 14) with a mean of 9.88 years (SD = 5.36) competitive 
playing experience. 
The first author administered the scale to five groups of approximately thirty 
participants prior to classes taken as part of their undergraduate degree. Participants 
were instructed to rate how each statement characterised their own decision-making 
processes in sport by considering situations in their sport that required them to make 
a decision. To aid in directing participants towards decision demanding situations, 
the experimenter provided some sport specific examples, such as the decision to 
retain possession, pass to a team-mate or shoot in team sports such as football, 
basketball and field hockey. Participants were informed that there were no right or 
wrong answers, were asked to answer as honestly as possible and were instructed not 
to spend too long on each item. These instructions were reinforced at the top of the 
questionnaire. Finally, the experimenter stated that all answers would remain 
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anonymous, and answered participants’ outstanding questions. All 21 items were 
rated on a five-point Likert scale, anchored by 0 (extremely uncharacteristic) and 4 
(extremely characteristic). 
4.2.2.1 Statistical Analysis. Following the procedure recommended by 
Gerbing and Hamilton (1996), principle components analysis using varimax rotation 
and Kaiser normalisation to enhance orthogonal separation was used to group items 
into uncorrelated factors. Two main decision rules were used for factor extraction: 
First, variables should yield an eigenvalue greater than 1.00, indicating that a factor 
explained more variance than a single item; second, items loading at > .50 on one 
factor and < .40 on all others were considered for inclusion (Pallant, 2007).  
4.2.3 Stage 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Institutional ethical approval 
was granted and all participants gave written consent prior to taking part in the 
study. The updated instrument was administered to 111 participants (80 male, 31 
female; mean age = 24.45, SD = 6.22 years) from a range of team sports, primarily 
football (n = 25), rugby (n = 11), basketball (n = 23), netball (n = 7) and athletics (n 
= 5). Participants were currently competing for local clubs or in inter-varsity 
competitions (n = 48); in recreational teams (n = 33); in county or regional level 
competitions (n = 17), or at national or international level (n = 13). Participants had 
a mean of 12.50 years (SD = 6.62) competitive playing experience. The procedure 
for administering the scale was the same as that used for the exploratory factor 
analysis. 
4.2.3.1 Statistical Analysis. Absolute fit indices such as the chi-square 
statistic and the goodness-of-fit index (GFI) as well as incremental fit statistics such 
as the comparative fit index (CFI), the based standardised root mean squared 
residual (SRMR) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) were 
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calculated. For both GFI and CFI, values > .95 constitute a good fit and values > .90 
an acceptable fit of the resultant model (Medsker, Williams, & Holahan, 1994). For 
the SRMR a cut-off value close to .08 has been suggested (Hu & Bentler, 1999). For 
the RMSEA, it has been suggested that values of less than .05 constitute good fit; 
values in the .05 to .08 range constitute acceptable fit; values in the .08 to .10 range 
marginal fit, and values > .10 poor fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1992). Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), representing both absolute and incremental fit indexes 
was also used. AIC adjusts the model chi-square to penalize for model complexity; 
the lowest AIC value indicates the optimal solution. 
4.2.4 Results. 
4.2.4.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis. Prior to performing principle 
components analysis we assessed the suitability of the data for factor analysis. 
Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the presence of many coefficients of 
.30 and above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin value was .85, exceeding the recommended 
value of .60 (Kaiser, 1974) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached 
statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. The 
results of the principle components analysis indicated four possible factor structures 
for the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale; an eight-item one factor solution 
(accounting for 33.70% of the variance), a 13-item two-factor solution (45.48%; 
shown in Table 4.1), a 17 item three-factor solution (52.51%; Appendix G), and an 
18-item four-factor solution (58.53%; Appendix H). From a theoretical perspective 
the two-factor solution offered a clear distinction between one factor comprising six 
items, of which five were adapted from the private self-consciousness component of 
the original Reinvestment Scale (one from public self-consciousness), and a second 
factor comprising seven items, six of which were adapted from rehearsal items (one 
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from public self-consciousness). Thus, items contained in the first factor focused on 
the role of consciousness in the decision making processes, while items in the 
second factor were concerned with ruminating about past decisions. The three-factor 
solution differed from the two-factor solution in that it separated items assessing 
awareness of the decision-making processes and items assessing public self-
consciousness about the decision-making process. The four-factor solution 
introduced a factor containing two items relating to the individual’s cognitive load 
when making a decision. The one-factor solution comprised a mixture of items from 
the rehearsal, private and public self-consciousness constructs of the original 
Reinvestment Scale.  
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Table 4.1.  Items and loadings for the two-factor solution of the Decision-Specific 
Reinvestment Scale following varimax rotation. 
 
Item Factor Loadings 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
I’m always trying to figure out how I make decisions. .80  
I’m concerned about my style of decision-making. .67  
I remember poor decisions I make for a long time afterwards.   .72 
I’m constantly examining the reasons for my decisions. .75 .31 
I get "worked up" just thinking about poor decisions I have 
made in the past. 
 .79 
I sometimes have the feeling that I’m observing my decision-
making process. 
.68  
I often find myself thinking over and over about poor decisions 
that I have made in the past. 
 .81 
I think about better decisions I could have made long after the 
event has happened. 
 .77 
I am alert to changes in how much thought I give to my 
decisions. 
.74  
I’m aware of the way my mind works when I make a decision. .68  
I rarely forget the times when I have made a bad decision, even 
about the minor things. 
 .75 
When I am reminded about poor decisions I have made in the 
past, I feel as if they are happening all over again. 
 .68 
I’m concerned about what other people think of the decisions I 
make. 
 .55 
*Factor loadings below 0.50 or cross loading above .40 are excluded 
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4.2.4.2 Confirmatory Factor Anlaysis. The results of the exploratory factor 
analysis revealed that the one-, two-, three- and four-factor solutions contained 
eigenvalues greater than 1.00. Given the subjective nature of the scree plot analysis, 
all of the solutions were tested using confirmatory factor analysis. 
4.2.4.2.1 Distribution of the data. Mardia’s (1970) coefficient of multivariate 
kurtosis was used to assess multivariate normality. Statistical analysis revealed that 
the data violated the multivariate normality assumption in the one factor 
(multivariate kurtosis estimate = 11.54), two factor (11.39), three factor (9.19), and 
four factor (9.48) solutions, therefore, robust maximum likelihood estimation was 
employed in confirmatory factor analysis. Univariate kurtosis values ranged from -
.24 to -1.18 (mean kurtosis value = -.76, SD = .28). 
4.2.4.2.2 Confirmatory Analysis of the Factor Structures of the Decision-
Specific Reinvestment Scale. In order to test the comparative fit of the 
competing factor structures of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale arising 
from the exploratory factor analysis, robust maximum likelihood confirmatory factor 
analyses were performed using EQS (Bentler & Wu, 1995). The results (Table 4.2) 
revealed that although all of the models met the criterion value of the comparative fit 
index (< .90) the two factor model was the only one to achieve an acceptable level 
for RMSEA (.08 to .10) and good fit for the CFI (> .95). The two factor solution 
showed the best fit across all of the fit criteria (χ2 =129.83 (64), CFI = .95, GFI = 
.87, SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .09, AIC = 1.83), maintaining acceptable values for all 
fit indices except for the GFI (< .90). 
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Table 4.2. Goodness of fit indexes for the competing models of the Decision-
Specific Reinvestment Scale. 
 
Model χ2 CFI GFI SRMR RMSEA AIC 
One Factor 74.06 (20)* .90 .87 .06 .16 34.06 
Two Factor 129.83 (64)* .95 .87 .04 .09 1.83 
Three Factor 276.64 (116)* .91 .80 .06 .11 44.64 
Four Factor 302.84 (129)* .91 .79 .06 .11 44.84 
Note. χ2 degrees of freedom are shown in parentheses after the test statistic. 
*P < .001 
4.2.4.3 Internal Consistency. Internal consistency estimates for the 
Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale subscales using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
across both Sample A and B were .89 (Factor 1) and .91 (Factor 2). Both factors 
show high internal consistency well above the criterion value (.70; see Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). 
4.2.5 Discussion 
We developed and validated a new instrument to assess individuals’ 
predisposition for exerting conscious control over their decision-making processes. 
Exploratory factor analysis revealed that the original list of items from the adapted 
Reinvestment Scale could be reduced to a one-, two-, three-or four-factor model. 
The two-and three-factor solutions had clearer conceptual coherence in comparison 
to the one- and four-factor solutions. According to assessments of model fit, 
confirmatory factor analysis revealed the thirteen-item two-factor scale showed the 
best fit.  
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Factor 1, labelled decision reinvestment, measures the respondent’s tendency 
to consciously monitor the processes leading up to the decision. A high score on this 
factor reflects a strong propensity for consciously monitoring the decision-making 
process, and parallels the conscious monitoring and control of movements in the 
motor domain (Masters et al., 1993; Hardy, Mullen & Jones, 1996). The seven items 
in the second factor, labelled decision rumination, assess the tendency to reflect 
upon previous poor decisions. Rumination is a thought process related to failure to 
achieve and typically involves repetitive thoughts about past events or current mood 
states (Martin & Tesser, 1996). For example, Scott and McIntosh, (1999) found that 
people who tend to ruminate also experience more negative affect, greater worry, 
and perform poorer on cognitively demanding tasks.  
4.3 Assessing Predictive Validity of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale 
We assessed the predictive validity of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment 
Scale by correlating scale scores with coaches’ peer assessments of participants’ 
ability to perform under pressure (See Study 4 in Masters et al., 1993). It is 
suggested that if the process of reinvestment extends to decision-making tasks then, 
in time-constrained environments, the propensity to engage in conscious decision-
making should result in poorer decision-making under pressure. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale scores will be positively 
associated with coach ratings of the players’ tendency to make incorrect decisions 
under pressure. 
4.3.1 Participants. Following granting of ethical approval, written informed 
consent (Appendix A) was obtained from participants. The sample comprised 59 
participants (31 males, 28 females), drawn from two university men’s basketball 
teams (n = 24), one university women’s basketball team (n = 12), one university 
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women’s netball team (n = 10), and one National League mixed korfball team (n = 
13). Participants had a mean age of 21.15 years (SD = 3.49) and a mean of 7.98 
years’ competitive experience (SD = 4.09). The mean age of the coaches was 32.40 
(SD = 8.05), with a mean of 7.40 years’ experience (SD = 1.67). All of the coaches 
had been with their respective teams for at least one year. 
4.3.2 Procedure. After completing the informed consent and demographic 
questionnaire (Appendix D), the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale (Appendix I) 
was administered to each team member immediately prior to a weekly training 
session. Participants were instructed to rate how each statement characterized their 
own decision-making in sport. They were asked to think about instances from their 
own sport in which they are required to make decisions, such as when to pass and to 
whom. They were further informed that there were no right or wrong answers, were 
asked to answer as honestly as possible, and were instructed not to spend too long on 
each item. These instructions were reiterated at the top of the questionnaire. Finally, 
participants were reassured that all answers would remain anonymous. All 13 items 
were rated on a 5-point Likert scale, anchored by 0 (extremely uncharacteristic) and 
4 (extremely characteristic). The coach of each team was required to rate each 
player’s tendency to choke using a ten-point Likert scale. The scale was anchored by 
1 = never chokes under pressure (makes correct decisions). 10 = always chokes 
under pressure (makes incorrect decisions). Coaches were instructed to think of each 
player’s ability to perform under pressure during instances in which he or she is 
required to make a decision, when completing their ratings. They were also 
instructed to ensure that their players remained unaware of their ratings. 
4.3.3 Results and Discussion. The relationship between Decision-Specific 
Reinvestment Scale scores and ratings of decision-making under pressure was 
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assessed through calculation of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. 
The analysis revealed a strong positive correlation between the global Decision-
Specific Reinvestment Scale scores and the decision-making ratings by the coaches 
(r = .74, p < .01). The subscale factors, decision reinvestment and decision 
rumination, were also significantly correlated with coaches’ ratings of players’ 
susceptibility to choking (r = .62, p < .01 and r = .60, p < .01, respectively). 
Correlations for each team were also calculated and ranged from .59 to .91 for global 
Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale scores (Table 4.3); figures that are similar to 
those reported using the Reinvestment Scale by Masters et al. (1993) for squash and 
tennis players (r = .64, p < .01). The correlations for each factor differed from team 
to team with decision rumination revealing moderate but non-significant 
relationships for women’s Basketball, Netball and Korfball teams and decision 
reinvestment replicating this relationship in the men’s Basketball 2nd team. 
Table 4.3. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between Decision-
Specific Reinvestment Scale (DSRS) global and subscale scores, and coach ratings 
of players’ tendency to choke. 
Sports Team Global  
DSRS 
Decision 
Reinvestment 
Decision 
Rumination 
University Men’s Basketball 1st Team .80** .85* .70* 
University Men’s Basketball 2nd Team .91*** .50 .86*** 
University Women’s Basketball 1st Team .59* .73** .35 
University Netball 1st Team .80** .79** .59 
National League mixed Korfball Team .63* .67* .34 
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*p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001,  
4.4 General Discussion 
The purpose of this experiment was to develop a decision-specific version of 
the Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993) that focused on individual propensity 
for engaging in conscious decision-making. Potentially this could help to identify 
individuals who are vulnerable to making poor decisions in complex or time-
constrained environments. The analysis revealed a 13-item, two-factor scale that 
assessed conscious monitoring of the decision-making process (decision 
reinvestment) and rumination over previous poor decisions (decision rumination)  
The results of Study 2 indicated that the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale 
scores of team sport participants were moderately related to their  propensity to 
choke, as judged by their respective coaches. 
Data analysis revealed two separate factors that were equally related to 
performance breakdown under pressure: decision reinvestment (r = .62, p < .01) and 
decision rumination (r = .60, p < .01). The emergence of these two factors appears to 
reflect the distraction and reinvestment theories that constitute the two distinct 
classes of attention-based accounts of choking (Beilock, Kulp, et al., 2004, Masters 
et al., 1993). The Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 2005) 
revealed a comparable two factor structure (conscious motor processing, movement 
self-consciousness) following a similar redevelopment of the original Reinvestment 
Scale. Both scales highlight the importance of conscious control of processes to this 
concept, whilst reference to ruminative thoughts is made in defining the second 
factor of the Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale as the “contemplation of the 
process of movement, as reflected in past, present and future motor activity” (p. 2). 
In addition, the rumination component corresponds well to the rehearsal items in the 
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Reinvestment Scale. Distraction and reinvestment theories have originally been 
viewed as contrasting explanations of the choking phenomenon. However, Beilock 
(2007) has suggested that pressure exerts two effects such that a performer’s 
working memory is consumed by worries and they are enticed into paying more 
attention to the step-by-step processes that govern performance. The effect these 
processes have on performance depends upon the demands of the task being 
performed. Well-learned proceduralised skills that do not tax working memory 
suffer from conscious control processes that disrupt the effortless, automatic nature 
of performance whereas working memory dependent tasks (e.g., mathematical 
problem solving) suffer when other cognitive activity consumes working memory 
resources.  
The role of consumed working memory in performance disruption was also 
examined by Poolton, Masters and Maxwell (2006) and later by Masters, Poolton, 
Maxwell and Raab (2008). This research examined the role of working memory on 
concurrent decision and motor performance by manipulating the extent of explicit 
knowledge of a motor skill using different learning conditions. They argued that 
explicit processes are dependent upon working memory due to the conscious 
retrieval of declarative knowledge to control motor skill execution and that implicit 
learning offers a method of ‘freeing up’ working memory in order to cope more 
efficiently with the increased processing demands of multiple concurrent tasks. They 
found the efficiency of performance for participants who learnt the motor skill 
explicitly deteriorated when required to make a complex decision in tandem with the 
motor action. The implication that both distraction and reinvestment based accounts 
of choking can induce a reduction in working memory resources highlights the 
importance of this function for performance under pressure. It can be argued that the 
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present scale reflects this in that ruminative thoughts (Decision Rumination) and the 
processing of explicit information in order to control actions (Decision 
Reinvestment) consume working memory. Decision-making in time-constrained, 
complex environments conceivably involves elements that place significant demands 
on working memory (e.g., implementation and evaluation of a game plan or 
strategy) as well as more proceduralized elements that run off  with minimal 
conscious involvement (e.g., processing of visual patterns). Further research is 
required to test the validity of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale with 
consideration to the variety of demands and situations commonly found in today’s 
sporting environments. More generally, the manipulation of the cognitive load 
through the use of different tasks (more motor tasks or more cognitive tasks) could 
also be used to test the different attentional theories of choking and the influence of 
dispositional reinvestment. 
Validation of the instrument in the present study is limited to time-
constrained, dynamic team sports that incorporate many different types of decisions, 
ranging from tactical game plans to immediate decisions (e.g., whether to shoot or 
pass). A logical extension of the present study is to assess the sensitivity of the scale 
with respect to different types of decision. Additionally, the present study used 
coach assessments of the performers’ decision-making performance under pressure 
and there is a need to corroborate these observations using actual performance data. 
For example, while coaches were asked to rate performers’ decision making 
performance, it might prove difficult to do so in skills where decisions also involve a 
motor component. While the coaches in the present study reported no difficulty in 
discriminating between the decisions made by their players and their subsequent 
attempt to execute the desired skill, it remains possible that a poor pass to an 
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individual might be rated as a poor decision to pass to them in the first place. One 
way of addressing this issue would be to assess predictive validity using sports skills 
or lab-based tasks that more clearly delineate the cognitive and motor components 
(Kinrade, Jackson & Ashford, 2010).  
The findings reported here should be viewed as preliminary, as for other 
psychometric tool development and initial validation studies. Cook and Campbell 
(1979) suggest that evidence of a tool’s psychometric properties and construct 
validity must come from a variety of investigations and methods (cf. Carron, 
Widmeyer & Brawley, 1985). Of particular interest in ongoing validation of the 
Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale is the need to determine whether it measures 
an individual difference factor that is sufficiently distinct from that measured by the 
Reinvestment Scale, and to what extent the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale 
improves on the predictive validity and other psychometric properties of the 
Reinvestment Scale. Research that uses the Reinvestment Scale, the Decision-
Specific Reinvestment Scale, and indeed the Self-Consciousness Scale, is necessary 
to assess the discriminant validity of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale. 
Finally, the nature of performance breakdown could be examined by using tasks that 
record both response time and accuracy (e.g. see Williams, Hodges, North & Barton, 
2006). In addition to this, validation studies are required to replicate the proposed 
factor structure in both sport and other decision-making domains. 
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Chapter 5: Decision-Making in Badminton. Predicting Performance Under 
Pressure 
5.1 Introduction 
Research into the role of attention in inducing the paradoxical performance 
effect of pressure has received considerable attention over the last three decades 
(Baumeister, 1984; Jackson, Ashford & Norsworthy, 2006; Masters, Polman & 
Hammond 1993). Despite this, comparatively little is known about the dispositional 
factors that predict ‘choking’ (Wang, Marchant, Morris & Gibbs, 2004), defined as 
the occurrence of poor performance in spite of high motivation and incentives for 
success (Baumeister, 1984; Jackson & Beilock, 2007). 
Investigations into the attentional processes underlying this phenomena have 
often been examined though two main theoretical frameworks; distraction and self-
focus. Distraction theory suggests that increases in performance pressure induces a 
shift in focus of attention to task-irrelevant cues or cause the performer to attempt to 
process large amounts of information rather than selecting specific cues, thus not 
giving enough attention to relevant information resulting in a poorer performance 
(Baumeister & Showers, 1986). Support for this theory has been found in studies 
indicating that highly anxious people are preoccupied with task-irrelevant thoughts 
(Eysenck, 1979; Wine, 1971) and from cognitive tasks that rely on working memory 
(DeCaro, Rotar, Kendra, & Beilock, 2010).  In contrast to distraction theory self-
focus theories maintain that a process of heightened self-awareness about 
performing correctly leads to a more conscious focus on the individual motor 
components of a skill. This results in a shift from an automatic, habitual response to 
a more step-by-step process that governs performance (Beilock & Carr, 2001; 
Masters, 1992). Researchers have examined this theoretical model under a variety of 
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different terms including deautomisation (Deikman, 1969), conscious processing 
(Hardy, Mullen & Jones, 1996), explicit monitoring (Beilock, 2007) and 
reinvestment (Masters, 1992).   
Investigation into the role attention plays in performance under pressure has 
led researchers to explore individual differences that may predict those individuals 
with a greater tendency to suffer performance decrements under pressure. These 
factors include trait-anxiety, skill-level, self-consciousness and reinvestment 
propensity (Baumeister & Showers, 1986; Masters et al., 1993). Self-consciousness 
is a trait that describes a person’s disposition to direct their attention either inward or 
outward (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975). Baumeister (1984) found that 
individuals with low dispositional self-consciousness were more likely to choke on a 
sensorimotor game than their high self-conscious counterparts. It was concluded that 
those of a highly self-conscious disposition were more acclimatised to performing 
whilst self-focusing, compared to their low self-consciousness counterparts, and 
therefore did not suffer performance decrements as a result of the pressure-induced 
increase to self-consciousness. However, others have reasoned that those high in 
self-consciousness are more susceptible to choke as they are more inclined to think 
too much under pressure (Jackson & Beilock, 2007). For example, Wang, Marchant, 
Morris and Gibbs (2004) found that self-conscious players were more susceptible to 
choking under pressure than less self-conscious players in basketball free-throws.  
Dispositional reinvestment can be defined as the “propensity for 
manipulation of conscious, explicit, rule-based knowledge, by working memory, to 
control the mechanics of one’s movements during motor output” (Masters & 
Maxwell, 2004, p.208). Masters et al. (1993) developed the Reinvestment Scale 
from the proposition that individual differences in the propensity to reinvest 
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conscious control processes exist. The scale is comprised of items drawn from 
previously validated scales, including the Cognitive Failure Questionnaire 
(Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982), the Self Consciousness Scale 
(Fengstein et al., 1975) and the Emotion Control Questionnaire (Roger & 
Nesshoever, 1987). Individuals classified as high reinvesters were found to be more 
likely to suffer skill failure under pressure than low reinvesters (Kinrade, Jackson & 
Ashford, 2010; Jackson et al., 2006; Maxwell, Masters & Eves, 2000; Maxwell, 
Masters & Poolton, 2008;). However, Masters & Maxwell, (2008) highlight that 
despite its support the Reinvestment Scale suffers from a number of limitations. The 
main issue lies in the lack of reference specifically to movement despite the majority 
of this research focusing on motor skills (Baumeister, 1984; Masters et al, 1993), 
which undermines its face validity. This led to the development of a movement 
specific reinvestment scale (Masters, Eves and Maxwell, 2005; cf. Masters & 
Maxwell, 2008), which comprised two distinct factors (movement self-
consciousness; conscious motor processing) and had sound test-retest reliability (r = 
.67 and r = .76, respectively) and internal reliability properties (α = .78 and α = .71, 
respectively). Support for the use of the movement specific scale has largely come 
from health settings in which an inward focus of attention on performance processes 
might be disruptive. For example, Wong, Masters, Maxwell and Abernethy (2008) 
investigated the relationship between reinvesting in motor processes and falls when 
walking in elderly individuals. Individuals who experienced falls scored 
significantly higher on the scale than those who did not experience falls, suggesting 
tendency to fall was associated with the propensity to exert conscious control. 
Masters, Pall, MacMahon, & Eves, (2007) examined differences between 
Parkinson’s disease sufferers’ and age matched controls. Awareness of action 
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mechanics and propensity to consciously monitor movements appeared to increase 
with the length of time individuals had been suffering from the disease. This was 
linked to rehabilitation strategies that encourage reinvestment to control actions as 
well as incessant anxiety about correctly executing motor processes that may 
increase reinvestment. Furthermore, Orrell, Masters, & Eves, (2009) used the MSRS 
to compare the differences in propensity to reinvest between stroke patients and non-
disabled individuals, and to examine the relationship between reinvestment and 
functional impairment from stroke. Reinvestment was significantly linked with 
functional impairment in stroke patients and the authors concluded that over-reliance 
upon reinvestment strategies in stroke rehabilitation may be debilitative when trying 
to regain functional independence. 
Decrements in performance under pressure are not confined to motor skills, 
and decrements in decision making and perceptual judgment tasks have also been 
observed (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; Payne, Bettman & 
Johnson, 1988; Smeeton, Williams, Hodges & Ward, 2005). Research on skill 
failure in cognitive tasks that place significant demands on working memory has 
generally supported distraction theory (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Beilock, Kulp, Holt, 
& Carr, 2004). Kinrade, Jackson and Ashford (2010) examined the moderating 
effect of dispositional reinvestment upon ‘choking’ in motor and cognitive tasks of 
varying complexity. They found that pressure had a deleterious effect on 
performance in a low complex motor task (peg-board), led to faster but more error-
prone performance in a high-complexity psychomotor task (card sorting), and led to 
more errors in a high-complexity working memory task (modular arithmetic). High 
reinvestment scale scores were significantly correlated with performance decrements 
from low to high pressure conditions in both low and high complex (golf-putting) 
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motor tasks, and in both working memory tasks. However, higher reinvestment 
scores were associated with a speeding of performance from the low to high pressure 
condition in the psychomotor tasks. Their findings suggest that the association 
between reinvestment and choking extends beyond the motor skill domain to 
cognitive tasks, particularly those that place significant demands on working 
memory, and that this relationship is moderated by task complexity. Similarly, 
Smeeton et al. (2004) discovered participants who learned an anticipation skill 
(return of a tennis stroke) explicitly suffered performance decrements under anxiety 
provoking conditions, compared to participants who learned through guided 
discovery and discovery leaning based methods. This evidence lends support to 
earlier work in the motor skill domain which suggests that explicit learning leads to 
reinvestment (Liao & Masters, 2001; Masters, 1992; Maxwell et al., 2000). In an 
attempt to examine the propensity for reinvesting explicit knowledge in decision 
making tasks, Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford & Bishop (2010) developed the Decision-
Specific Reinvestment Scale. The scale was primarily developed from items based 
on the original reinvestment scale (Masters et al, 1993). From a pool of 21 items, 
factor analysis revealed a 13-item 2-factor model. The first factor focused on the 
conscious monitoring of the processes that produce a decision (decision 
reinvestment), while the second factor highlights an individual’s propensity to focus 
upon past inaccurate decisions that they have made (decision rumination). Their 
initial investigation into the predictive validity of the scale used judgments of 
coaches, who were required to rate each player’s tendency to choke using a ten-point 
Likert scale. The scale was anchored by 1 = never chokes under pressure (makes 
correct decisions). 10 = always chokes under pressure (makes incorrect decisions). 
Coaches were instructed to think of each player’s ability to perform under pressure 
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during instances in which he or she is required to make a decision, when completing 
their ratings. The analysis revealed a very strong correlation between Decision-
Specific Reinvestment Scale score and peer ratings (r = .74, n = 59, P < .01). 
Whilst encouraging, the initial validation of the DSRS did not assess actual 
decision making performance. The aims of the current study were, first, to 
investigate susceptibility to choking in a perceptual judgment task in which rapid 
decisions regarding the intentions of an opponent need to be made. Evidence from 
Smeeton et al. highlights the potential for a perceptual analogue of reinvestment yet 
choking in such tasks has yet to be systematically examined. The second aim of the 
study was to examine the predictive validity of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment 
Scale in a relevant sport-specific task. The return of an overhead strike in badminton 
was chosen as it has been used extensively in studies of anticipation skill and relies 
on the attunement to the quantifiable kinematic information that constrains the 
execution of the action (Abernethy, 1988; Abernethy & Russell, 1987; Abernethy, 
Zawi & Jackson, 2008). Abernethy et al. (2008) highlighted that the striking action 
of an overhead shot is segmented into several parts recruited sequentially, in a 
proximal-to distal manner. With each segment, and the transfer between segments, 
giving an insight into the outcome of the action the explicit knowledge base for the 
action may be substantial. Based on the initial correlations with peer review ratings 
of decision making performance under pressure (Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford, & 
Bishop, 2010), we predicted that propensity for reinvestment would be associated 
with poorer performance under high pressure trials. Additionally, there is a need to 
determine whether the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale measures an individual 
difference factor that is sufficiently distinct from that measured by the Reinvestment 
Scale, and specifically the extent to which the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale 
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improves on the predictive validity and other psychometric properties of the 
Reinvestment Scale. Therefore, the current study will also compare the predictive 
properties of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale and original Reinvestment 
Scale. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants. Twenty-four skilled badminton players (M experience = 
10.08 years, SD = 4.58) participated in the study. The sample was comprised of 18 
males and 6 females, with a mean age of 23.46 years (SD = 4.90). Institutional 
ethical approval was granted and all participants gave written consent (Appendix A) 
prior to participating in the study. 
5.2.2 Design and Measures. The study used a 3 (Pressure) x 2 
(Reinvestment group) factorial design with the pressure factor incorporating an A-B-
A design (low pressure, high pressure, low pressure). Response time and response 
accuracy served as dependent variables. 
5.2.2.1 The Reinvestment Scale. The Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 
1993; Appendix B) is comprised of twenty items that were considered likely to 
predict individual propensity for reinvesting controlled processing under pressure or 
psychological stress. Twelve items were taken from the Self-Consciousness Scale 
(Fenigstein et al.,1975), a further seven items were taken from the Rehearsal factor 
of the Emotional Control Questionnaire (Roger & Nesshoever, 1987), and one item 
was taken from the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, (Broadbent et al., 1982). 
Masters et al. reported that the Reinvestment Scale had good internal reliability 
(Cronbach alpha = .86) and test-retest reliability over a four-month period (r = .74). 
In line with previous studies, (Jackson et al., 2006; Kinrade, Jackson, & Ashford, 
2010) and consistent with the Self-Consciousness Scale, participants rated each item 
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on a 5-point scale from 0 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic). 
As a result the item “Do you have trouble making up your mind?” was written in 
statement form: “I have trouble making up my mind” to facilitate rating using the 5-
point scale. 
5.2.2.2 Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale. The Decision-Specific 
Reinvestment Scale (Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford, & Bishop, 2010; Appendix I) 
comprises 13 items that were considered likely to predict individual propensity for 
choking under pressure or psychological stress. Items from the original RS were re-
worded to focus on decision making. The scale is comprised of 13 items split into 
two factors. The first factor, decision reinvestment, contains 6 items assessing the 
conscious monitoring of processes involved in making a decision; for example, “I’m 
always trying to figure out how I make decisions”. The second factor, decision 
rumination, contains 7 items assessing the tendency to focus on past inaccurate 
decisions that they have made; for example, “I often find myself thinking over and 
over about poor decisions that I have made in the past”. Internal consistency 
estimates for the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale subscales using cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient were as follows; Factor 1 = .89, and Factor 2 = .91. Participants 
rated each item on the same 5-point scale used for the Reinvestment Scale. 
5.2.2.3 Explicit Knowledge. To measure participants’ awareness of 
information governing their decisions, participants were required to write down any 
information they considered important in making their judgments. Practice clips 
were shown to participants to aid recall and enhance the sensitivity of the test. Rules 
reported by the participants referred to a specific body part or aspect of shuttle flight, 
or contained relevant information relating these features to flight direction. 
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Participants were also required to rate the importance of this information and their 
awareness of using this information in each block of trials (Appendix J). 
5.2.3 Manipulation Checks. 
5.2.3.1 State Anxiety. To assess the effectiveness of the pressure 
manipulation, the cognitive and somatic anxiety subscales of the Revised 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2R: Cox, Martens & Russell, 2003; 
Appendix E) were administered prior to the low- and high-pressure trials. 
Participants were asked to indicate the intensity with which they were experiencing 
each of the 12-items on a 4-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (not at all) and 4 
(very much so). Cox et al. (2003) reported acceptable internal consistency estimates, 
using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, for both cognitive (α > .81) and somatic anxiety 
subscales (α > .82). 
5.2.3.2 Perceived Pressure. After each block participants were asked to 
respond using a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (“no pressure”) and 7 
(“extreme pressure”), how much pressure they felt they were under. Additionally, at 
the end of the testing session, participants responded to the question “In which trials 
did you feel you were under the most pressure?” and asked to select an option from 
“trials with the camera”, “trials without the camera” or “no difference” (Appendix 
K). 
5.2.4 Experimental Task and Construction of Test Stimuli. A four-choice 
task was developed in which participants were required to judge which of four court 
locations a badminton player was about to strike the shuttle towards (near left, near 
right, far left or far right, see Figure 5.1). The task represented returning an overhead 
strike (overhead clear or overhead drop) from the centre of the court. Two expert 
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players were used to create the practice and test stimuli. Players were filmed with a 
digital video camera from a central position in the opposing court.  
Video clips were digitised and edited using Pinnacle Studio (Version 11.0) to 
create the practice and test films. The practice block comprised 16 trials including 
two examples of each opposing player striking to each of the four targets, all of 
which were randomly presented. The three test blocks each contained 32 trials 
comprised of four examples of each opposing player striking to each of the four 
target locations. All trials began fifty frames prior to, and were occluded ten frames 
after, shuttle racquet impact. A grey screen followed the occlusion point of each clip 
and lasted for 1700ms. Participants were instructed that responses must be made 
before the end of the grey screen or the response would be recorded as incorrect. 
Inclusion of a time limit for responding and the instruction to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible were designed to discourage participants from waiting for full 
ball flight information prior to making their decision.  
The task was designed and run using E-Prime (v.2.0.1; Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, US). Visual stimuli were presented on a 
computer screen, viewed from a distance of approximately 0.5m. Participants were 
instructed to indicate their judgment by pressing one of four response buttons on a 
handheld key pad, corresponding to the four target locations. 
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Figure 5.1. Diagram depicting the design of the video stimuli used for the four-
choice reaction time task 
 
5.2.5 Pressure Manipulation. The pressure manipulation involved two 
steps; the first was to induce evaluation apprehension by requiring participants to 
perform the tasks in the presence of an associate of the experimenter who filmed the 
trials. A cover story was given in which participants were told their performance on 
the next set of trials was to be filmed for the Badminton National Governing Body in 
order to assess their anticipation and decision making skills against other players of 
their level and ability. Participants were informed that the computer used both 
reaction time and response accuracy equally to compute a performance score. 
Finally, participants were told that if they could improve their performance score by 
20% relative to the average for their age and ability, they would receive £10 and that 
the best performance from all participants would win £100. 
5.2.6 Procedure. Having gained informed consent from participants, a 
convenient time for testing was arranged. Upon arrival at the testing area the initial 
questionnaire package (consisting of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale, 
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Reinvestment Scale and demographic questionnaire; Appendix I, B & D 
respectively) was administered. Participants were tested individually and informed 
not to discuss the task after the experiment.  
After being informed about the nature of the task participants were shown the 
16 practice trials. Prior to the practice trials, participants were instructed that they 
should respond as quickly and as accurately as possible as both decision time and 
accuracy were being recorded. This instruction was reinforced before each block of 
trials. The practice trials enabled participants to become familiar with the viewing 
perspective, the time constraints for responding, as well as the striking actions of the 
performers used in the test stimuli. Immediately prior to the first block of test trials, 
the cognitive and somatic subscales of the CSAI-2R were administered. The 32 trials 
constituting the low-pressure test phase were then presented. These were followed 
by a five-minute interval in which the scenario used to create the high-pressure 
environment was presented. Participants were introduced to the experimenter’s 
associate, were given the cover story regarding the filming of trials for the 
Badminton National Governing Body, and were informed of the performance 
needed in order to win their prize money. The cognitive and somatic subscales of the 
CSAI-2R were then administered for a second time, after which the 32 trials 
constituting the high-pressure phase were presented. Following the conclusion of the 
high pressure block of trials, the associate then left the room. Participants were then 
informed the final block of trials was for calibration purposes, would not be filmed 
or used for the National Governing Body, nor would their performance affect any 
money they may or may not have won. They then completed the cognitive and 
somatic subscales of the CSAI-2R and were again reminded to perform as quickly 
and accurately as possible.  
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Following completion of the final block of test trials, the awareness test was 
administered and final perceived pressure check performed. Upon completion of the 
experiment participants were then thanked for their participation and debriefed about 
the purpose of the experiment and the true nature of the cover stories provided 
during the protocol. Following completion of the analysis, participants were later 
contacted to inform them regarding their performance. 
5.2.7 Data Analysis. To analyze the overall effect of pressure on 
performance, the response time and response accuracy data were subjected to 
separate paired samples t-test’s between high and low pressure blocks (mean low 
pressure block score – block 1 and block 3).  To test for differences in the use of 
explicit knowledge between low and high reinvesters the awareness data were 
subjected to an independent samples t-test. The number of explicit rules reported 
was also correlated with change in performance between high and low pressure 
blocks (mean low pressure block score – high pressure block score).  To assess the 
role of dispositional reinvestment in choking, and compare the predictive validity of 
the Reinvestment Scale and Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale, a multiple 
regression analysis was performed using global scores of each scale as predictors of 
performance change between high and low pressure blocks. Alpha was set to .05 for 
all statistical tests and effect size is indicated by partial eta squared (ηp2). 
5.3 Results 
Preliminary screening of all data, using univariate z scores (> ±3.29) and 
Mahalanobis distance values, revealed no outliers. Descriptive statistics revealed 
that participants’ Reinvestment Scale scores ranged from 17 to 57 (M = 40.96, SD = 
11.43). Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale scores ranged from 13 to 41 (M = 
27.46, SD = 7.97).  
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5.3.1 Decision-Specific Reinvestment.  
5.3.1.1 Response Accuracy. A paired samples t-test was conducted to 
compare response accuracy between the high and low (mean low pressure block 
score – block 1 and block 3) pressure conditions. There was no significant difference 
between response accuracy in the low (M = .78, SD = .16) and high pressured 
conditions (M = .79, SD = .17; t (23) = .11, p = .91, 95% CI: -.03 to .04). As can be 
seen in Figure 5.2A, the response accuracy remained stable across pressure 
conditions for both low reinvestment (low pressure block one, M = 0.80, SD = 0.17; 
high pressure block, M = .80, SD = .18; low pressure block two, M = 0.79, SD = 
0.15) and high reinvestment groups (low pressure block one, M = 0.76, SD = 0.18; 
high pressure block, M = .77, SD = .16; low pressure block two, M = 0.79, SD = 
0.18). 
5.3.1.2 Response Time.  A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare 
response time (ms from shuttle impact) between the high and low (mean low 
pressure block score – block 1 and block 3) pressure conditions. There was no 
significant difference between response accuracy in the low (M = 419.07, SD = 
148.78) and high pressured conditions (M = 420.27, SD = 142.74; t (23) = .13, p = 
.90, 95% CI: -17.83 to 20.23). As can be seen in Figure 5.2B, the response time 
remained stable across pressure conditions for both low reinvestment (low pressure 
block one, M = 383.82, SD = 162.71; high pressure block, M = 385.73, SD = 148.54; 
low pressure block two, M = 388.90, SD = 167.65) and high reinvestment groups 
(low pressure block one, M = 440.97, SD = 137.38; high pressure block, M = 454.82, 
SD = 133.92; low pressure block two, M = 462.60, SD = 132.46). 
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Figure 5.2. Mean response accuracy (A) and mean response time (B) for high and 
low reinvesters using the Decision Specific Reinvestment Scale under low and high 
pressure conditions. 
 
5.3.2 Predictive Validity of Reinvestment and Decision-Specific 
Reinvestment Scale. Multiple regression, using performance change 
between high and low pressure trials (mean low pressure block score – high pressure 
block score), to assess predictive power of the Decision-Specific and original 
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Reinvestment Scale was performed on response accuracy and response time 
separately (Table 5.1). Analyses revealed neither scale to be a significant predictor 
of performance change under pressure for response accuracy (Decision Specific 
Reinvestment Scale, β = -.31, p = .07; Reinvestment Scale, β = -.31, p = .07) or 
response time (Decision Specific Reinvestment Scale, β = -.31, p = .07; 
Reinvestment Scale, β = -.31, p = .07). 
Table 5.1. Multiple Regression Analysis between Decision-Specific Reinvestment 
Scale scores and original Reinvestment Scale scores on performance change under 
pressure. 
 B SE B β 
Response Accuracy    
 Constant 0.02 .07  
 Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale -0.002 .003 -.17 
 Original Reinvestment Scale 0.001 .002 .09 
Response Time    
 Constant 28.59 38.53  
 Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale -1.76 1.49 -.31 
 Original Reinvestment Scale .45 1.04 .11 
Note: Response Accuracy, R2 = .02, ∆R2 = -.07;  
Response Time, R2 = .07, ∆R2 = .-.02;  
*P < .05. 
 
5.3.3 Pressure Manipulation Check. To test whether the pressure 
manipulation was successful a repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was performed with the cognitive and somatic sub-scale scores of the 
CSAI2-R and perceived pressure rating scores entered as dependent variables. The 
multivariate analysis indicated a significant overall effect of pressure (Wilks’ 
Lambda = .24, F(6,18) = 9.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .77). The univariate analyses revealed 
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significant effects of pressure for cognitive anxiety (F(2,46) = 17.78, p < .001, ηp2 
=.44), somatic anxiety (F(1.41,32.43) = 13.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .37) and the perceived 
pressure rating score (F(2,46) = 40.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .64). Inspection of the means 
revealed greater scores in the high pressure block compared to the low pressure 
blocks for cognitive anxiety (low pressure block one, M = 18.00, SD = 6.24; high 
pressure block, M = 24.58, SD = 9.26; low pressure block two, M = 17.42, SD = 
7.42), somatic anxiety (low pressure block one, M = 14.52, SD = 5.26; high pressure 
block, M = 19.05, SD = 7.03; low pressure block two, M = 14.17, SD = 5.77) and 
perceived pressure ratings (low pressure block one, M = 2.63, SD = 1.21; high 
pressure block, M = 4.58, SD = 1.67; low pressure trial block, M = 2.25, SD = 1.15).  
5.3.4 Explicit Knowledge. The type of information, reported by participants 
as underpinning their choices, focused either on explicit knowledge of the performer 
(e.g. footwork, body / arm position and direction of gaze) or the racket (e.g. angle / 
speed at impact, backswing / follow-through and sound of impact). Pearson product 
moment correlations were performed on the number of explicit rules reported and 
the change in performance between high and low pressure blocks (mean low 
pressure block score – high pressure block score). Analyses revealed a weak and non 
significant relationship between increase in number of explicit rules reported and 
poorer performance accuracy under pressure (r = -.31, p = .07) however, increases in 
the number of explicit rules reported was significantly related to increases in 
response time under pressure (r = -.41, p = .02). Also, slower response times were 
related to more accurate performance under pressure (r = .41, p = .02). 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the number of 
explicit rules reported by participants in the high and low reinvestment groups. 
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There was no significant difference between the number of rules reported by the low 
(M = 2.58, SD = 1.00) and high reinvesters (M = 2.75, SD = 9.65; t (22) = -.42, p = 
.34, 95% CI: -1.00 to .66).  All 24 participants stated they felt “no difference” in 
terms of their reliance upon this information between low pressure and high pressure 
trials. 
5.4 Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effect of pressure on 
performance in a time-constrained decision-making task, and to examine the 
predictive validity of the Decision Specific Reinvestment Scale (Kinrade, Jackson, 
Ashford, & Bishop, 2010). In the study, participants were required to respond to 
video stimuli of an opponent performing an overhead shot to one of four targets. 
Participants responded as quickly and accurately as possible by indicating which of 
four possible locations the shuttle would land. Analysis of the cognitive and somatic 
anxiety sub-scales of the CSAI2-R and the ratings of perceived pressure revealed 
that the manipulation was successful. Overall, there was no evidence for 
performance decrements under pressure, in spite of clear evidence that participants 
were both more anxious and felt under greater pressure to perform well. 
Consequently, the prediction that dispositional reinvestment would be associated 
with susceptibility to skill failure under pressure was not supported and the nature of 
this evidence is discussed in relation to both speed and accuracy of participants’ 
performance.  As choking was not observed, neither the Decision-Specific nor 
original Reinvestment scales were found to be significant predictors of performance 
change under pressure for response accuracy or response time. Explicit knowledge 
was also found to be unrelated to performance change under pressure and no 
different between low and high reinvesters. 
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The analysis of performance data revealed no significant difference in either 
response time or decision accuracy between the high-pressure trials (Block 2) and 
the low-pressure trials (Block 1 and Block 3). This was despite participants reporting 
increases in cognitive and somatic anxiety, and feelings of perceived pressure during 
the high pressure block and contradicts a large corpus of research that has linked 
increases in state-anxiety and levels of reinvestment to choking (Masters et al, 1993; 
Smeeton et al, 2005; Wang et al, 2004). There are two possible explanations for 
these findings; (1) pressure did not increase sufficiently to affect performance; and 
(2) the task is not susceptible to skill failure. The first explanation extends from the 
presence of anxiety in several of the dominant theories of choking. For example, 
distraction theories suggest that choking occurs because increased anxiety levels 
cause individuals to become distracted, limiting available working memory 
resources (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001). Explicit monitoring theories also link choking to 
anxiety, suggesting that anxiety leads to conscious attempts to control processes 
resulting in deautomisation of the skill (Vickers & Williams, 2007) or that anxiety 
leads to individuals reinvesting in explicit rules to control performances (Masters, 
1992). Therefore, if the pressure manipulation used in the high pressure block failed 
to illicit increases in anxiety, performance would be unaffected. However, the 
manipulation used in the present study has been used in a number of studies 
(Beilock, Carr et al, 2002; Beilock, Kulp et al., 2004; DeCaro, Carlson, Thomas & 
Beilock, 2008) and uses a reward incentive to create a competitive environment and 
invokes evaluation apprehension through the presence of a camera. Whilst Hardy et 
al., (1996) suggest that using a financial incentive to induce pressure may actually 
increase extrinsic motivation without inducing an anxiety response, data from the 
manipulation check shows that participants did exhibit an anxiety response. These 
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findings highlight increases in anxiety and pressure ratings greater than those 
observed in Kinrade, Jackson and Ashford (2010) investigation into choking in 
cognitive and motor tasks. Choking was still observed in some tasks despite smaller 
increases in anxiety responses suggesting that the non significant findings in the 
performance data are not the result of the pressure manipulation.  
Therefore, the non-significant impact of pressure might alternatively be a 
result of the task is not susceptible to skill failure. Evidence for choking has largely 
come from motor tasks such as golf putting, wall volley and hockey dribbling tasks 
(Beilock & Carr, 2001; Chell et al., 2003; Jackson et al., 2006). Shea, Wulf, 
Whitacre and Park, (2001) suggested that more complex skills might be more 
vulnerable to skill breakdown because of their higher attentional demands. Masters 
et al.’s (1993) initial study using a simple two-dimensional rod tracing task, showed 
performance of the individuals was not affected under high pressure conditions. The 
investigators suggested an explanation that the rod tracing task was not complex 
enough to present demands that would lead to reinvestment. Wang et al (2004) also 
suggested that when complex tasks were used the result was generally negative on 
performance, however when simple tasks were employed the performance was 
positive or constant. Similarly, Kinrade, Jackson and Ashford (2010) found that 
increased anxiety led to faster but more error-prone performance in a high-
complexity card sorting task, and led to more errors in a high-complexity modular 
arithmetic task; without changes to performance on low complex versions of the 
same tasks. The clips used in the present task were occluded 10 frames after shuttle 
impact, thus providing participants with a lot of information (including shuttle flight) 
upon which to base their decision. Additionally, the window in which participants 
were required to respond (1700ms) was much greater than the average response time 
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needed (M = 419.47ms, SD = 147.11) suggesting that the task may have been too 
easy and participants may not have experienced any real temporal pressure. The 
findings from the current study show similar results to those that used low complex 
skills. It may be that this task is dependent on proceduralized elements that run off 
with minimal conscious involvement and place minimal demands on working 
memory or the task does not lend its self to explicit monitoring. However, the 
current findings do contrast those of Smeeton et al. (2005) whom utilised a very 
similar task to that of the present study. Here participants were required to respond 
to visual stimuli of a tennis stroke using pressure sensitive floor mats that recorded 
response time and accuracy. In contrast to our findings they found that participants 
from an explicit learning group (associated with propensity to reinvest) performed 
worse when placed under pressure than participants from discovery and guided 
discovery learning groups. However, the small group sample (Explicit group, N= 8) 
and relative young age of participants do limit comparisons. 
The findings from the explicit knowledge test support those of Smeeton et al. 
who found increases in the number of explicit rules reported to be significantly 
related to increases in response time under pressure. However, the current study did 
not find explicit knowledge to be related to decrements in decision accuracy, as seen 
by Poolton et al. (2004) who found that Reinvestment Scale scores predicted the 
number of rules accumulated by novice golf putters, which in turn predicted 
subsequent performance failure under anxiety-inducing conditions. This suggests 
that participants were taking longer to process information, perhaps as a result of 
exerting conscious control but without concurrent effect of decrements in accuracy 
during high pressure trials. This again suggests that the complexity of the task may 
be significant. Indeed, the data indicated that participants reported using relatively 
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few explicit rules in making their judgments. Whilst there may be four options for 
the task, participants’ decisions were based on processing information from two or 
three visual cues.  
Another possible explanation may lie in the environment in which decision-
making skills are learnt. Anticipation skill has proved to be a reliable discriminator 
of novice and expert performers (Abernethy, 1990a; 1990b). It may be that skill 
acquisition for such skills takes place later on in learning, when athletes are 
frequently engaged in a competitive sport environment. Elite athletes practice daily 
and compete in heightened pressure situations on a regular basis. It has been 
suggested that skills learnt under conditions of heightened performance pressure are 
less likely to be affected by performance pressure (Beilock & Carr, 2001). This is 
supported by Oudejans and Pijpers (2009), who conducted experiments in which 
athletes practiced their skills under induced anxiety. Results showed during the 
anxiety post test that, although levels of cognitive and somatic anxiety were 
increased, performance was maintained by those who trained under conditions of 
high anxiety. Similarly, athletes’ perceptions of anxiety may also influence the effect 
it has on performance. Jones, Hanton, and Swain (1994) investigation into elite and 
non elite swimmers revealed that elite performers interpreted cognitive and somatic 
anxiety states as being more facilitative to performance than non elite performers. 
In conclusion, the results of the present study do not support the original 
hypothesis that high reinvesters are more susceptible to the detrimental effects of 
pressure on cognitive based tasks such as decision-making (Kinrade, Jackson & 
Ashford, 2010). Neither the Decision-Specific nor original Reinvestment scales were 
found to be significant predictors of choking, nor was the amount of explicit 
knowledge related to performance breakdown. The main explanation for these 
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findings is a result of the study not yielding a “choking” effect on performance with 
regard to participants’ response accuracy and time. It is suggested that the reason for 
this observation may lie in the cognitive demands of the task, or task complexity. 
Therefore, future research may consider examining decision-making in sport using 
more complex decision-making based tasks.  
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Chapter 6: The Role of Reinvestment and Task Complexity on Decision-
Making in Basketball 
6.1 Introduction 
In today’s sporting climate the prevailing Lombardian focus exemplifies the 
need for athletes to succeed, huge psychological pressures are experienced. 
Consequently, it is common to see competitors perform significantly below 
expectations in spite of high motivation and incentives for success, generally 
referred to as ‘choking’ (Baumeister, 1984; Jackson & Beilock, 2007). A significant 
body of research has examined the processes underlying this phenomenon, with 
much research focusing on the attentional processes that govern skill execution 
(Baumeister, 1984; Jackson, Ashford & Norsworthy, 2006; Masters, Polman & 
Hammond 1993). The two main theoretical frameworks; distraction and self-focus 
that have been used to explain choking draw evidence from differing backgrounds. 
Distraction theory, which suggests that increases in performance pressure provoke a 
shift in focus of attention to task-irrelevant cues, draws support from cognitive tasks 
that rely on working memory (DeCaro, Rotar, Kendra, & Beilock, 2010).  In 
contrast, self-focus theory suggests that performance pressure increases self-
awareness about performing correctly causing individuals to attempt to consciously 
control normally automatic processes and behaviours (Baumeister, 1984; Masters, 
1992). Researchers have examined self-focus theory from different psychological 
perspectives (social, cognitive, behavioural) and under a variety of different terms 
including deautomisation (Deikman, 1969), reinvestment (Masters, 1992), conscious 
processing (Hardy, Mullen & Jones, 1996), and explicit monitoring (Beilock, 2007).   
Masters and colleagues’ work on Reinvestment Theory includes 
consideration of individual differences in the tendency to reinvest, defined as the 
112 
 
“propensity for manipulation of conscious, explicit, rule-based knowledge, by 
working memory, to control the mechanics of one’s movements during motor 
output” (Masters & Maxwell, 2004, p.208). More broadly, the concept of 
reinvestment has received substantial support from a variety of motor tasks 
including golf putting (Hardy et al, 1996), a football ‘wall volley’ task (Chell, 
Graydon, Crowley, & Child, 2003) and field-hockey dribbling (Jackson et al., 2006). 
Interest in individual differences prompted Masters et al. (1993) to develop the 
Reinvestment Scale (RS), a 20-item scale comprised of items drawn from previously 
validated scales, including the Cognitive Failure Questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, 
Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982), the Self Consciousness Scale (Fengstein, Scheier & 
Buss, 1975) and the Emotion Control Questionnaire (Roger & Nesshoever, 1987). 
Individuals classified as high reinvesters were found to be more likely to suffer skill 
failure under pressure than were low reinvesters (Maxwell, Masters & Eves, 2000; 
Jackson et al., 2006; Maxwell, Masters & Poolton, 2008; Kinrade, Jackson & 
Ashford, 2010). Following conceptual advancements to the definition of 
reinvestment, and to address limitations in the design of the original scale, Masters, 
Eves and Maxwell, (2005; cf. Masters & Maxwell, 2008) developed the Movement-
Specific Reinvestment Scale (MSRS). Factor analysis of the new scale revealed two 
distinct factors: movement self-consciousness, which focuses on the concern about 
‘style’ of movement and public perceptions, and conscious motor processing, which 
focuses on the contemplation of the process of movement. To date, there is little 
research into the psychometric properties of the MSRS in sport; however, evidence 
from health settings indicates that an inward focus of attention on performance 
processes might be disruptive. For example, MSRS scores have been found to be 
associated with the incidence of falls in the elderly (Wong, Masters, Maxwell & 
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Abernethy, 2008), the length of time individuals have been suffering from 
Parkinson’s disease (Masters, Pall, MacMahon, & Eves, 2007), and functional 
impairment in stroke patients (Orrell, Masters, & Eves 2009). 
Research examining the role of reinvestment in skill failure under pressure 
has largely focused on motor tasks while researchers have tended to appeal to 
distraction theory to explain skill failure in cognitive tasks (Beilock & Carr, 2001; 
Beilock, Kulp, Holt, & Carr, 2004). Although not measuring individual differences, 
there is some evidence that reinvestment might also apply to skill failure in 
perceptual-motor tasks. Specifically, Smeeton et al., (2005) found that junior players 
who learned to judge the direction and depth of tennis strokes with the aid of explicit 
rules subsequently suffered performance decrements when performing the task 
under pressure. Indeed, explicit learners became both slower and less accurate under 
pressure and slowing of decision time was strongly correlated with the number of 
explicit rules reported. By contrast, this correlation was non-significant in the guided 
discovery and discovery leaning groups. Similarly, Poolton, Masters and Maxwell 
(2006) and Masters, Poolton, Maxwell and Raab (2008) investigated the benefits of 
implicit learning to cognitive efficiency in a table tennis task involving both a motor 
and decision-making component. Following a training period, in which participants 
learned to perform a table tennis shot either implicitly (through analogy learning) or 
explicitly, motor performance and movement kinematics were assessed as 
participants performed a concurrent low- and high-complexity decision-making task 
concerned with where to direct the shot. Findings from both studies revealed that 
only explicit learners exhibited performance decrements when performing a 
concurrent decision-making task and this was only apparent in the high-complexity 
version of the task. They concluded that explicit processes place an increased load 
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upon working memory, due to the conscious retrieval of declarative knowledge to 
control motor skill execution, which impairs processing efficiency and the ability to 
meet the demands of multiple concurrent tasks.  
Kinrade, Jackson and Ashford (2010) examined the moderating effect of 
dispositional reinvestment upon choking in motor and cognitive tasks of varying 
complexity. They found that pressure had a deleterious effect on performance in a 
low complex motor task (peg-board), led to faster but more error-prone performance 
in a high-complexity psychomotor task (card sorting), and led to more errors in a 
high-complexity working memory task (modular arithmetic). High RS scores were 
significantly correlated with performance decrements from low to high pressure 
conditions in both low and high complex (golf-putting) motor tasks, and in both 
working memory tasks. However, higher RS scores were associated with a speeding 
of performance from the low to high pressure condition in the psychomotor tasks.  
Evidence that the association between reinvestment and choking extends 
beyond the motor domain led Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford and Bishop (2010) to 
develop the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale (DSRS); their intention being to 
measure propensity for reinvesting explicit knowledge in decision-making tasks. The 
scale was developed by adapting items from the original RS and adding one item (“I 
always try and weigh up all the different factors when making decisions”). From a 
pool of 21 items, factor analysis revealed a 13-item 2-factor model. The first factor 
was labeled decision reinvestment and focused on conscious monitoring of the 
processes that produce a decision (e.g., “I’m always trying to figure out how I make 
decisions.”). The second factor was labeled decision rumination and focused on an 
individual’s propensity for ruminating about inaccurate decisions they have made in 
the past. Their initial investigation into the predictive validity of the scale used 
115 
 
judgments of coaches, who were required to rate each player’s tendency to choke on 
a 10-point scale anchored by 1 (“never chokes under pressure (makes correct 
decisions)”) and 10 (“always chokes under pressure (makes incorrect decisions)”). 
Coaches were instructed to think of each player’s ability to perform under pressure 
during instances in which he or she is required to make a decision, when completing 
their ratings. The analysis revealed a strong correlation between DSRS scores and 
peer ratings of decision failure under stress (r = .74, n = 59, p < .01). 
Whilst encouraging, the initial validation of the DSRS did not assess actual 
decision making performance. Consequently, Kinrade, Jackson and Ashford (in 
preparation; Chapter 5) investigated the predictive validity of the scale utilising a 
perceptual judgment task in badminton. Twenty-four skilled badminton players were 
required to judge which of four court locations an opposing player was about to 
strike the shuttle towards. The researchers adopted an A-B-A design in which the 
task was performed under low-pressure and high-pressure conditions. Although 
significant increases in cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety and ratings of perceived 
pressure were observed during the high-pressure block, pressure did not significantly 
affect response time or judgment accuracy in either the low or high reinvestment 
groups. Consequently, it was not possible to draw conclusions about the moderating 
effect of dispositional reinvestment because choking was not observed. The authors 
suggested a possible explanation may lie in the complexity of the judgments being 
made, and the possibility they did not place sufficient cognitive demands on the 
processing capacity of individuals, thereby making it less susceptible to 
reinvestment of conscious processing under pressure. In support, Kinrade, Jackson 
& Ashford (2010) only observed choking in the complex versions of the cognitive 
based tasks (working memory and psychomotor). Set against this, the type of 
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judgments were similar to the tennis judgment task employed by Smeeton et al. 
(2005). Complexity of decision-making tasks can be manipulated in a variety of 
different ways including using dual tasks (Siemann & Gebhardt, 1996, c.f. Raab, 
2003), transferring tasks (Reber, 1967) or as is the case in the present study, by 
manipulating the number of choices and interacting elements (Raab, 2003).  
Following the inconclusive results presented in Chapter 5, the aims of the 
current study were, first, to investigate susceptibility to choking in a complex 
perceptual judgment task. In so doing, the second aim of the study was to examine 
the predictive validity of the DSRS in a team sport task in which decision 
complexity was systematically manipulated. A choice reaction time basketball task 
was chosen that required participants to judge to whom to pass the ball, with 
complexity manipulated by depicting 3-on-3 and 5-on-5 versions of the task. Based 
on the correlations between DSRS scores and peer review ratings of decision making 
performance under pressure (Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford, & Bishop, 2010), we 
predicted that propensity for reinvestment would be associated with greater decision-
making decrements under high pressure relative to low pressure. Last, there is a need 
to determine whether the DSRS measures an individual difference factor that is 
sufficiently distinct from that measured by the RS, and specifically the extent to 
which the DSRS improves on the predictive validity and other psychometric 
properties of the RS. Accordingly, in the current study we also compared the 
predictive validity of the DSRS and original RS. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants. Thirty-eight skilled male basketball players with a mean 
age of 23.46 years (SD = 4.90) participated in the study. Participants were currently 
competing for local clubs or in inter-university competitions (n = 25), in county or 
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regional level teams (n = 2), or at national level (n = 11) at the time of the study. 
They had a mean of 10.00 years (SD = 4.65) of competitive playing experience. 
Institutional ethical approval was granted and all participants gave written consent 
(Appendix A) prior to participating in the study. 
6.2.2 Design and Measures. The design used a 3 (Pressure) x 2 
(Reinvestment Group) x 2 (Task Complexity) factorial design, with the pressure 
factor incorporating an A-B-A design (low pressure, high pressure, low pressure). 
Response time and response accuracy served as dependent variables. 
6.2.2.1 The Reinvestment Scale. The RS (Masters et al., 1993; Appendix B) 
is comprised of twenty items. Twelve items were taken from the Self-Consciousness 
Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975), a further seven items were taken from the Rehearsal 
factor of the Emotional Control Questionnaire (Roger & Nesshoever, 1987), and one 
item was taken from the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, (Broadbent et al., 1982). 
Masters et al. reported that the RS had good internal reliability (Cronbach alpha = 
.86) and test-retest reliability over a four-month period (r = .74). In line with 
previous studies, (Jackson et al., 2006; Kinrade, Jackson, & Ashford, 2010) and 
consistent with the Self-Consciousness Scale, participants rated each item on a 5-
point scale from 0 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic). As a 
result the item “Do you have trouble making up your mind?” was written in 
statement form: “I have trouble making up my mind” to facilitate rating using the 5-
point scale. 
6.2.2.2 Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale. The DSRS (Kinrade, Jackson, 
Ashford, & Bishop, 2010; Appendix I) comprises 13 items that were considered 
likely to predict individual propensity for choking under pressure or psychological 
stress. Items from the original RS were re-worded to focus on decision making. The 
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scale is comprised of 13 items split into two factors. The first factor, decision 
reinvestment, contains 6 items assessing the conscious monitoring of processes 
involved in making a decision; for example, “I’m always trying to figure out how I 
make decisions”. The second factor, decision rumination, contains 7 items assessing 
the tendency to focus on past inaccurate decisions they have made; for example, “I 
often find myself thinking over and over about poor decisions that I have made in 
the past”. Internal consistency estimates for the DSRS subscales using Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient were as follows; Factor 1 = .89, and Factor 2 = .91. Participants 
rated each item on the same 5-point scale used for the RS.  
6.2.2.3 Explicit Knowledge. To measure participants’ awareness of 
information governing their decisions, participants were required to write down any 
information they considered important in making their judgments. Practice clips 
were shown to participants to aid recall and enhance the sensitivity of the test 
(Shanks & St John, 1994). Explicit rules were operationally defined as statements 
that referred to specific aspects of the offensive set, individual player characteristics 
or relevant information relating these features to a player’s openness to receive a 
pass. Participants were also required to rate the importance of this information along 
with their awareness of using this information in each block of trials (Appendix J). 
6.2.3 Manipulation Checks. 
6.2.3.1 State Anxiety. To assess the effectiveness of the pressure 
manipulation, the cognitive and somatic anxiety subscales of the Revised 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2R: Cox, Martens & Russell, 2003; 
Appendix E) were administered prior to the low- and high-pressure trials. 
Participants were asked to indicate the intensity with which they were experiencing 
each of the 12-items on a 4-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (not at all) and 4 
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(very much so). Cox et al. (2003) reported acceptable internal consistency estimates, 
using cronbach’s alpha coefficient, for both cognitive (α > .81) and somatic anxiety 
subscales (α > .82). 
6.2.3.2 Perceived Pressure. After each block participants were asked to rate 
how much pressure they felt they were under on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored 
by 1 (“no pressure”) and 7 (“extreme pressure”), Additionally, at the end of the 
testing session, participants responded to the question “In which trials did you feel 
you were under the most pressure?” and asked to select an option from “trials with 
the camera”, “trials without the camera” or “no difference” (Appendix K). 
6.2.4 Experimental Task and Construction of Test Stimuli. Two-choice 
and four-choice reaction time tasks were developed in which the participants were 
required to judge to whom to pass the ball (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2). The task 
represented a common offensive set viewed from the centre of the court and from 
each wing. The situation used in this experiment was based on a simple “motion 
offence” in basketball. This involved players ‘screening’ away from the ball to 
provide two passing options (low complexity task: pass to the cutting forward; pass 
to the sealing guard) or four passing options (high complexity task: pass to the 
cutting forward; pass to the cutting guard; pass to the sealing forward; pass to the 
sealing guard). Expert coaches were consulted to define the correct option in each 
video sequence. Scenarios were filmed to provide a pool of between 8-10 trials for 
each option at each of the three viewing angles. Players from a premier division 
University basketball team were used as the actors for clip construction. Video trials 
were digitised and edited using Pinnacle Studio (Version 11.0) to create the stimuli 
for the practice and test blocks. A grey screen followed the occlusion point of each 
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clip and lasted for 1700ms. Participants were instructed that responses must be made 
before the end of the grey screen or the response would be recorded as incorrect. The 
inclusion of the time constraint was designed to reflect the presence of a similar time 
constraint that participants would face in a game situation. 
Video sequences of each scenario were selected based on the independent 
evaluations of two expert national league coaches who rated each clip for quality, 
based on how much the clip represented a good example of the offensive 
arrangement, and clarity of the available passing option. This left a pool of between 
four and seven trials available for each option at each viewpoint. The coaches then 
ranked the top four trials based on clarity and quality for each option at each 
viewpoint. Inter-rater reliability was assessed using intra-class correlations for high 
complexity (ICC = .74) and low complexity tasks (ICC = .79). Finally, the coaches 
calculated a ‘decision point’ for each video sequence, operationally defined as the 
point at which the best passing option became evident. This was used as a reference 
to determine participant decision time for each trial. Inter-rater reliability between 
the two coaches for decision point was found to be very high (high complexity task: 
ICC = .99; low complexity task ICC = .99).  
Participants were presented with 36 practice trials, made up of two cycles of 
each passing option filmed at each of the three viewpoints for the high-complexity 
(2 x 4 x 3 = 24 trials) and low-complexity (2 x 2 x 3 = 12 trials) sequences. The test 
blocks consisted of one cycle of the above (18 trials). Trials were allocated to each 
block (practice, low pressure 1, high pressure, low pressure 2) based on the coaches’ 
quality ratings. Within each condition trials were blocked by viewpoint, the 
presented order of which was counterbalanced across participants, passing option 
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and complexity were randomised throughout and each block consisted of novel 
clips. 
The task was designed and run on E-Prime (v. 2.0.1; Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, US). Video sequences were presented on a 
computer screen and were viewed from a distance of approximately 0.5 m. 
Participants were instructed to respond to each sequence by pressing one of four 
response buttons using a handheld number pad depicting the two (low complex task) 
or four (high complex task) passing options (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.1. Video still depicting the design of the video stimuli used for the low 
complexity, two-choice reaction time task 
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Figure 6.2. Video still depicting the design of the video stimuli used for the high 
complexity, four-choice reaction time task 
 
6.2.5 Pressure Manipulation. The pressure manipulation involved two 
steps; the first was to induce evaluation apprehension by requiring participants to 
perform the tasks in the presence of an associate of the experimenter who filmed the 
trials. A cover story was given in which participants were told their performance on 
the next set of trials was to be filmed for the Basketball National Governing Body in 
order to assess their anticipation and decision making skills against other players of 
their level and ability. Participants were informed that the computer used both 
response time and response accuracy equally to compute a performance score. 
Finally, participants were told that if they could improve their performance score by 
20% relative to the average for their age and ability, they would receive £10 and that 
the best performer in the study would win £100. 
6.2.6 Procedure. Having gained informed consent from participants, a 
convenient time for testing was arranged. Upon arrival at the testing area the initial 
questionnaire package (consisting of the DSRS, RS and demographic questionnaire; 
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Appendix I, B & D respectively) was administered. Participants were tested 
individually and informed not to discuss the task after the experiment.  
After being informed about the nature of the task participants were told they 
should respond as quickly and accurately as possible because both decision time and 
judgment accuracy were being recorded and used to determine overall performance. 
This instruction was reinforced prior to each subsequent block of trials. Participants 
were then shown the 36 practice trials in order to familiarise them with the viewing 
perspectives and the time constraints for responding, as well as the offensive 
arrangement used in the test stimuli. Immediately prior to each block of test trials, 
the cognitive and somatic subscales of the CSAI-2R were administered. The 18 trials 
constituting Low Pressure 1 test block were then presented and were described to 
participants as more practice. After this block, participants rated their perception of 
pressure. Following the Low Pressure 1 test block, participants were introduced to 
the experimenter’s associate and were given the cover story regarding the filming of 
trials for the National Governing Body. They were then informed of the performance 
needed in order to win their prize money and were reminded to perform as quickly 
and accurately as possible. The cognitive and somatic subscales of the CSAI-2R 
were then administered for a second time and the 18 trials constituting the High 
Pressure test block were presented. Following the conclusion of the high pressure 
block of trials, the associate left the room. Participants were then informed that the 
final block of trials (Low Pressure 2) was to be used for calibration purposes, would 
not be filmed or used for the National Governing Body, and that their performance 
would not affect any money they may or may not have won. They then completed 
the cognitive and somatic subscales of the CSAI-2R and were reminded to perform 
as quickly and accurately as possible. 
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After completion of the test trials participants again rated the perceptions of 
pressure, after which the awareness test was administered.Upon completion of the 
experiment participants were thanked for taking part in the study and were debriefed 
about the true purpose of the experiment. Following completion of the study and 
associated analyses, participants were contacted to inform them of their 
performance. 
6.2.7 Data Analysis. To analyze the effect of pressure on performance, the 
response time and response accuracy data were subjected to separate 2 x 3 x 2 x 3 
(Group x Block x Complexity x Viewpoint) ANOVAs, with DSRS Group entered as 
a between subjects factor and all other variables entered as repeated measures. 
Where appropriate, follow-up analyses were conducted to further investigate the 
source of any interaction effects. Assignment of each participant to the high or low 
reinvester group was determined by conducting a median split on the DSRS data. 
Continuous data from the scale was dichotomized to facilitate analysis of interaction 
effects while maintaining inclusion, given the constraints of the sample size, which 
would otherwise be lost. Although it is acknowledged that this is at the cost of a 
slight loss to statistical power.”  To test for differences in use of explicit knowledge 
between low and high reinvesters the awareness data were subjected to an 
independent samples t-test. The number of explicit rules reported was also correlated 
with change in performance between high and low pressure blocks (mean low 
pressure block score minus high pressure block score).  To compare the predictive 
validity of the RS and DSRS a multiple regression analysis was performed using 
global scores of each scale as predictors of performance change between high and 
low pressure blocks. Alpha was set to .05 for all statistical tests and Greenhouse-
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Geisser corrections were applied where the test for sphericity was significant. Effect 
size is indicated by partial eta squared (ηp2). 
6.3 Results 
Preliminary screening of all data, using univariate z scores (> ±3.29) and 
Mahalanobis distance values, revealed no outliers. Descriptive statistics revealed 
that participants’ DSRS scores ranged from 11 to 48 (M = 30.00, SD = 9.11). RS 
scores ranged from 19 to 64 (M = 41.71, SD = 10.68). An independent samples t-test 
revealed a significant difference in DSRS global scores between low (M = 22.47, SD 
= 5.03) and high (M = 37.53, SD = 5.09) reinvestment groups, categorised using a 
median split technique (t (36) = -9.17, p < .001, 95% CI: -18.39 to -11.72). 
6.3.1 Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale Group. 
6.3.1.1 Response Accuracy. A 2 x 3 x 2 (Group x Block x Complexity) 
ANOVA revealed significant main effects for block (F(2,72) = 6.09, p = . 004, ηp2 = 
.15) and complexity (F(1,36) = 29.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .45), and a non-significant 
main effect for DSRS Group (F(1,36) = .11, p = .74, ηp2 = .03). Significant 
interactions were found between DSRS group and block (F(2,72) = 4.03, p = .02, ηp2 
= .10) as well as complexity and block (F(2,72) = 7.11, p = .002, ηp2 = .17). To test 
the interaction effect of block and DSRS group, separate one way ANOVAs were 
performed on combined complexity scores for high and low reinvestment groups. 
Low reinvestment group analyses revealed a non-significant effect for block 
(F(2,36) = 3.17, p = .05, ηp2 = .15). However in the high reinvestment group there 
was a significant effect of block (F(2,36) = 5.56, p = .008, ηp2 = .24) with pairwise 
comparisons indicating differences between the high pressure trial (M = .75, SD = 
.03) and low pressure trial two (M = .86, SD = .03, p = .007). Figure 6.3 highlights 
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observations that in the low complexity condition, decision accuracy showed slight 
but non-significant increases across blocks for low reinvesters (Low Pressure 1, M = 
.83, SE = .06; High Pressure, M = .90, SE = .05; Low Pressure 2, M = .91, SE = .04) 
and high reinvesters (Low Pressure 1, M = .84, SE = .06; High Pressure, M = .87, SE 
= .05; Low Pressure 2, M = .95, SE = .04). However, in the high complexity 
condition, decision accuracy remained stable across blocks for low reinvesters (Low 
Pressure 1, M = .75, SE = .03; High Pressure, M = .75, SE = .04; Low Pressure 2, M 
= .76, SE = .03) whilst high reinvesters displayed poorer performance under high 
pressure than low pressure (Low Pressure 1, M = .76, SE = .03; High Pressure, M = 
.62, SE = .04; Low Pressure 2, M = .78, SE = .03). 
 
Figure 6.3. Mean response accuracy scores on a low- and high-complex decision-
making task for high and low reinvesters using the Decision Specific Reinvestment 
Scale under low and high pressure conditions. 
 
6.3.1.2 Response Time. A 2 x 3 x 2 (Group x Block x Complexity) ANOVA 
revealed significant main effects for block (F(2,72) = 66.85, p < . 001, ηp2 = .65) and 
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complexity (F(1,36) = 26.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .42), and a non-significant main effect 
for DSRS Group (F(1,36) = 2.75, p = .11, ηp2 = .07). A significant interaction was 
found between complexity and block (F(2,72) = 8.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .19), while 
other interactions were non-significant. To test the interaction effect of complexity 
and block, separate one way ANOVAs were performed on response time data for 
each level of complexity. Low complexity condition analyses revealed a significant 
effect for block (F(1.73,64.07) = 52.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .59) with pairwise 
comparisons highlighting that the low pressure trial one (M = 76.21, SD = 177.62) 
was significantly slower than the high pressure trial (M = -104.43, SD = 151.58, p < 
.001) and low pressure trial two (M = -105.22, SD = 143.53, p < .001). Additionally, 
in the high complexity condition there was also a significant effect of block 
(F(1.58,58.28) = 25.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .41) with pairwise comparisons highlighting 
that the low pressure trial two (M = -58.56, SD = 186.80) was significantly faster 
than the high pressure trial (M = 71.37, SD = 194.99, p < .001) and low pressure trial 
one (M = 127.26, SD = 202.53, p < .001). 
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Figure 6.4. Mean response time scores on a low- and high-complex decision-making 
task for high and low reinvesters using the Decision Specific Reinvestment Scale 
under low and high pressure conditions. 
 
6.3.2 Predictive Validity of Reinvestment and Decision-Specific 
Reinvestment Scale. To compare predictive validity of the Decision-
Specific to the original RS, separate multiple regressions were conducted for the 
low-complex (3 v 3; Table 6.1) and high-complex (5 v 5; Table 6.2) conditions, 
using response accuracy and response time change across pressure conditions as the 
dependent variables. Analysis of the low complex condition revealed neither scale to 
be a significant predictor of response accuracy change under pressure (DSRS, β = 
.13, p = .47; RS, β = -.03, p = .86) or response time change under pressure (DSRS, β 
= .30, p = .09; RS, β = -.15, p = .39). However, in the high complex condition, 
DSRS score was shown to be a significant predictor of decrements in response 
accuracy under pressure (β = .47, p = .01) but not decision time (β = .19, p = .25), 
whilst global RS score was not a significant predictor of decision accuracy change (β 
= -.04, p = .82) or decision time change (β = -.28, p = .10). 
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Table 6.1. Multiple Regression Analysis between Decision-Specific Reinvestment 
Scale scores and original Reinvestment Scale scores on performance change under 
pressure in the low complexity (3 v 3) task. 
 B SE B β 
Response Accuracy    
 Constant -0.04 .09  
 Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale 0.002 .002 .13 
 Original Reinvestment Scale < 0.001 .002 -.03 
Response Time    
 Constant 43.86 87.43  
 Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale 3.75 2.13 .30 
 Original Reinvestment Scale -1.60 1.81 -.15 
Note: Response Accuracy, R2 = .02, ∆R2 = -.04; Response Time, R2 = .09, ∆R2 = .03;  
*p < .05. 
 
Table 6.2. Multiple Regression Analysis between Decision-Specific Reinvestment 
Scale scores and original Reinvestment Scale scores on performance change under 
pressure in the high complexity (5 v 5) task. 
 B SE B β 
Response Accuracy    
 Constant -.16 .12  
 Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale .01 .003 .47* 
 Original Reinvestment Scale -0.001 .003 -.04 
Response Time    
 Constant 16.39 86.08  
 Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale 2.44 2.09 .19 
 Original Reinvestment Scale -3.03 1.79 -.28 
Note: Response Accuracy, R2 = .21, ∆R2 = .17; Response Time, R2 = .09, ∆R2 = .04;  
*p < .01. 
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6.3.3 Pressure Manipulation Check. To test whether the pressure 
manipulation was successful a repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was performed with the cognitive and somatic sub-scale scores of the 
CSAI2-R and perceived pressure rating scores entered as dependent variables. The 
multivariate analysis indicated a significant overall effect of pressure (Wilks’ 
Lambda = .22, F(6,32) = 18.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .78). Mauchly’s test of sphericity 
revealed violations in cognitive and somatic anxiety subscales as well as pressure 
ratings, so Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied. The univariate analyses 
revealed significant effects of pressure for cognitive anxiety (F(1.69,62.47) = 22.85, 
p < .001, ηp2 =.38), somatic anxiety (F(1.49,55.25) = 13.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .26) and 
the perceived pressure rating score (F(1.53,56.57) = 64.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .63). 
Inspection of the means revealed higher cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and 
perceived pressure in the high pressure block than in the low pressure blocks 
(cognitive anxiety: Low Pressure 1, M = 16.47, SD = 4.61; High Pressure, M = 
20.63, SD = 7.19; Low Pressure 2, M = 14.53, SD = 4.91; somatic anxiety: Low 
Pressure 1, M = 12.71, SD = 2.89; High Pressure, M = 15.60, SD = 5.38; Low 
Pressure 2, M = 12.70, s = 3.40; perceived pressure: Low Pressure 1, M = 2.45, SD = 
1.18; High Pressure, M = 4.50, SD = 1.50; Low Pressure 2, M = 2.02, SD = 1.38).  
6.3.4 Explicit Knowledge. The type of information, reported by participants 
as underpinning their choices, focused either on offensive awareness (e.g. readiness 
of receiver, size mismatches, speed of cutter, strength / speed of screener) defensive 
awareness (e.g. Location of defender, defensive strategy for dealing with screens, 
help position of other defenders) and threats to outcome (e.g. ease of pass required, 
type of pass required, ease of shot from pass, distance of pass / to basket). Pearson 
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product moment correlations were calculated on the number of explicit rules 
reported and the change in performance between high and low pressure blocks 
(mean low pressure block scores minus high pressure block score). Analyses 
revealed no significant relationships between the number of explicit rules reported 
and performance change between low- and high-pressure trials for decision accuracy 
or decision time in either the low complexity (Accuracy, r = -.04, P = .41; Time, r = 
-.23, p = .08) or high complexity (Accuracy, r = -.24, P = .07; Time, r = .17, p = .15) 
conditions. Faster response times were related to larger performance decrements in 
decision accuracy under pressure in both the low-complexity (r =.35, p = .02) and 
high-complexity (r = .36, p = .01) conditions. 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the number of 
explicit rules reported by participants in the high and low reinvestment groups. 
There was no significant difference between the number of rules reported by the low 
(M = 4.21, SD = 1.65) and high reinvesters (M = 4.00, SD = 1.86; t (36) = .37, p = 
.36, 95% CI: -.95 to 1.37).  All 38 participants stated they felt “no difference” in 
terms of their reliance upon this information between low pressure and high pressure 
trials. 
6.4 Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effect of pressure on 
performance on a low- and high-complex version of a time-constrained decision-
making task, and to examine the predictive validity of the DSRS (Kinrade et al., 
2010). In the study, participants were required to respond to video stimuli of a 
common offensive set, based on a simple “motion offence”, in basketball, viewed 
from three viewpoints (the centre of the court and from each wing). The task 
required either a two-choice (low complexity 3 v 3 situation) or four-choice (high 
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complexity 5 v 5 situation) response. Participants responded as quickly and 
accurately as possible by indicating which player was the best option to pass to. The 
cognitive and somatic anxiety sub-scales of the CSAI2-R and the ratings of 
perceived pressure were used to examine the success of the pressure manipulation. 
Overall, the analysis revealed performance decrements under pressure with regard to 
response accuracy, which were moderated by both task complexity and DSRS. More 
specifically, support was found for the prediction that dispositional reinvestment 
would be associated with susceptibility to skill failure under pressure in the high 
complexity condition of the decision-making task. Whilst the analysis of the reaction 
time data was less clear, a general speeding of performance over successive blocks 
was observed, either blocks to and/or three being faster depending on complexity. 
There was also clear evidence that participants were both more anxious and felt 
under greater pressure to perform well. Examination of the predictive validity of 
Decision-Specific and original Reinvestment scales revealed that only the former 
was a significant predictor of performance change under pressure with regard to 
response accuracy in the high complexity condition. Explicit knowledge was found 
to be unrelated to performance change under pressure and no different between low 
and high reinvesters. This discussion will elaborate on the theoretical explanations of 
these findings and highlight their congruence with the existing body of research. 
The analysis of performance data revealed significant differences in the 
decision accuracy between the high-pressure trials (Block 2) and the low-pressure 
trials (Block 1 and Block 3) and that this difference was moderated by Decision-
Specific Reinvestment. More specifically, the results show that low reinvesters 
performance remained largely stable across all blocks. However, high reinvesters’ 
decision accuracy was significantly lower during the high-pressure block compared 
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to the low-pressure block two. The findings from the regression analysis revealed 
DSRS global scores to be associated with performance breakdown in response 
accuracy for the high complex task. This is consistent with research in the motor 
skill literature that has examined the role of reinvestment in performance breakdown 
(Masters et al., 1993; Maxwell et al., 2000) and extends the findings from the initial 
validation of the DSRS, whereby global scale scores were highly correlated with 
peer ratings of choking tendency. This supports the hypothesis that a tendency to 
engage in conscious control and ruminative mental thoughts is detrimental to 
performance under conditions of increased pressure. The observation of this 
phenomenon in only the high complexity condition mirrored the findings of Kinrade, 
Jackson and Ashford (2010), who found performance decrements in high complexity 
versions of working memory and psychomotor tasks. The findings also lend support 
to Masters et al., (1993) who observed that simple tasks place relatively little burden 
on the processing capacity of individuals, meaning they are still able to meet the 
processing demands of the task efficiently despite increases in workload from the 
concurrent application of conscious control. Performance failure in the high-
complexity condition for high reinvesters under pressure is particularly interesting 
considering reinvestment’s association with explicit learning and Raab’s (2003) 
contention that high complexity decisions are better served by explicit learning, 
whereas low complexity decisions are better learnt implicitly. He investigated the 
role of learning and complexity on tactical decision-making using a similar 
interactive simulation of a game situation to that adopted in the present study. When 
the decision was low in complexity (Experiments 1 and 2), participants who learned 
the task implicitly had superior decision-making performance. However, in high-
complexity tasks (Experiments 3 and 4), explicit learners showed superior decision-
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making performance. Conversely, the present study found decision-making 
performance in both complexity conditions to be no different between low and high 
reinvesters (linked with reliance upon explicit knowledge). Furthermore, the finding 
that the propensity to reinvest can be detrimental to performance under conditions of 
increased anxiety in complex decisions is incongruent with Raab’s (2003) 
recommendation for explicit learning in teaching complex decision-making.  
There is evidence of an association between explicit knowledge and 
propensity for reinvestment in the motor learning literature (Poolton et al., 2004); 
however, there was no difference in the amount of explicit knowledge reported by 
high and low reinvesters in the present study, nor was it correlated with performance 
change under pressure. These findings leave open the possibility raised by Kinrade, 
Jackson and Ashford (2010) that explicit monitoring and control of movements may 
occur independently from the application of explicit rules or indeed that a different 
process of skill breakdown is implicated. A possible explanation may lie in the role 
of working memory. Distraction-based accounts view choking as a result of reduced 
working memory due to consumption from task irrelevant cues and thoughts of 
worry. Masters and Maxwell (2004) drew parity between reinvestment and 
distraction explanations highlighting that the explicit processes used when 
reinvesting ones actions rely on working memory to store and manipulate 
information and that a reduction in working memory capacity to perform the primary 
task can result in performance breakdown. Support for a working memory 
explanation was also found in the studies of Poolton et al., (2006) and Masters et al., 
(2008) on concurrent motor and decision making performance of implicit and 
explicit learners.  
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The DSRS was developed from the original RS; however, there are 
differences in the factor structures of each instrument. The original scale consisted 
of a single Reinvestment factor and did not attempt to measure the process of 
reinvestment directly, but rather linked conceptually-related items that aimed to 
predict this process. The DSRS arguably has greater face validity and comprises two 
factors concerned with processes hypothesized to consume working memory: 
ruminative thoughts (Decision Rumination) and processing of explicit information 
during the decision-making process (Decision Reinvestment). Results of the multiple 
regression analyses indicated that in the more complex decisions the DSRS was a 
better predictor of less accurate decision making under pressure than was the 
original RS. Perhaps the DSRS’s factor structure is more sensitive in examining of 
processes that inhibit working memory than the original RS. Indeed, the factor 
structure is comparable to the two factor structure of Movement Specific 
Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 2005) (conscious motor processing, movement 
self-consciousness) developed due to the criticisms of the lack of face validity with 
the original RS.  
The general trend from the response time data seemed to be a speeding of 
decision time between blocks one and two and/or between blocks two and three that 
was moderated by the complexity condition. Of important note was the consistent 
finding across complexity regarding the lack of difference between low and high 
reinvesters. This suggests that a speed-accuracy trade-off, often observed in sports 
domains (Schmidt & Lee, 2005), does not explain the performance decrements 
under pressure in decision accuracy exhibited by the high reinvesters. A potential 
explanation for the observed differences in decision accuracy under pressure without 
differences in decision time may come from decision field theory (Busemeyer & 
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Townsend, 1993). The theory holds that, under time pressure, decision makers may 
be subject to a decision threshold (the point at which a decision must be made), 
leading them to reduce the amount of information used in making a decision 
(Johnson, 2006). Participants were all required to complete the task as quickly and 
as accurately as possible in order to achieve a best performance score. Faster 
decision times result in less time available to sample the relevant information upon 
which to base a decision. As a result less salient information is often missed. As low 
and high reinvesters showed no difference in decision time under pressure it may be 
assumed that the slower processing efficiency of high reinvesters, as a result of 
conscious control strategies and ruminative thoughts, reduced the amount of 
information they were able to process before reaching the decision threshold, 
resulting in a poorer decision than that of low reinvesters who were able to draw 
from a more complete sample of processed information. However, caution must be 
taken when interpretation this data as preliminary analysis revealed an interaction 
effect of viewpoint. Results revealed that the observed speeding across trials was 
inconsistent between the different viewpoints but not interact with DSRS groups. 
From a theoretical perspective there is no apparent reason why decision time should 
differ across viewpoints. Differences were observed between all viewpoints despite 
two viewpoints essentially being mirror image perspectives. All viewpoints viewed 
attacking players move away from the camera to set the screen with other attacking 
players coming towards the camera. Task instructions, demands, viewing distance 
and clip quality were all equated and presentation order was counterbalanced 
thereby eliminating order and familiarity or learning effects.  
In conclusion, the results of the present study support the original hypothesis 
that high reinvesters would be more susceptible to the detrimental effects of pressure 
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in complex decision-making tasks (Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford, & Bishop, 2010). 
Individuals with high scores on the DSRS made less accurate decisions under 
pressure compared to their low reinvesting counterparts. The DSRS was found to be 
a significant predictor of choking, whilst the amount of explicit knowledge 
individuals reported was unrelated to choking. The findings of the present study 
support a working memory explanation of choking by which Reinvestment of 
explicit knowledge through conscious control and ruminative thought consume 
working memory thereby reducing the information available for task performance 
(Masters & Maxwell, 2004). 
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the choking phenomenon in tasks with 
a significant cognitive component. More specifically, it aimed to examine the roles 
of reinvestment and task complexity, and to identify individual differences that may 
highlight those individuals with a greater propensity to choke. In Chapter 3, the 
moderating effect of dispositional reinvestment upon ‘choking’ was examined by 
testing performance of a battery of tests that included low-complexity and high-
complexity tests of motor skill, psychomotor and working memory, performed under 
low-pressure and high-pressure conditions. The aim of Chapter 4 was to construct a 
tool that predicts susceptibility to impaired decision-making under pressure. Here, a 
decision-specific version of the Reinvestment Scale was developed, which measured 
an individual’s propensity for engaging in conscious control of decision-making 
processes and manifestations of ruminative thoughts. Chapter 5 described an 
investigation into the susceptibility to choking in a perceptual judgment task, which 
required rapid decisions regarding the intentions of an opposing badminton player’s 
shuttle placement from an overhead shot. The second aim of the experiment was to 
examine the predictive validity of the Decision-Specific and original versions of the 
Reinvestment Scale in a relevant sport-specific task. Expanding further on this work, 
Chapter 6 examined the moderating effect of task complexity on choking in a 
perceptual judgment task and again scrutinized the predictive validity of the 
Decision-Specific and original Reinvestment Scales.  
This discussion is in three parts. The first part summarizes the main findings 
of the experiments presented in the preceding chapters. The second part considers 
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the emergent themes and implications of these findings and is split into three parts; 
theoretical explanations of choking, the role of task complexity and the practical 
implication of the findings. The final part of the discussion considers some 
limitations of the present research and highlights possible directions for future 
investigation.  
7.2 Summary of findings from Experiments 
Initial inspiration for investigating the present area of research stemmed from 
a desire to examine choking, through an individual differences perspective, in a 
different sporting context to that of the traditional well learnt motor skill. In 
particular, do theoretical explanations for the underlying mechanisms of 
performance failure under pressure still hold under different task constraints and can 
we highlight those individuals more prone to choking based on these accounts. 
The first hypothesis came from Masters’ (1992) Reinvestment theory that has 
examined the choking phenomenon in motor tasks, and theorizes that performance 
breakdown is a result of undoing the automatic nature of well learnt motor skills due 
to exertion of conscious control using explicit knowledge. More specifically, the 
hypothesis was to examine the role of Reinvestment in choking on cognitive based 
tasks such as working memory and psychomotor tasks. A plethora of evidence has 
corroborated the Reinvestment Scale’s validity to predict skill failure under pressure 
in motor tasks (Masters et al., 1993; Poolton et al, 2004; Maxwell et al., 2000); 
however the nature of any relationship with skill failure in more cognitive-oriented, 
working-memory dependent tasks had yet to be determined. Additionally, the 
mediating effect of task complexity has shown that the relationship between 
Reinvestment scores and performance decrements under pressure are more apparent 
in complex tasks. It was hypothesized that reinvestment would be associated with 
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poorer performance under pressure in both motor and cognitive-oriented tasks, 
highlighting that the scale also contains several items that arguably align more 
closely with distraction-based accounts of choking such as rumination about past 
emotional events.  
Experiment one was designed to test this hypothesis using low complex and 
high complex tests of card sorting (psychomotor), modular arithmetic (working 
memory) as well as  pegboard (low complexity) and golf putting (high complexity) 
tests of motor skill. The results revealed that pressure had a deleterious effect on 
performance in the peg-board motor task, led to faster but more error-prone 
performance in the high-complexity card sorting task, and led to more errors in the 
high-complexity modular arithmetic task; thus supporting research that has found 
similar performance breakdown in tasks under pressure (Beilock, Kulp, et al., 2004). 
These findings support the original hypothesis in showing that high reinvestment 
scale scores were significantly correlated with performance decrements from low to 
high pressure conditions in both the peg-board and golf-putting tasks, and in both 
modular arithmetic tasks in line with previous research (Masters et al., 1993; 
Maxwell et al., 2000). However, in the card-sorting tasks, higher reinvestment scores 
were associated with a speeding of performance from the low to high pressure 
conditions. The findings suggest that the association between reinvestment and 
choking extends beyond the motor skill domain to cognitive tasks, particularly those 
that place significant demands on working memory, and that this relationship is 
moderated by task complexity. However, closer inspection of the relationship 
between skill failure and the subscales of the Reinvestment scale suggest this may 
not necessarily be indicative of an individual’s propensity to exert conscious control 
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as the scale contains several items that are more closely associated with distraction 
(Public Self-Consciousness and Rehearsal). 
These findings, coupled with conceptual advancements in defining 
reinvestment and the observation that the original scale did not directly specify 
movement (Jackson et al., 2006), prompted steps to develop a psychometric 
instrument that highlighted a performer’s predisposition to reinvest explicit 
knowledge relating specifically to decision making. Experiment 2 followed a similar 
process to Masters, Eves, and Maxwell (2005) in their development of a movement 
specific version of the Reinvestments Scale. Here, items from the original 
Reinvestment Scale were modified to reflect cognitions when making decisions. 
From a pool of 21 items, factor analysis revealed a 13-item 2-factor model. The first 
factor focused on the conscious monitoring of the processes that produce a decision 
(decision reinvestment) that reflected the conscious control processes described in 
reinvestment theory (Masters & Maxwell, 2008). The second factor highlighted an 
individual’s propensity to focus upon past inaccurate decisions that they have made 
(decision rumination), associated with increased worry (Scott & McIntosh, 1999) 
and prevalent in distraction based accounts of choking (Beilock, Kulp, et al, 2004). 
In an initial validation of the psychometric properties of the instrument, peer rating 
scores of players’ tendency to choke, as judged by their coaches, were shown to be 
highly correlated with their responses to the scale and were similar to those reported 
using the original Reinvestment Scale by Masters et al. (1993) for squash and tennis 
players. However, while these data were encouraging, one obvious limitation was 
reliance on peer ratings of performance failure under pressure rather than a direct 
measure of decision making performance. 
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Considering this, the purpose of Experiment 3 was to examine the 
differences between high and low reinvesters’ performance on a sport specific 
perceptual judgment task under conditions of low and high pressure. The experiment 
failed to fully examine the moderating effect of dispositional reinvestment as 
choking was not observed. Pressure had a non-significant effect on response time or 
judgment accuracy in low or high reinvestment groups, using both the original and 
decision specific reinvestment scales. Significant increases in the cognitive and 
somatic anxiety sub-scales of the CSAI-2R and ratings of perceived pressure during 
the high pressure block indicated that this was not the result of a weak pressure 
manipulation. Instead, based on evidence from motor skill failure under pressure 
(Beilock & Carr, 2001; Chell et al., 2003; Jackson et al., 2006) it was suggested that 
the task itself did not place sufficient cognitive demands on the processing capacity 
of individuals, thereby rendering performance more tolerant to reinvestment of 
conscious processing.  
Experiment 4 looked to address the issues emanating from experiment three 
by manipulating the complexity of a perceptual judgment task. Using the same 
experimental design as experiment three, the results supported the hypothesis that 
dispositional reinvestment would be associated with susceptibility to skill failure 
under pressure in the complex version of the decision-making task only, specifically 
with regard to decision accuracy. Although constrained by interactions of viewpoint, 
the reaction time data showed a general speeding of performance as participants 
progressed through the blocks, whilst pressure ratings and CSAI-2R data showed 
participants were anxious and under pressure. Examination of the predictive validity 
of Decision-Specific Reinvestment scales and its discriminant validity from the 
original Reinvestment scale found only the former to significantly predict 
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performance change under pressure with regard to response accuracy in the complex 
version of the task. Explicit knowledge was found to be unrelated to performance 
change under pressure and no different between low and high reinvesters. It is 
suggested that the increased face validity and the more specific consideration of a 
broader range of processes that inhibit working memory, those being conscious 
control and ruminative thoughts, enhanced its predictive power over that of the 
original scale. 
7.3 Emergent Themes and Implications of Findings 
Throughout the course of the present research programme a number of 
salient themes have emerged regarding the effects of pressure, dispositional 
reinvestment, allocation of attention and task complexity. Hence, the purpose of this 
section is to appraise the main findings and highlight the possible implications with 
regard to theoretical explanations for the processes that underlie choking and sports 
performance under pressure. 
7.3.1 Theoretical explanations of choking.  As highlighted in the literature 
review, the two main theoretical explanations of the processes that underpin 
choking, distraction and reinvestment were once considered to be conflicting 
accounts with the former citing attention away from the task as detrimental to 
performance whist the latter claimed attention towards the task to be 
disadvantageous. However, Masters and Maxwell’s (2004) concept of a working 
memory based explanation looked for common ground in the two theories and the 
findings of this thesis seem to support such an account. They highlight that the 
explicit process used when reinvesting under pressure consumes working memory in 
the same way that distraction based accounts suggest anxiety induced worry and task 
irrelevant cues. The reduced function of working memory then debilitates processing 
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efficiency causing skill breakdown, a conclusion quite comparable to Eysenck and 
Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency theory. Experiment one found choking to occur 
in a task that does not lend itself to conscious control using explicit information. 
Furthermore, correlations between the source subscales of the Reinvestment Scale 
and performance change under pressure revealed the subscale that aligns most with 
explicit monitoring accounts of choking (private self-consciousness) was unrelated 
to performance change. Whilst public self-consciousness and rehearsal subscales, 
more concerned with distracting thoughts of external factors or rumination over 
previous emotional events, were related to choking. The factor structure of the 
Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale also reflects the importance of considering 
elements that consume working memory with the presence of ruminative thoughts 
(Decision Rumination) and the processing of explicit information in order to control 
actions (Decision Reinvestment) prominently featured. 
7.3.2  Task Complexity. With regard to the examination of skill failure 
under pressure, the experiments presented here have displayed performance 
decrements in a variety of tasks that required varying cognitive demands. 
Experiment one found performance decrements under artificially induced pressure in 
motor, psychomotor and working memory tasks, whilst experiment four showed the 
phenomenon in a perceptual judgment task. These findings support a plethora of 
research that observed phenomena in similar tasks (Masters et al., 1993; Chell 
Graydon et al., 2003; Jackson et al., 2006; Beilock, Kulp, et al., 2004; Beilock & 
DeCaro, 2007). However, not all tasks were found to be susceptible to the 
debilitating effects of pressure. Experiment three found performance on a perceptual 
judgment task to be unaffected by pressure. Similarly, the low complexity version of 
the task used in experiment four also showed no performance difference between 
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high and low pressure conditions. Confirmation that the manipulations used in each 
study were successful by the CSAI2-R data led to suggestions that these findings 
were a result of the complexity of the task. Indeed, the interaction effects of 
complexity observed in the psychomotor and working memory tasks also highlight 
the mediating effect of task complexity in the observation of choking. It is suggested 
that simple tasks were not complex enough to present demands that would lead to 
reinvestment (Masters et al., 1993). Whilst not specifying the role of reinvestment, 
other research has pointed to the attentional cost of more complex skill yielding a 
greater tendency to suffer task failure (Shea, et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2004). The 
current evidence suggests support for the notion that skill failure under pressure is 
mediated by task complexity. Due to the lower attentional demands of simple tasks, 
following the additional demands created by conscious control of ruminative 
thought, sufficient working memory is still available in order to maintain 
undisrupted performance. 
7.3.3 Practical Implications. The practical implications of the results 
discussed concern, first, the identification of those individuals more prone to 
choking from a decision-making perspective, second, insight into potential 
precautionary measures, and, third, a possible grounding for preventative 
interventions. The encouraging findings for the use of the Decision-Specific 
Reinvestment Scale as a tool to highlight those individuals more prone to disrupted 
decision-making under pressure provide coaches and practitioners with a useful 
instrument with which to complement their observations. The two-factor structure 
may also offer an explanation to the root cause of any observed performance 
breakdown to examine if failure under pressure was a result of ruminative thought or 
exertion of conscious control. This will then better inform coaches in their selection 
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of suitable training or interventions in order to alleviate the symptoms of such 
phenomenon.  
Training methods which promote cognitively efficient decision-making 
should be encouraged to ensure individuals are capable of meeting the increased 
attentional demands of pressure. Whilst implicit learning has shown resilience to 
performance breakdown under pressure (Masters, 1992) performance fails to 
progress at the rate of explicit learning and even after longer periods of learning 
implicit learners do not achieve the same performance levels as their explicit 
counterparts (Maxwell et al., 2000). However, perceptual training methods such as 
video-based procedures are often conducted using a highly explicit form of learning, 
implicit learning methods suffer from a slower learning rate and lack practicality, 
particularly in terms of transfer to the field. Jackson and Farrow (2005) highlight 
several methodological and practical issues in implementing an implicit learning 
method to teach complex anticipation skills. A possible alternative to implicit 
learning, which looks to avoid the issues regarding performance level, whilst still 
maintaining efficient motor control is that of analogy learning. Liao and Masters 
(2001) used analogies to integrate the complex rule structure of a skill into a simple 
metaphor to aid instruction. Crucially, whereas explicit rules would occupy and be 
manipulated by the phonological loop, analogies are most likely held on the visuo-
spatial sketchpad thus sharing the cognitive load across each element of the central 
executive, the key contrivance in working memory (Baddeley, 1992). Evidence has 
suggested analogies provide a learning method that produces robustness under 
pressure, dual task demands and stable performance under tasks that require 
decisions and motor skills to be executed in close temporal proximity (Liao & 
Masters, 2001; Poolton et al., 2006; Masters et al., 2008). Instructing individuals to 
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evaluate opponents’ actions when executing a motor skill using analogies that 
describe the mechanics of those actions, may provide an effective method of 
teaching decision-making skills without the inherent issues surrounding explicit 
instruction. 
7.4  Strengths of Present Research 
One of the main strengths of this research programme is the contribution it 
makes to the existing body of knowledge. Although the phenomenon of choking has 
received a relatively large amount of attention over the past decade (See Beilock & 
Gray, 2007 and Hill et al., 2010 for reviews), the vast majority of this work has 
focused on the performance of motor skills under pressure, with little consideration 
of the cognitive skills that affect sports performance such as decision-making. Using 
attentional theories of choking, predominantly the construct of Reinvestment 
(Masters, 1992), performance decrements under pressure have been examined in a 
variety of sport specific decision-making tasks in Chapters 5 and 6, following 
confirmation that this phenomenon is observed in working memory and 
psychomotor tasks in Chapter 3. Additionally, this work has led to the development 
of the Decision Specific Reinvestment Scale, a psychometric tool for identifying 
individuals with a propensity to engage in behaviors under pressure that compromise 
decision-making performance. Initial findings suggest the scale has sound predictive 
validity and the scale has the potential to be useful in a variety of domains, 
extending beyond sport, that require decision-making in high pressured 
environments. 
7.5 Limitations of Present Research 
The goal of this line of research was to gain a more complete understanding 
of the concept of choking in decision making and the processes that underlie this 
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phenomenon. A further goal was to develop a psychometric instrument to identify 
those individuals more susceptible to disrupted decision-making under pressure. 
Throughout the process of conducting this investigation, a number of limitations 
were identified and therefore must be addressed. 
7.5.1 Generalization of research. The present study is limited to time-
constrained, dynamic team sports. In experiments three and four perceptual 
judgments, based on visual stimuli, were isolated in order to produce a performance 
measure of decision making. However, the sporting domain as a contextual 
environment offers a multidimensional framework with which to examine decision-
making. Johnson (2006) highlights the variety of decision agents (coaches, players, 
officials, etc.) tasks (tactics, ball allocation, team selection, etc.) and contexts (before 
a game, during play, during timeouts, etc.) that produce different task demands, rely 
on different processes and interact with each other to influence how decisions are 
made. Johnson also highlights several key characteristics of decision-making in 
sports, such as naturalistic, dynamic and processed online, most of which were 
maintained in the tasks used for the various experiments within this thesis. However 
the fact remains there is no “standard” type of decision in sports and the findings of 
this work relate largely to the context in which it was examined. 
7.5.2 Tasks used. There is also a possible limitation regarding the 
characteristics of the tasks used that affect the interpretation of the findings. As 
highlighted earlier, the peg-board task, selected as a measure of psychomotor skill 
(Woo, Proulx & Greenblatt, 1991) has also been referred to as an effort based task 
(Baumeister, Hutton & Cairns, 1990). The implications of the classification of this 
task have been discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Caution should also be shown in the 
interpretation of findings from the golf putting task used in Experiment 1. The golf 
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putting task used for the high complex version of a motor skill differs from putting 
on a real golf course. Here participants were not required to “hole” a putt, rather to 
putt the golf ball on a carpeted surface so that it came to rest in the centre of a 
circular target. The lack of a hole, in combination with the scoring criteria of the 
task, resulted in the task becoming more of an assessment of the ability to judge the 
weight or distance of the putt rather than the direction. Putts that have perfect line 
and would usually be holed in a normal putting situation may continue rolling 
beyond the high scoring zones of the target whilst puts off line, that would not 
normally end in the hole (width of a standard golf cup is 10.8cm), may come to rest 
in a high scoring zones. It could therefore be argued the task used was not a true 
reflection of putting ability. However, in comparison to the peg board the task is still 
a reflection of performance on a high complex motor skill, as it requires fine motor 
control and coordination of various muscle groups, plus is subject to a plethora of 
technical instructions that underlie the putting action used in golf. 
7.5.3 Isolating Decision Making. In experiments three and four, perceptual 
judgment tasks, which required participants to respond using a keypad, were used to 
measure decision-making performance. In the sporting contexts from which they are 
taken, the act of responding is far more complex a motor skill than the act of 
pressing a button. In both tasks there are often additional decisions within the 
response itself. For example, in the badminton task, not only must the receiver 
process the information regarding the intended destination of the opposing players 
shot, they must also make a decision on where to return the shuttle to and then 
execute the motor skill correctly to achieve the desired outcome. The attentional cost 
of processing information in real life situations is therefore likely to be greater than 
in the tasks used in the present studies. Masters Poolton, Maxwell and Raab (2008) 
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highlighted the effect of this additional load in examining the effects of explicit and 
implicit learning methods on performance of a table tennis shot that required a 
concurrent decision to be made. Their findings revealed that only participants who 
learnt explicitly suffered performance disruption when performing a concurrent high 
complex decision. It was suggested that implicit learning promotes cognitively 
efficient motor control allowing individuals to meet the demands required to execute 
movements and make decisions in close temporal proximity. Therefore a more 
ecologically valid measure would be to replicate the experimental design of 
experiment four using a similar task to that used by Masters et al. (2008). 
7.5.4 Magnitude of Pressure Manipulation. The methods used to 
manipulate the degree of pressure individuals experienced during high pressure trials 
in experiments one, three and four were based on established methods used in 
previous studies (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Gray, 2004) and were all found to increase 
feelings of cognitive and somatic anxiety as well as perceived pressure. However, 
despite the advantages of manipulating pressure in a lab based setting, such as a 
controlled and measurable setting, the problem of ecological validity is still inherent 
by design. Whilst experiments three and four looked to address this issue by creating 
environments that contained multiple sources of pressure commonly seen in the real 
world, including monetary incentives, peer pressure and social evaluation 
components (Beilock & Gray, 2007; Hardy et al., 1996; Masters, 1992) it is still 
doubtful that the pressure induced by such manipulations approaches that 
experienced in real world settings. Of course, we are bound by ethical considerations 
so even if it were possible to mimic the feelings of pressure experienced by, for 
example, performers charged with taking a penalty kick in a football World Cup 
final, it is doubtful whether ethical clearance would be granted. 
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7.5.5 Self Report Measures. Whilst the administration of self-report 
questionnaires is advantageous to some extent, as they reflect information derived 
directly from the person experiencing the phenomena and collect a large amount of 
comparable data, they do have limitations. Self-report measures rely on the 
individual to report their own behaviors and feelings truthfully and may result in 
response distortions such as acquiescence, extreme and central tendency responding, 
and negative affectivity bias, and socially desirable responding (Lanyon & 
Goodstein, 1997). Using a similar scale, Orrell et al. (2008) suggested that the scores 
on the questionnaires they distributed may have been influenced by a social 
desirability bias with some individuals overestimating their functional capabilities 
and some repeating the same answer regardless of the question being asked. Despite 
these potential criticisms, self-report continues to offer both practical and conceptual 
advantages to researchers and is considered the most common tool in social and 
behavioural sciences research (Harrison, McLaughlin & Coalter, 1996). 
In the experiments that examined differences in anxiety ratings between high 
and low pressure trials, perceived anxiety intensity was measured using the CSAI2-
R to record perceived anxiety intensity. Although this provided consequential 
information, it must be recognized that an insight into the frequency of experiences 
of anxiety may have enhanced the findings. It has been suggested that both 
frequency and intensity of responses should be viewed as independent dimensions, 
each contributing to the development of affective states (Hanton, Mellalieu and Hall, 
2004). Considering this notion, a possible extension would be to examine 
differences in the proportion of time an individual experiences anxiety related 
symptoms between high and low reinvesters. 
7.6 Suggestion for Future Research 
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The findings of the current programme of research provide a basis for further 
investigation into the examination of choking in decision-making based tasks in 
sport. The development of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale showed 
promise in its ability to identify those individuals who are susceptible to disrupted 
decision-making under pressure. However, the process of establishing the scale as a 
valid and reliable tool is still in its infancy and must be examined further in order to 
fully ascertain its psychometric properties. 
Further investigation into the discriminant validity of the DSRS must be 
completed, considering both the original Reinvestment Scale and the Movement 
Specific Reinvestment Scale have been shown to discriminate stroke patients (Orrell 
et al., 2009) and Parkinson disease patients (Masters et al., 2007) from age matched 
controls. Such an examination may look to examine football players who have 
missed penalties under pressure, whereby we may hypothesize that those individuals 
who failed due to poor decision-making (e.g. selecting side of goal to shoot at) may 
score higher on the DSRS (especially the decision rumination factor). However, 
players who failed due to poor execution of the motor skill (e.g. blasting the ball 
over / ’scuffing’ the kick) may score higher on the Movement-Specific 
Reinvestment Scale. This line of investigation could also be applied beyond the 
sporting environment perhaps examining the discriminant validity of individuals 
with a history of poor decision-making (e.g. failed stockbrokers or convicted felons). 
As highlighted earlier, the complex, dynamic and multidimensional nature of 
sport provides an excellent domain within which to examine decision-making. 
Investigations into those situations in sport, in which performance relies solely on an 
individual’s ability to make the right decision, would provide a particularly fertile 
research area to further examine the role of conscious control and ruminative 
153 
 
thoughts on choking in decision-making. Umpiring or refereeing provide a unique 
context in which match officials are required to make subjective judgments, based 
on guidelines that are often open to interpretation and are habitually subjected to 
intense scrutiny. Indeed, future research should look to expand on Poolton, Chan and 
Masters (under review) recent investigation, which showed a tendency to ruminate 
upon poor decisions was associated with football referees making a disproportionate 
amount of decisions in favor of the home team. Another example of a context 
displaying interesting characteristics relates to tactical decisions made by coaches 
under temporal pressure. The time-out in basketball often places coaches into an 
environment where tactical decisions, based on a number of contributing factors 
must be made in a short period of time. 
Experiments three and four provide a good basis for further research. The 
findings highlight the role of complexity as being critical in examining susceptibility 
to choking. However, as highlighted earlier, the current investigation does not 
consider the additional attentional load that accompanies the natural response to this 
task in the form of a complex motor skill. Findings from Poolton, et al., (2006) and 
Masters, et al., (2008) indicate the potential scope for examining performances 
which require athletes to meet the demands of decision-making tasks and the 
concurrent execution of complex motor responses. A more ecologically valid 
measure of the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale would be to utilise such tasks 
(concurrent decision making and complex motor response) and methods of analysis 
(accuracy and movement mechanics), and would also provide an insight into the 
effect rumination has on movement execution. 
Another line of future research would be to address the limitations 
surrounding the environment within which these experiments are explored. A large 
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majority of the choking research is undertaken in a laboratory based setting with 
very few examining this phenomenon in real-world settings (Jordet, 2009). One of 
the main reasons is the ease with which pressure can be ethically manipulated and 
measured in a controlled laboratory setting. The purpose of laboratory-based 
investigations is to provide insight in to the real world; however Beilock and Gray 
(2007) highlight conflict in comparisons between the two environments. They 
suggest that lab based settings may exaggerate the frequency with which the 
phenomenon is observed in the real world due to the novelty of the experience, 
whilst countering with the implication that the types of pressure observed in lab-
based settings are magnified in real world settings causing a greater frequency of 
occurrence in the latter environment. Future research could follow the work of Wills 
and Kinrade (2010) who examined the role of movement-specific and decision-
specific reinvestment in choking in netball using actual game performance measures. 
Here, fifteen female university netball players’ performances were followed across a 
season with video-based performance statistics (passing accuracy and interceptions) 
analyzed for the three highest and three lowest pressure games. They found a strong 
relationship between passing accuracy performance change and Decision-Specific 
Reinvestment Scale scores and its subscales, but no relationships for Movement-
Specific Reinvestment Scale scores. This suggests DSRS was better at predicting 
skill failure in passing which relies on two elements for successful performance: 
making the correct decision as to who and when to pass the ball, and then executing 
the motor skill effectively.  Given the multi-faceted nature of skills required in many 
sports, research using both the movement-specific and decision-specific 
reinvestment scales has the potential to provide the most complete assessment of 
habitual tendencies that make individuals susceptible to skill failure under pressure. 
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Future research should look to utilise match analysis techniques that address 
common criticisms of laboratory based research that highlight a failure to link 
findings with practice.  Specifically, these techniques enable researchers and coaches 
to assess performance in an environment where ‘real’ pressure is experienced rather 
than the simulated pressure often observed in laboratory based experiments. Further, 
ecological validity is enhanced by examining decision-making and motor actions 
concurrently rather than isolating either component. 
7.7 Conclusion 
The present research examined the choking phenomenon in cognitive based 
tasks. More specifically, it looked to identify the role reinvestment plays in skill 
failure under pressure on tasks other than proceduralised motor skills. Overall, 
support was found for the hypothesis that Reinvestment is detrimental to 
performance under pressure; however it is suggested that it is not the only process to 
disrupt performance. Initial findings from the first experiment suggested a tendency 
to reinvest was associated with skill failure under pressure in both cognitive and 
motor tasks, especially those that place significant demands on working memory; 
thus lending support to the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters et al., 1993). 
However, interpretation of these findings was clouded due to the lack of face 
validity with the original Reinvestment score, suggesting that several items are more 
closely associated with distraction. The development of a Decision-Specific 
Reinvestment Scale in Experiment 2 provided similar conclusions. The factor 
structure of the proposed scale reflected the importance of conscious control 
tendencies whilst also implicating the role of ruminative thoughts. Findings from 
subsequent investigations into choking in sport specific decision-making tasks based 
on perceptual judgment skills, lend support to the predictive validity of the scale, 
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suggesting it proved to be a better predictor of skill failure under pressure on these 
tasks than the original Reinvestment Scale, however similar to Masters et al., (1993) 
choking was only observed in tasks of greater complexity. Whilst the study fails to 
provide definitive evidence to support one of the main attentional theories of 
choking, namely distraction and self-focus, Masters and Maxwell’s (2004) concept 
of a working memory based explanation and Mullen & Hardy (2000) attentional 
threshold hypothesis do offer suitable explanations to the results presented here. 
Both highlight the detrimental effect to performance of engaging in behaviors that 
consume working memory, such as conscious control and ruminative thought. 
However as suggested, research into the precise mechanisms underpinning skill 
failure in decision-making tasks and examinations of the predictive validity of the 
DSRS are still in their infancy and much more research is required to establish its 
usefulness as a psychometric tool. It is hoped that the research presented herein 
provides the basis for further investigation into the disrupted decision-making 
observed in high pressure situations. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
DECLARATION OF INFORMED CONSENT 
I give my informed consent to participate in this study, which examines 
psychological aspects of sport participation.  I consent to publication of study results 
as long as the information is anonymous and disguised so that I cannot be identified.  
I further understand that although a record will be kept of my having participated in 
the study, all experimental data collected from my participation will be identified by 
number only. 
 
1) I have been informed that my participation in this study will involve me filling 
in a series of questionnaires that examine psychological aspects of sport. * 
 
2) I have been informed that there are no known discomforts or risks involved in 
my participation in this study 
 
3) I have been informed that there are no “disguised” procedures in this study.  
All procedures can be taken at face value. 
 
4) I have been informed that the investigator will gladly answer any questions 
regarding the procedures or purpose of this study when the questionnaires have 
been completed and returned. 
 
5) I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time 
without any kind of penalty. 
 
Experimenter: 
Noel Kinrade 
 
Participant’s signature    Date: 
___________________    ____________________ 
For further information please contact on: noel.kinrade@brunel.ac.uk 
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*Note: Slight wording changes were made to better describe the demands of each 
experiment 
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Appendix B 
Reinvestment Scale 
Please answer the following questions about yourself by circling the appropriate 
number. For each of the statements, indicate how much each statement is like you by 
using the following scale: 
Extremely 
Uncharacteristic 
Un      
Characteristic 
Neutral Characteristic Extremely 
Characteristic 
0 1 2 3 4 
Please be as honest as you can throughout, and try not to let your responses to one 
question influence your response to other questions. There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
1 I’m always trying to figure myself out 0 1 2 3 4 
2 I’m concerned about my style of doing things 0 1 2 3 4 
3 I remember things that upset me or make me angry for a long 
time afterwards 
0 1 2 3 4 
4 I get ‘worked up’ just thinking about things that have upset 
me in the past 
0 1 2 3 4 
5 I reflect about myself a lot 0 1 2 3 4 
6 I’m concerned about the way I present myself 0 1 2 3 4 
7 I often find myself thinking over and over about things that 
have made me angry 
0 1 2 3 4 
8 I think about ways of getting back at people who have made 
me angry long after the event has happened 
0 1 2 3 4 
9 I’m self-conscious about the way I look 0 1 2 3 4 
10 I never forget people making me angry or upset, even about 
small things 
0 1 2 3 4 
11 When I am reminded of my past failures, I feel as if they are 
happening all over again 
0 1 2 3 4 
12 I usually worry about making a good impression 0 1 2 3 4 
13 I’m constantly examining my motives 0 1 2 3 4 
14 I worry less about the future than most people I know 0 1 2 3 4 
15 One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in 
the mirror 
0 1 2 3 4 
16 I sometimes have the feeling that I’m off somewhere watching 
myself 
0 1 2 3 4 
17 I’m concerned about what other people think of me 0 1 2 3 4 
18 I’m alert to changes in my mood 0 1 2 3 4 
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19 I’m aware of the way my mind works when I work through a 
problem 
0 1 2 3 4 
20 I have trouble making up my mind 0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix C 
Reinvestment Scale Score Sheet 
Master, R. S. W., Polman, R. C. J., & Hammond, N. V. (1993). Reinvestment: A 
dimension of personality implicated in skill breakdown under pressure. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 14, 655-666. 
 
Private Self-Consciousness (PrSC) 
  Add items  1, 5, 13, 16, 18, and 19 
 
Public Self-consciousness (PuSC)  
  Add items  2, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 17 
 
Rehearsal (RH) 
  Add items  3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 14 
  Item 14 is reverse scored (i.e. 0 = 4, 0 = 1) 
 
Cognitive Failure (CF) 
  Add items  20 
 
The score for each factor of the RS is calculated by adding the scores of the 
items in each factor together. To get a total reinvestment score add all items together 
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Appendix D 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Please complete the following set of questions as accurately as possible. 
 
Full name  
 
Age Years:                       
 
 
 
Ethnic origin (please circle)  
White-
UK/Irish 
 
Black-
Caribbean 
 
Black-
African 
 
Indian 
 
Pakistani 
 
Bangladeshi 
 
Chinese 
 
Mixed race 
 
White 
European 
 
White-Other 
 
Asian-Other 
 
Other ethnic 
group 
(If Other, 
please specify) 
 
_________________________
________ 
 
At what level do you currently play? 
(please circle) 
 
Recreational 
 
Club 
 
County 
 
 
Regional 
 
 
National 
 
International 
    
At what age did you start playing? Years:                                           
 
  
How long have you been playing at 
your current level? 
Years:                                          Months: 
  
All information provided will remain completely confidential.  
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Appendix E 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory- 2 Revised 
A n umber o f s tatements t hat at hletes h ave u sed t o d escribe t heir f eelings b efore 
competition are given below. Read each statement and circle the appropriate number to 
indicate how you feel right now. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too 
much t ime on a ny one  s tatement, but  c hoose t he a nswer w hich be st describes your 
feelings right now. For each of the statements, indicate how much each statement is like 
you by using the following scale: 
 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately so Very Much so 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
1) I am concerned about this experiment 1 2 3 4  
2) I feel nervous 1 2 3 4  
3) I have self-doubts 1 2 3 4  
4) I feel jittery 1 2 3 4  
5) I am concerned that I may not do as well in this experiment 
as I could 
1 2 3 4  
6) My body feels tense 1 2 3 4  
7) I am concerned about losing 1 2 3 4  
8) I feel tense in my stomach 1 2 3 4  
9) I am concerned about choking under pressure 1 2 3 4  
10) My body feels relaxed 1 2 3 4  
11) I’m concerned about performing poorly 1 2 3 4  
12) My heart is racing 1 2 3 4  
13) I’m concerned about reaching my goal 1 2 3 4  
14) I feel my stomach sinking 1 2 3 4  
15) I’m concerned that others will be disappointed with my 
performance 
1 2 3 4  
16) My hands are clammy 1 2 3 4  
17) I’m concerned I won’t be able to concentrate 1 2 3 4  
18) My body feels tight 1 2 3 4  
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Appendix F 
Reinvestment Scale Modified Items for Scale Construction 
Please answer the following questions about yourself by circling the appropriate number. 
For each of the statements, indicate how much each statement is like you by using the 
following scale: 
 
Extremely 
Uncharacteristic 
Uncharacteristic Neutral Characteristic Extremely 
Characteristic 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Try to think of situations in which you have to make decisions. Please be as honest as you 
can throughout, and try not to let your responses to one question influence your response to 
other questions. There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
1 I’m always trying to figure out how I make decisions. 0 1 2 3 4 
   
2 I’m concerned about my style of decision making. 0 1 2 3 4 
   
3 I remember poor decisions I make for a long time 
afterwards. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
4 I reflect about decisions I have made a lot. 0 1 2 3 4 
   
5 I’m concerned about the way I make decisions. 0 1 2 3 4 
   
6 I’m constantly examining the reasons for my decisions. 0 1 2 3 4 
   
7 I get "worked up" just thinking about poor decisions I have 
made in the past. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
8 I sometimes have the feeling that I’m observing my 
decision-making process. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
9 I often find myself thinking over and over about poor 
decisions that I have made in the past. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
10 I’m self-conscious about making decisions. 0 1 2 3 4 
   
11 I think about better decisions I could have made long after 
the event has happened. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
12 I am alert to changes in how much thought I give to my 
decisions. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
13 I worry about whether my decision-making makes a good 
impression. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
14 I’m aware of the way my mind works when I make a 
decision. 
0 1 2 3 4 
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15 I rarely forget the times when I have made a bad decision, 
even about the minor things. 
0 1 2 3 4 
       
16 One of the last things I do before making a decision is re-
check all of the facts. 
0 1 2 3 4 
       
17 When I am reminded about poor decisions I have made in 
the past, I feel as if they are happening all over again. 
0 1 2 3 4 
       
18 I’m concerned about what other people think of the 
decisions I make. 
0 1 2 3 4 
       
19 I have trouble making up my mind. 0 1 2 3 4 
       
20 I always try and weigh up all the different factors when 
making decisions. 
0 1 2 3 4 
       
21 I worry less about future decisions I may have to make than 
most people I know. 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix G 
Factor Loadings for the 3 Factor Solution  
 
 
Variable 
Factors 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
DMS Question 1  .78  
DMS Question 2  .64  
DMS Question 3 .72   
DMS Question 5 .35 .61  
DMS Question 6 .31 .74  
DMS Question 7 .80   
DMS Question 8  .71  
DMS Question 9 .81   
DMS Question 10  .37 .68 
DMS Question 11 .75   
DMS Question 12  .69  
DMS Question 13   .68 
DMS Question 14  .71  
DMS Question 15 .75   
DMS Question 17 .66   
DMS Question 18 .38  .65 
DMS Question 19   .71 
*Factor loadings below 0.50 or cross loading above .40 are excluded 
191 
 
Appendix H 
Factor Loadings for the 4 Factor Solution  
 
Variable 
Factors 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
DMS Question 1  .77   
DMS Question 2  .65   
DMS Question 3 .72    
DMS Question 5 .36 .63   
DMS Question 6 .33 .74   
DMS Question 7 .81    
DMS Question 8  .72   
DMS Question 9 .82    
DMS Question 11 .75    
DMS Question 12  .70   
DMS Question 13  .32 .71  
DMS Question 14  .68   
DMS Question 15 .76    
DMS Question 16    .79 
DMS Question 17 .66    
DMS Question 18 .37  .70  
DMS Question 19   .65 .32 
DMS Question 20    .62 
*Factor loadings below 0.50 or cross loading above .40 are excluded 
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Appendix I 
The Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale 
Please answer the following questions about yourself by circling the appropriate number. 
For each of the statements, indicate how much each statement is like you by using the 
following scale: 
 
Extremely 
Uncharacteristic 
Uncharacteristic Neutral Characteristic Extremely 
Characteristic 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Try to think of situations in which you have to make decisions. Please be as honest as you 
can throughout, and try not to let your responses to one question influence your response to 
other questions. There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
1 I’m always trying to figure out how I make decisions. 0 1 2 3 4 
   
2 I’m concerned about my style of decision making. 0 1 2 3 4 
   
3 I remember poor decisions I make for a long time 
afterwards. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
4 I’m constantly examining the reasons for my decisions. 0 1 2 3 4 
   
5 I get "worked up" just thinking about poor decisions I have 
made in the past. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
6 I sometimes have the feeling that I’m observing my 
decision-making process. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
7 I often find myself thinking over and over about poor 
decisions that I have made in the past. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
8 I think about better decisions I could have made long after 
the event has happened. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
9 I am alert to changes in how much thought I give to my 
decisions. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
10 I’m aware of the way my mind works when I make a 
decision. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   
11 I rarely forget the times when I have made a bad decision, 
even about the minor things. 
0 1 2 3 4 
       
12 When I am reminded about poor decisions I have made in 
the past, I feel as if they are happening all over again. 
0 1 2 3 4 
       
13 I’m concerned about what other people think of the 
decisions I make. 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix J 
Explicit Rule Use Questionnaire 
Please write down any rules or information you used in order to judge where the shuttle will 
land. For each rule/information, indicate its importance for judging shuttle direction using 
the following scale*: 
Unimportant Of Little 
Importance 
Moderately 
Important 
Important Very Important 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Please also indicate which trials you used this information the most:  
 More on trials 
without camera 
More on trials 
with camera 
No Difference  
1 2 3 
 Please be as honest as you can throughout. There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
1  Importance 0 1 2 3 4 
 Information Use 1  2  3 
  
2  Importance 0 1 2 3 4 
 Information Use 1  2  3 
  
3  Importance 0 1 2 3 4 
 Information Use 1  2  3 
   
4  Importance 0 1 2 3 4 
 Information Use 1  2  3 
   
5  Importance 0 1 2 3 4 
 Information Use 1  2  3 
   
6  Importance 0 1 2 3 4 
 Information Use 1  2  3 
   
7  Importance 0 1 2 3 4 
 Information Use 1  2  3 
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*Note: Slight wording changes were made to better describe the demands of each 
experiment 
Appendix K 
Pressure Manipulation Check 
Block 1 
How much pressure did you feel that you were under during the trials you have just 
completed? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No 
pressure 
     Extreme 
pressure 
 
 
Block 2 
How much pressure did you feel that you were under during the trials you have just 
completed? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No 
pressure 
     Extreme 
pressure 
 
 
Block 3 
How much pressure did you feel that you were under during the trials you have just 
completed? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No 
pressure 
     Extreme 
pressure 
 
 
In which trials did you feel you were under the most pressure? 
  
 More on trials without camera More on trials with camera No Difference  
1 2 3 
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